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 This project adopts an interdisciplinary lens grounded in the transnational 
analytics of Ethnic Studies, Asian American Studies, and Asian Studies to better 
understand the formation of North Korea as a political and cultural construct within a 
U.S.-based context. This project analyzes a collection of texts such as: congressional 
hearings, documentaries, archival materials, non-fiction material, and comedy to draw out 
 xi    
the larger common sense that portrays North Korea as an unstable, rogue nation. I argue 
that this common sense establishes North Korea as being “interiorly different” which 
adds ideological difference as another measure of racial difference. The goal of this 
dissertation is to outline the ways in which the interiorized difference of North Korea has 
been used to fulfill the imperatives of different political projects such as: American 
militarism, global humanitarianism, and the global American Left. As such, this project 
explicates how North Korea has become a malleable construction that has been shaped in 
different ways within American political and cultural discourse.  
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Introduction 
 
On November 17, 2011, President Barack Obama addressed the Australian 
Parliament to detail the objectives of the pivot towards the Asia Pacific, an endeavor that 
counts on Australia as an ally. Obama explained that since the threats of Iraq and 
Afghanistan have waned, the U.S. will “pivot” from these areas to focus on the “vast 
potential” of the Asia Pacific.1 Obama portrayed the United States as a “Pacific nation,” 
citing the role that Asian immigrants’ labor has played in building the United States, and 
weaved a narrative of violence, sacrifice, and a prosperous future ahead: “…from the rice 
paddies of Southeast Asia to a cold Korean Peninsula, generations of Americans have 
served here, and died here—so democracies could take root; so economic miracles could 
lift hundreds of millions to prosperity.”2 While Asia Pacific is marked by the “future” it 
has to offer in terms of economic prosperity, global security, and human rights, Korea 
remains behind, stuck in the “cold.”  
The United States has made efforts to bring Korea out of the “cold.” In 2015, on 
the 70th anniversary of the Korean War, Charles Rangel (D-NY) introduced “House 
Resolution 384: Calling for a formal end to the Korean War” into Congress, which he 
wrote and sponsored with John Conyers (D-MI) and Sam Johnson (R-TX). The 
resolution explains that even though the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, the 
Korean War “…remains one of the world’s longest ongoing armed conflicts” that has 
claimed the lives of so many and has involved not only the Korean Peninsula but also the 
                                                      
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament” (speech, Canberra, 
Australia, November 17, 2011) Obama White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.  
2 Ibid.  
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United States.3 If the resolution passes, it would be celebrated as tribute to those who 
fought in the war, who fell victim to its violence, and who were separated from their 
families. Rangel wanted the resolution to push the global community to pursue an image 
of a unified Korea and to support efforts “…to promote international peace, security, 
denuclearization, economic prosperity, human rights, and the rule of law both on the 
Korean peninsula and elsewhere.”4 This vision of the Korean peninsula is driven by the 
neoliberal, imperial, and neocolonial aspirations of the U.S. in which its “unified Korea” 
paves way to a new era of U.S. global hegemony in Asia, as articulated through the Asia 
Pacific pivot. 
However, in this call to end the Korean War, the United States continues to 
escalate its war against North Korea through sanctions, public denouncements, and 
unrelenting undermining of its leadership—a persistence that is illustrative of the Cold 
War’s “protracted afterlife.”5 In Ends of Empire, Jodi Kim explains that in this protracted 
afterlife, the Cold War is not just an historical period but also an “epistemology and 
production of knowledge, and as such it exceeds and outlives its historical eventness.”6 
For instance, when North Korea was named a member of the “axis evil” in President 
George Bush’s first State of the Union after 9/11 in 2002, this configuration was 
reminiscent of Reagan’s designation of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” during the 
Cold War.7 In this current iteration, North Korea is accused of prioritizing the 
                                                      
3 U.S Congress, Calling for a formal end of the Korean War, 114th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2015) 1.  
4 Ibid, 1.  
5 Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis, Minnesota 
University Press, 2010) 3.  
6 Ibid, 3-4. 
7 Ibid, 4.  
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction over its starving citizenry—an accusation 
that melded militarism and human rights together—a dialectical formation that frames the 
current American campaign against North Korea. This project explores how this 
dialectical formation is grounded in the perceived interiorized difference of North 
Korea—a construction that relies on conflicting ideological dispositions to express racial 
difference. This dissertation asks the following questions: How is the interiorized 
difference of North Korea being used to sustain and escalate American militarism in 
Korea? How is the interiorized difference of North Korea being used to support the 
purported benevolence of American humanitarianism?  
This project embraces the Cold War as a “hermeneutic” to decipher North 
Korea’s place in the War on Terror —a placement that renews U.S. efforts to finally end 
and claim victory in the Korean War.8 This project does not consider North Korea as a 
formation of the War on Terror but as a residual of the Cold War that has been 
reanimated in the global campaign against terror. I argue that the War on Terror allows 
for the continued forgetting of the Korean War by portraying North Korea as a current 
terrorist threat as opposed to a Cold War enemy produced by the United States.  
 Additionally, I engage with the dialectical formation of militarism and 
humanitarianism to illustrate how the U.S. vilification of North Korea masks its own 
culpability in the Korean peninsula. In particular, I critically examine the activities of the 
North Korean human rights project—a collection of activists, elected officials, 
legislators, scholars, non-profit personnel, and researchers—that promote regime change 
in and/or collapse of North Korea due to the alleged brutality of its leadership towards the 
                                                      
8 Ibid, 3.  
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North Korean people.9 This collective do not officially coordinate their activities together 
but their work overlap and intersect because of their shared goal of collapse/regime 
change. I argue that this movement has been central in positioning the United States as 
the key actor in the toppling the North Korean regime—an objective that would grant a 
final victory to the United States in the Korean War.  
Key Literature  
A majority of academic scholarship on North Korea is “still dominated by the 
Cold War—driven area studies model, which aggressively prioritizes security-related 
works.”10 In Toward a Better Understanding of North Korea, Sonia Ryang describes that 
the scholarship on North Korea is filled with speculations, forecasting, and predictions 
about what North Korea “might or might not do in certain given situations”—scenarios 
that have found more traction in the post 9/11 moment.11 She argues that since the United 
States is technically not at war with North Korea, this academic discourse escalates the 
tensions of war between the two countries.12 The nature of this scholarship is illustrative 
of how area studies has contributed to the interests of the U.S nation-state. In Learning 
Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies, H.D. Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi explain 
that in the post-World War II era, the original objective of area studies was to collect and 
deliver information about rival nations; however, the field shifted its focus to investigate 
areas of the world that were “considered vital to the interests of the United States in the 
                                                      
9 I attribute this definition to the work of Christine Hong.  
10 Sonia Ryang, “Introduction: North Korea: Going Beyond Security and Enemy Rhetoric,” in Toward a 
Better Understanding of North Korea, ed. Sonia Ryang (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009) 2.  
11 Ibid, 2.  
12 Ibid.  
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Cold War.”13 In response, a growing conversation has emerged among scholars in the 
field of Critical Asian Studies to redirect attention to how the histories of American 
militarism, colonialism, and imperialism have shaped U.S. engagement with North 
Korea.  
In December 2013, Critical Asian Studies released a special two-part issue on the 
North Korean human rights movement that offered a “critical reflection on the dominant 
discursive frame of North Korean human rights as a modality of asymmetrical power.”14 
The objective of the special issue was to bring attention to the histories, knowledge, and 
figures that have remained in “the shadows of the North Korean human rights project.”15 
Christine Hong, the editor of the issue, explains that the objective of the collection was to 
underscore the polemical limitations of this humanitarian venture by highlighting its  
…amnestic posture toward imperial violence; a lethal politicized agenda 
gussied up as a moral mission; a geopolitical language and structure of 
post 9/11 U.S. unilateralism; and an ideological mode of perception, 
conversion, subject-formation, and historiography. Working beyond these 
limitations, a number of the essays in this issue inquire into modes of 
understanding and engaging North Korea in addition to human rights 
practices that have been sidelined by the dominant, regime-change-
oriented North Korean human rights project.16  
 
In particular, Hong argues that the North Korean human rights movement creates a 
historiography that expunges the history of the violence of American militarism and 
imperialism in North Korea. During the Korean War, the United States launched a three-
year long aerial campaign against North Korea that destroyed parts of its infrastructure, 
                                                      
13 H.D Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi, “Introduction: The ‘Afterlife of Area Studies,” in Learning 
Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies, eds. Masao Miyoshi and Harry Harootunian (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002) 2.  
14 Christine Hong, “Introduction: Reframing North Korean Human Rights,” Critical Asian Studies 45 
(2013) 526.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
6 
 
 
including the irrigation systems that supplied water for 75% of the country’s food 
production.17 It was also the first time that the United States had used napalm; in other 
words, North Korea became the testing ground for a weapon that would be used to bring 
death and destruction in the subsequent proxy wars of the Cold War. Korean Historian, 
Bruce Cummings estimates that two million civilians perished during the Korean War. 
Afterward the armistice, the United States would impose economic sanctions that sought 
to isolate North Korea from the global economy. The United States banned all exports to 
North Korea; similar sanctions have continued in varying degrees till this day. In the 
1990’s, the U.S. applied sanctions on North Korea with the purpose of forcing its leaders 
to cease their production of nuclear technology and weapons.18 As I will illustrate in the 
first two chapters, these histories of military violence and economic sanctions have not 
been acknowledged within the various segments of the North Korean human rights 
project. Instead, as Hong argues, this humanitarian venture embraces the convenience of 
the present in which a “human rights critique amnestically wipes the slate clean.”19 In 
other words, a human rights critique pushes aside the history of American militarism and 
instead chooses to focus on the presence of human rights violations The convenience of 
the present enables the United States to portray North Korea’s proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction as the efforts of a delusional dictator trying to spread terror as 
opposed to a sovereign country attempting to defend itself against a superpower that has 
repeatedly threatened its livelihood.  
                                                      
17 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York City: W.W Norton & 
Company) 296.  
18 Haeyoung Kim, “Stifled Growth and Added Suffering: Tensions Inherent in Sanctions Policies Against 
North Korea,” Critical Asian Studies (2004) 91. 
19 Christine Hong, “Introduction: Reframing North Korean Human Rights,” Critical Asian Studies 45 
(2013) 515.  
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Contributions: Ethnic Studies & Transnational Asian American Studies  
Ethnic Studies 
 I contribute to the work of Christine Hong, Sonia Ryang, and other concerned 
scholars of Asian Studies by considering U.S and North Korean relations through an 
Ethnic Studies and Transnational Asian American Studies perspective.  In order to do so, 
I argue that we must first understand how North Korea has been racialized based on their 
“ideological difference.” In Humanitarian Violence, Neda Atanasoski explains that 
“spaces of atrocity” like North Korea have become degraded as anachronistic and an 
illiberal system of governance that works against the modernizing efforts of the West to 
maintain global geographies of “freedom,” as articulated by the politics of the “axis of 
evil.”20 As such, the basis of difference is not only grounded in racial/biological 
distinctions but ideological dispositions as well, otherwise known as the “interior 
difference of belief.”21 Applying Atanasoski’s framework, my dissertation focuses on 
how the construction of North Korea’s interiorized difference or its “illiberal mode of 
governance” serves to distance North Korea from Western modernity, thus justifying the 
clamor for its collapse.22 Also, what is central to this construction of North Korea’s 
interiorized difference is the alliance between South Korea and the United States—an 
alliance that has allowed the United States to advance its role of liberator of Korea.  
North Korea and South Korea have been central to America’s image as an agent 
of liberation in diverging but complementary ways. To better contextualize this 
connection to Atanasoski’s work, we need to look at the alliance between the United 
                                                      
20 Neda Atanasoski, Humanitarian Violence: The U.S. Deployment of Diversity (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2013) 7.   
21 Ibid, 6. 
22 Ibid.  
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States and South Korea; and how this relationship has contributed and sustained North 
Korea’s interiorized difference. If we understand interiorized difference to be about how 
ideological beliefs are used to differentiate and categorize actors like nation-states—how 
is “visible difference” managed and balanced by perceived ideological similarity? In 
Service Economies, Jin Kyung Lee explains that the postwar economic development and 
“miracle” that South Korea experienced turned the nation into a “…model minority in the 
broader context of the United States’ neocolonial ‘under-development and 
impoverishment’ of countries in Latin America and Africa.”23 As the success story of 
neocolonial American tutelage, South Korea’s visible difference is harnessed as an asset 
because it contributes to the image of the U.S. as a transformative force in the global 
community. I bring this context into conversation to reveal the ways in which the 
construction of racial difference can shift and align itself with specific imperial and 
neocolonial formations. In the case of South and North Korea, visible difference becomes 
a secondary concern to interiorized difference because difference of belief can be 
corrected with tutelage. I argue that by conceptualizing North Korea as being interiorly 
different provides an entryway for Ethnic Studies scholars to consider how “rogue” 
countries like North Korea constitute a viable site to understand how race is being 
constructed within the larger frame of geopolitics. As the current presidential 
administration continues to exclude immigrant and refugee populations based on their 
religious difference, the concept of interiorized difference is an important lens to 
understand how the global racial order is being constituted in a multitude of ways to 
                                                      
23 Jin-Kyung Lee, Service Economies: Militarism, Sex Work, and Migrant Labor in South Korea 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) 29-30.  
9 
 
 
sustain global American hegemony.24 Of course, the concept of interiorized difference 
does not set aside biological and physiological difference as a marker of racial difference 
but instead adds another strand to our complex understanding of race and racialization.  
Transnational Asian American Studies  
 Another contribution of this project is to bring North Korea into the field of Asian 
American Studies. Instead of framing Asian American Studies as a field that considers 
only the lives of Asian Americans within the domestic boundaries of the United States, a 
transnational approach allows for scholars to articulate how the formation and the 
racialization of Asian Americans is directly linked to the current ventures and residuals of 
the American empire.25 I begin this exploration of these material linkages through the 
different figures that have emerged from the Korean War.  
The figures of the Korean War reveal how the unevenness of power and violence 
was used to solidify certain racial gendered formations and dynamics. In Sex Among 
Allies, Katherine H. Moon explores how the sexual exploitation of tens of thousands of 
Korean women by U.S. soldiers was a “necessary evil” to ensure that the U.S. military 
remained in South Korea.26  As such, prostitutes who worked and lived in military camp 
towns have been largely ignored by South Korean society because they are the “…living 
testaments of Korea’s geographical and political division into North and South and of the 
South’s military insecurity and the consequent dependence on the United States.”27 
However, in the case of adoptees, adoptees were figured as “…objects of humanitarian 
                                                      
24 By current presidential administration, at this time, is the Trump Administration.  
25 Yen Le Espiritu, Home Bound: Filipino American Lives across Cultures, Communities, and Countries 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2003) 8.   
26 Katherine H. Moon, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S-Korea Relations (New York City: 
Columbia University Press, 1997) 9.  
27 Ibid. 
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concern and became major beneficiaries of overseas charity following the war.”28 In 
Adopted Territory, Elena Kim explains that adoptees were instrumental to “…American 
postwar communist containment policy that sought to use humanitarian aid as a means of 
building good will among the Korean people.”29 Kim argues that the narrative of 
intercountry adoptions wavers between exploitation and humanitarianism, whereby some 
American servicemen played a paternalistic role as the key sources of support for 
orphanages in Korea that received donations from the concerned in the U.S. and others 
are known to have abandoned their own interracial children who had been illegitimately 
conceived. These uneven power dynamics are also found in the marriages between 
American servicemen and Korean women as explored in Ji-Yeon Yuh’s Beyond the 
Shadow of Camptown. Yuh explains that the gendered positioning of Korea as the 
“feminine order” in need of protection by the “masculine superiority” of the United 
States was a “…major factor in the skewed gender profile of intermarriages between 
Koreans and Americans, the overwhelming majority of which are between American men 
and Korean women.”30 While the relationship between South Korea and the United States 
during the Korean War determined the formation of these figures within the context of 
war, these racial and gendered formations would also follow those who choose to leave 
South Korea for the United States.  
For instance, during the Korean War, sexual encounters between American 
soldiers and Korean women resulted in marriages and the subsequent migration of 
                                                      
28 Eleana J. Kim, Adopted Territory: Transnational Korean Adoptees and the Politics (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010) 48. 
29 Ibid, 48.  
30 Ji-Yeon Yuh, Beyond the Shadow of Camptown: Korean Military Brides in America (New York City: 
NYU Press, 2002) 10. 
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Korean women to the United States. The War Brides Act of 1945 allowed American 
soldiers to bring their Korean wives to the United States on the basis of family 
reunification.31 In Haunting the Korean Diaspora, Grace Cho explains that sociologists 
believed that these marriages between Korean women and white men were a “social fact 
of assimilation.”32 As such, this marker of assimilation or “honorary whiteness” is a 
“facet of the American fantasy, the larger fantasy of how the United States imagines itself 
as a site of liberation and a nation of saviors…”33 Of course, this fantasy depends on the 
belief that someone or something needs to be saved. The manifestation of the role of the 
American savior in these marital unions is reflective of how the United States saw itself 
in relationship to South Korea. In other words, the spread of American benevolence had 
also reached the realms of American domesticity. Cho writes that war brides (or the 
yonggongju) are “heavily invested in the American dream, carrying the weight of a 
familial longing for America, yet at the same time, her ‘assimilation’ in the United States 
is contingent on her serving from the past…”34 I argue that the formation and the 
valorization of the North Korean refugee in the American political and cultural landscape 
is also dependent on a similar forgetting of the violence of the Korean War. The North 
Korean refugee crisis is constantly framed as a result of the brutality (or interiorized 
difference) of North Korean dictatorship as opposed to the longer history of American 
sanctions, embargos, and the denial of food aid. This forgetting allows the United States 
                                                      
31 Jaidep Singh “War Brides Act of 1945,” Asian American History and Culture: An Encyclopedia, edited 
by Huping Ling and Allan W. Austin (New York City: Routledge, 2015) 90. 
32 Grace M. Cho, Haunting the Korean Diaspora, 130.  
33 Ibid, 130-131.  
34 For Cho, the yanggongju is a general reference to Korean women that engaged in sexual relations and 
relationships with American soldiers. The yanggongju is a complicated figure whose sexual labor is 
simultaneously condemned (for playing into American subordination) and praised (for sustaining American 
interest in South Korea). Cho explains that the GI bride is one formation of the yanggongju. See Ibid, 32.  
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to shape North Korea and its relationship to the nation-state in ways that sustain 
American global hegemony. The figure of the North Korean refugee is central to this 
molding because of how the population is used to signify the brutality of North Korean 
leadership—a valorization that can be traced back to the beginning of the Cold War.  
The history of migration of refugees from the North and South reflected the 
politics of the Cold War, more specifically, how they were ideologically valorized during 
this era.  In “Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans 
in South Koreans,” Byung-Ho Chung chronicles the evolution of the migration of North 
Koreans to the South from 1945 to the present. After World War II, there was a large 
flow of Korean migrants to both South and North Korea, and migrants to each side were 
politicized by both nations. For North Korea, soldiers who returned represented “the 
undying ideological power of socialism” despite its economic problems.35 For South 
Korea, North Korean refugees acknowledged the “absolute triumph of capitalism over 
communism.”36 By the end of the Korean War, it is estimated that 650,000 refugees had 
crossed to the South. Those who crossed the border had to prove that they were staunchly 
anticommunist in order to avoid political suspension and discrimination.37  Refugees from 
the North also had to strongly identify with Christianity in order to survive. Chung 
explains that refugees from the North “became synonymous with “Christians” and 
“anticommunists.”38 Like refugees in East Europe, North Koreans were “instruments of 
                                                      
35 Chung, Byung Ho. "Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South 
Korea," Korean Studies (2009): 5 
36 Ibid, 5. 
37Chung, Byung Ho. "Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South 
Korea," Korean Studies (2009): 6 
38 Ibid, 6.  
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the Cold War” and “increments of power and sources of espionage and information.”39 
Quite simply, they had become “important symbols in the ideological rivalry of the Cold 
War.”40 During the Cold War (1962-1993), the South Korean government generously 
compensated defectors who provided military secrets weapons across the armistice line. 
The financial rewards and special treatment that defectors received were granted through 
the “Special Relief Act for Patriots and Heroes to the State.”41 Grounded in Cold War 
politics, those who crossed the border were considered to be “openly rejecting the 
North,” which was touted as “an act of distinguished service to the state.”42 The defection 
of these North Koreans helped South Korea’s propaganda against North Korea and to 
“prove the superiority of the South Korean capitalist system.”43 However, the political 
valorization of North Korean refugees would begin to subside as the international 
community transitioned to a post-Communist era.   
After the collapse of the socialist bloc, North Korea had to endure the problems 
that the collapse exacted on the country’s economic and social systems. These conditions 
and the great famine of the 1990s led to the migration of North Korean citizens to other 
countries for employment and food. Between 1993 and 1997, there was an exponential 
growth of North Korean migration to the South. At this time, these refugees were treated 
as “economic refugees or people under social welfare,” instead of patriots as they were 
                                                      
39  Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001) 7. 
40 Ibid, 7. 
41 Chung, Byung Ho. "Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South 
Korea." Korean Studies (2009): 8.  
42 Ibid, 8. 
43 Ibid, 8. 
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previously.44 These changes in political recognition corresponded with the change in 
compensation for refugees, which was the result of a change in governmental oversight, 
and new legislation that was responsible for aiding North Koreans refugees. In 1993, the 
“Act to Protect North Korean Brethren Who Returned to the State” changed oversight 
from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Health and Welfare. This shift in 
governmental agencies signaled the loss of political value that the North Korean refugees 
once held for the South Korean government. 
 I include the history of North Korean refugees within South Korea to provide 
historical context but also to show how the specter of the Cold War hovered over the 
figure of the North Korean refugee, especially with its current configuration in the North 
Korean Human Rights project. In other words, Cold War logics were re-deployed in a 
seemingly different geopolitical context. Before 9/11, there were no legislative efforts to 
support the asylum of North Korean refugees; however, after 9/11, the language of 
human rights and the figure of the North Korean refugee began to emerge in legislative 
efforts, culminating in the proposed North Korea Democracy Bill of 2003.  Beside 
economic sanctions, this legislative proposal was significant in that it granted refugee 
status and settlement in the United States to North Korean refugees.45 The bill did not 
pass, but Bush signed the North Korean Human Rights Act into law in 2004, which has 
subsequently been re-authorized during the Obama administration.46  
                                                      
44 Ibid, 8.  
45 Chang, Semoon. “A Chronology of U.S. Sanctions Against North Korea,” Economic Sanctions Against a 
Nuclear North Korea: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Against Since 1950, edited 
by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2007) 49 
46 The object of the bill is to provide different resources to North Korea that promote “democracy” and also 
intends to assist North Korean refugees in gaining asylum. 
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 I historicize the emergence of the North Korean refugee in American geopolitics 
to provide a historically and culturally grounded interpretation of how the Korean War 
continues to persist via the current iteration of U.S. and North Korean relations. I employ 
the analytics of Transnational Asian American Studies to understand how the American 
empire has shaped the lives of Asian Americans. In this case, a significant portion of the 
“two million strong” Korean American community can be attributed to the displacement 
and forced migrations that occurred because of the Korean War.47 I argue that the 
celebration of the alleged socioeconomic success of Korean Americans provides the 
United States historical precedent for its intervention in North Korea. Of course, these 
humanitarian overtures are grounded in the forgetting of U.S. militarism and imperialism 
that allowed for the division of Korea and subsequent displacement of its people in the 
first place.  
In short, conceptualizing the North Korean refugee as a residual of the Korean 
War allows for this conflict to be revitalized with new stakes. In the case of the North 
Korean refugee, Sonia Ryang argues that when North Koreans are humanized, it is done 
to malign the North Korean leadership for their human rights violations.48 North Korean 
refugees are used to prove the brutality of North Korea and to justify the demand for its 
collapse, which illustrates the dialectical formation of militarism and humanitarianism 
that shapes the North Korean Human Rights movement. As such, I argue that American 
intervention on behalf of the North Korean refugee has revived the Korean War with new 
                                                      
47 Committee on International Relations, The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004: Issues and 
Implications, 109th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2005) 4. 
48 Sonia Ryang, “Introduction: North Korea: Going Beyond Security and Enemy Rhetoric,” 4.  
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stakes that bolster the United States as the eventual and rightful victor in the Korean War, 
erasing its role as the war’s key perpetrator.  
Methodological Approaches   
 This project adopts an interdisciplinary methodology that draws from a variety of 
cultural materials, including congressional hearings, legislative documents, public 
addresses, documentaries, films, and standup comedy. I focus on how these various 
materials work concurrently across their various sites to maintain the hegemonic 
construction of North Korea as an unstable nation-state that cannot be trusted and thus 
must be dismantled. I explicate the relationship that exists between cultural and political 
sphere as articulated in Melani McAlister’s Epic Encounters. McAlister proposes that 
foreign policy is a “meaning-making activity” in which the nation-state can define its 
borders, interests, or in the case of North Korea, its threats.49 In Re-imagining North 
Korea in International Politics, Shine Choi argues that foreign policy been central to 
solidifying North Korea as a “problem” based on how this mechanism establishes binary 
relationships such as “good/bad, civilized/barbaric, normal/abnormal, pure/impure, [and] 
masculine/feminine.”50 For instance, the North Korean Human Rights Act was enacted 
on the belief that North Korea was abusing its citizens—the support and passage of this 
legislation solidified North Korea’s otherness as a violent state. While the objective of the 
North Korean Human Rights Act was to provide asylum to North Koreans, the Act’s 
economic sanctions penalized North Korea for its continued proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. In 2016, the United Nations passed a resolution that would reduce North 
                                                      
49 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 5.  
50 Shine Choi, Re-imagining North Korea in International Politics: Problems and Alternatives (Routledge: 
New York City, 2015) 9.  
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Korea’s coal export, cutting its export revenue by 25 percent—a resolution that was 
drawn up by the United States.51 In other words, foreign polices like sanctions work to 
strangle the economies of rogue nation-states and ultimately, challenge their ability to 
support themselves.  
 As for the cultural sphere, McAlister explains that cultural texts do not simply 
illustrate the “preexisting social anxiety” but when placed within history, they can fulfill 
political objectives as well.52 In her work on the Middle East and the United States, 
McAlister argues that cultural products ideologically construct places as being 
“acceptable area[s] for the exercise of American power” and how these places can be 
used “as a stage for the production of American identities.”53 My project adopts 
McAlister’s approach by arguing that cultural texts have been central to solidifying North 
Korea as a brutal and barbaric nation-state that requires American intervention to hasten 
its collapse, which will then allow the United States to claim victory in Korea as a global 
leader in humanitarianism and security. Also, these cultural materials are grounded in the 
context of the current moment that embraces the conveniences of the present. While I 
bring together cultural and political texts to draw out this narrative, I approach these texts 
through a transnational framework that bridges Asian American studies, critical Asian 
studies, and American Studies and situate them within the history of U.S. empire in Asia 
to disrupt the present with the inconveniences of the past.  
 
                                                      
51 Dave Boyer, “U.N. hits North Korea with new round of sanctions over nuclear program,” Washington 
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Chapter Overview 
The first chapter catalogs the varying ways that the North Korean Human rights 
project has attempted to solidify and circulate the narrative of North Korea’s brutality 
within the American political and cultural sphere. It also examines how this narrative 
intersects with narratives of American benevolence and redemption, which renders the 
figure of the North Korean refugee compelling to a larger American audience. The goal 
of this chapter is to illustrate how the North Korean refugee has been used to build a 
common sense understanding of North Korea’s brutality for an American audience. I 
suggest that the common sense that surrounds North Korea reveals the ways in which 
North Korea has become a construction that lends itself to shaping and fulfilling different 
political projects and affiliations.  
 For the second chapter, I extend the transnational lens of the first chapter to 
explore how Korean Americans have been hailed to join the North Korean human rights 
project through the non-profit organization, Liberty in North Korea (LiNK). I explore 
how the narrative of the “socioeconomic success” of Korean Americans has been used as 
evidence of American benevolence in order to obligate community them to support North 
Korean refugees. As an American-based organization, LiNK provides young Korean 
Americans an opportunity to fulfill this obligation based on the language of universal 
human rights and ethnic affiliation. I examine how LiNK’s Korean American members 
have adopted the organization’s discourse of having a shared humanity with North 
Korean refugees, but have also emphasized their shared ethnicity and histories of 
division, war, and loss. As such, this ethnic-based affiliation provides Korean Americans 
the possibility of providing a different type of care that does not strictly adhere to the 
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polemics of universal human rights but that point to the lingering material and 
psychological violence of war that has been passed down through the generations of the 
Korean Diaspora. By including both North Korean refugees and Korean Americans in the 
same analytical frame, I explicate how these figures work together to produce a form of 
ideological and cultural labor that helps to erase U.S. imperial violence in the Korean 
peninsula. At the same time, this chapter also illuminates how young Korean Americans 
are (inexplicitly) exposing this very violence at the same time. As such, the common 
sense that sustains LiNK’s narrative of North Korea offers an opportunity for Korean 
Americans to explore their relationship to the Korean War and its aftermath.  
The next chapter reads Korean American comedienne Margaret Cho’s 
performances that center on North Korea: her impersonation of former North Korean 
leader, Kim Jung Il in the television show, 30 Rock, and her portrayal of a fictional army 
general at the 2015 Golden Globes. I explicate how the relationship between the United 
States and North Korea shapes these performances, but also how these forces work in 
concert with how Asian Americans are racialized as the perpetual “unassimilable alien.” 
In particular, I analyze how the legibility of these performances is grounded in North 
Korea’s refusal to assimilate to hegemonic standards of governance, similar to Asian 
American rejection of assimilation. I analyze these performances against the backdrop of 
the Sony hacking scandal in which North Korea was accused of leaking compromising 
materials in response to the studio’s release of The Interview, a comedic film that details 
the fictional assassination of North Korea’s current leader, Kim Jung Un. Although there 
was never any evidence to prove North Korea’s guilt, the United States saw this 
(unsubstantiated) provocation as tantamount to a declaration of a (cyber) war.  
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While the first three chapters deal with U.S. relations with North Korea in the 
current moment, the final chapter shifts back to the Cold War by focusing on the brief 
alliance between North Korea and the Black Panthers that was forged in the late 1960s to 
early 1970s. The objective of this chapter is to provide an alternative formation of North 
Korea that is grounded in an anti-U.S. imperial politic that united the young nation-state 
with radical groups like the Black Panthers. I look to the archival materials that were 
collected by the North Korea International Documentation Project, a collection that was 
sponsored by the Wilson Center. I end with this chapter to offer an alternative 
imagination of North Korea that does not align with its current hegemonic constructions 
in order to highlight how North Korea sought to challenge U.S. state violence through 
Third World politics. While this chapter is situated within a different historical time and 
context as the rest of dissertation, the key connection here is how the Black Panther Party 
looked to North Korea to pursue its own political goals. Instead of using North Korean 
brutality to justify the continuation of American militarism in Korea, the Black Panther 
Party looked to North Korea to bolster its radicalism.  
Conclusion 
 In Ends of Empire, Jodi Kim explains that the Korean War was the initial conflict 
that solidified the logics of the Cold War and determined how the United States would 
carry out its subsequent proxy wars and respond to the anticolonial movements that 
would emerge.54 Unresolved, the Korean War remains as a “Cold War epistemology in 
the making.”55 My project focuses on how the knowledge produced about North Korea (a 
                                                      
54 Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire, 150.  
55 Ibid, 34. 
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creation of the Korean War) has been deployed to attempt to resolve this decades-long 
conflict.  Since North Korea constitutes the “last remaining fault line of the Cold War,” 
my dissertation brings attention to how the United States has constructed North Korea as 
the site of the unfinished business of the Cold War.56 As a “Cold War remnant” North 
Korea has not been “solved” but has been “repressed” and forced to violently return in its 
designation as a member of the War on Terror’s “axis of evil.”57 This insertion of North 
Korea into this notorious triad sought to bring North Korea back onto the global stage for 
scrutiny, suspicion, and ridicule but through a different ideological and military 
campaign. In many ways, I argue that the United States has welcomed this return because 
this campaign allowed its leaders to claim a victory that has been so elusive all these 
years. The goal of this project has been to explicate the various strands of knowledge that 
allow for this possibility of American hegemony in Korea. In other words, this project 
has been concerned about how the Korean War has been reanimated through North Korea 
within the American cultural and political sphere. My work contributes to the growing 
conversation around North Korea that seek to adopt different theoretical, analytical, and 
interdisciplinary strategies to challenge the dominant academic discourse on North 
Korea—a discourse that welcomes war between the United States and North Korea.  
The objective of this dissertation is not to disprove the United States’ allegations 
about North Korea or to claim North Korea’s innocence. Rather, my goal has been to 
show how the United States has extracted ideological value from North Korea’s assumed 
brutality and terror to support the continuation of American militarism and imperialism in 
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Korea. In doing so, I seek to provide another venue to study North Korea outside of the 
realm of securitization, one that calls attention to the scope of the American empire in 
Korea. I argue that by using the interdisciplinary and transnational field of Asian 
American Studies, we can understand the current iteration of the Korean War via North 
Korea in the context of the brutality of the United States militarism and imperialism in 
Korea—a juxtaposition that is central to formulating a complex picture of U.S. and North 
Korean relations.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
“But we know their true nature”: Cataloguing the Common Sense of the North 
Korea human rights movement 
 
In his first State of the Union after the events of 9/11, President George W. Bush 
introduced the “axis of evil,” a label used to reference an alliance of nation-states that 
allegedly threatens the world with terrorism. Determined by the logics of Islamphobia, 
the axis included not only the usual suspects—Iran and Iraq—but also North Korea. 
President Bush reasoned that “some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since 
September the 11th.  But we know their true nature.  North Korea is a regime arming 
with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.”58Although 
there has been no direct provocation from North Korea prior to this speech, Bush still 
interpreted a “quiet” North Korea as an act of deception that necessitated constant 
suspicion, vigilance, and inspection from the United States.  
 In a 2009 Senate hearing, then Senator Sam Brownback similarly warned about 
the “evils” of North Korea:  
 
Perhaps all of the evils of Camp 22 and these other camps 
are fictions. If that is so, let Kim Jong Il open them to the 
eyes of the world. Let him refute me and all of us who 
believe that it is beneath our nation to collaborate with the 
evil of this depth.59 
 
Based on North Korean refugee testimonies, Camp 22 is known as a notorious North 
Korean prison where North Koreans are forced into hard labor, tortured, and killed. 
Brownback’s challenge to Kim Il Jung to disprove these accusations is framed by his 
absolute belief in the “depth” of North Korea’s evil—any possibility of uncertainty is 
                                                      
58 George W. Bush, State of the Union, (speech, Washington D.C., January 29, 2002) George W. Bush 
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bulldozed by Brownback’s certainty in North Korea’s brutality. Like Bush, Brownback 
remains confident in his beliefs about North Korea because of the perceived underlying 
“evil” of its “true nature.”  
In both cases, a racial logic that posits North Korea as an undisputed threat to the 
global community outweighs the lack of any actual evidence for these claims. Christine 
Hong rightly argues that the campaign against North Korea, more specifically, against its 
human right violations, has become evidentiary; it “generally passes as common sense.”60 
These passages reveal how there is a larger “common sense” around North Korea that 
dismisses any need for concrete evidence to prove its insidious behavior. Consequently, 
this common sense allows for easy condemnation of North Korea: “It is easy to condemn 
North Korea. What could be easier?”61 This chapter asks the following questions: Where 
does this common sense about North Korea emerge? What type of ideological labor does 
this “common sense” provide for the United States? What does this common sense erase 
in its formation and circulation?   
This chapter traces the common sense that surrounds North Korea via the plight 
of North Korean refugees—a population that enables the United States to easily condemn 
and punish North Korea for humanitarian reasons. In particular, I examine how this 
common sense has been developed through the North Korea human rights movement, 
which is a transnational humanitarian campaign that focuses on “exposing” North Korea 
through the testimonies of North Korean refugees articulated via a multitude of 
platforms: congressional hearings, documentaries, non-fiction literature, podcasts, and 
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social media.  I borrow the label “North Korea human rights movement” from Christine 
Hong, who describes the movement as a “human rights regime” that regards North Korea 
as a “temporal aberration—the fact of its perdurability an offense grievous enough for it 
to be yoked, along with Iraq and Iran, in a tripartite ‘axis of evil’ destined for 
eradication.”62 I examine how these materials work together to promote this objective or 
common sense. In Epic Encounters, Melani McAlister explains that framing knowledge 
as a form of common sense: 
focuses on the cultural work that happens at the messy intersections. We 
can begin to see how certain meanings can become naturalized by 
repetition, as well as the ways that different sets of texts, with their own 
interests and affiliations, come to overlap, to reinforce and revise one 
another toward an end that is neither entirely planned nor entirely 
coincidental.63  
 
 This chapter brings all these different texts together to illustrate how they work 
together in ways that are “entirely coincidental.” These materials are colluding by 
happenstance because each is invested in the use of state power and violence but does so 
through the language of humanitarianism. In this case, these materials overlap each other 
to collectively advocate for the collapse of North Korea. I argue that this overlap is 
grounded in the common sense that has emerged to define, explain, or understand North 
Korea’s “true nature” as the reason for its poor treatment of its people and its disregard 
for the expectations of civilized governance. If North Korea’s interiorized difference has 
become the basis of common sense understanding of the country, the North Korean 
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refugee has become the exception or “exceptional figure” to that rule.64 First, North 
Korea’s isolation and lack of transparency has made it difficult for intelligence officials 
to gather information about the country. As the black box of intelligence, North Korean 
refugees have become valuable sources of information because of the insight they can 
offer about North Korea and its leadership—a role that was also fulfilled during the days 
of the Cold War in South Korea.65 In the field of Critical Refugee Studies, Yen Le 
Espiritu has argued that refugees should be considered as a “as a site of social and 
political critiques, whose emergence, when traced, would make visible the processes of 
colonization, war, and displacement.”66 While Critical Refugee Studies does this tracing 
to critique the violence of state power, the North Korea human rights movement has also 
treated the North Korean refugee as a site to critique the violence of the North Korean 
leadership. In other words, the North Korean refugee is used to make the violence and 
brutality of North Korean leadership publicly visible for international condemnation and 
intervention.   
Secondly, I explicate how North Korean refugees are framed as exceptional 
figures because despite the perceived violence of the North Korean leadership, these 
individuals were able to flee because of their desperation for freedom. The figure of the 
North Korean refugee has thus been used to demarcate the difference between the 
brutality of North Korean leadership and the North Korean people—the former is 
incapable of providing freedom to its citizenry and the latter is desperately seeking and 
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risking their lives for freedom. This framing renders this population as being 
exceptionally worthy of global attention and in this case, global action. I examine how 
this process of exceptionalization relies on a singular individual(s) because by doing so it 
becomes easier for those unfamiliar with the crisis to create connections and thus act on 
them.  
This chapter analyzes a collection of different cultural texts: non-fiction literature, 
a documentary, congressional hearings, and an interactive webpage. The timeline of these 
materials range from 2002 to the present moment. The methodological objective of these 
materials is to “mak[e] spaces of atrocity transparent and accessible to our 
interventionism, visual, military, and legal technologies work in concert to affirm ‘our’ 
humanity by saving those suffering under a ‘reign of terror.’”67 Instead of organizing my 
analysis into different themes, this chapter moves from site to site to articulate how each 
builds on, repeats, and affirms each other. I trace how different figures, narratives, and 
ultimately, conclusions about North Korea’s fate repeatedly surface to affirm the larger 
political objective of the North Korea human rights enterprise: we must collapse North 
Korea in the name of human rights. Christine Hong warns that an “engineered regime 
collapse would have grave humanitarian consequences on average North Koreans.”68 
This goal of regime collapse reveals how the language of human rights has become a 
“militarized instrument of U.S. power” in which this ethic of humanitarianism works to 
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mask state violence.69 I underscore how the language of humanitarianism and militarism 
works seamlessly together to advocate for the collapse of North Korea.   
The first section examines how efforts to analogize the North Korea refuge crisis 
to the events of the Underground Railroad connects the plight of the refugees to a 
familiar historical event for the American audience. I argue that this analogy focuses on 
the actions of individuals rather than on understanding how the U.S. nation-state has 
participated in the making of the crisis itself. I use Melani Kirkpatrick’s book Escape 
from North Korea to detail and critique this analogy; I then look to the documentary 
Seoul Train to show how the North Korea human rights enterprise has used the 
Underground Railroad for its present needs. The second section turns to the legislative 
realm. I analyze how the U.S. common sense understanding of North Korea’s brutality 
becomes articulated through the figure of the North Korean refugee. I argue that since 
common sense becomes the lens through which to read the refugee testimonies, these 
testimonies function as supplemental sources of knowledge to further affirm the existing 
understanding of North Korea. This section focuses on the congressional hearings that 
took place between 2002 between 2007, which debated whether or not North Korea 
improperly and/or misused foreign humanitarian aid. Although there was no solid proof 
that these accusations were true, these hearings rely on the plight of North Korean 
refugees to function as evidence of North Korean corruption. In other words, if the 
refugees are here, then North Korea’s corruption has to be true. The final section focuses 
on the Bush Institute’s “North Korean Freedom,” a humanitarian initiative that allows 
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former President George W. Bush to further purse his campaign against North Korea 
through a collaborative effort with state, non-state actors, and the American public. 
Ultimately, these sections work to explicate how eradicating North Korea has become 
articulated through the North Korean refugee crisis that advocates for collapse in the 
name of human rights.   
 
The “New” Underground Railroad: Analogizing the Plight of North Korean 
Refugees   
 
I cannot help but look at that and the subsequent history, our own history 
with the underground railroad and the heroic efforts of some to secretly 
help some to escape and what is going on now among typically Christian, 
although Buddhist as well, typically faith-inspired persons who are 
attempting to help individuals escape because the governments are too 
scared to act. […] We see that. I am thinking to myself this has an eerie 
similarity to what we have experienced in our own country. I hope that 
what does not happen is what we did in our own country, which is to 
kowtow to ''states rights.'' In this context, North Korea's states rights to 
oppress and enslave its own people, to keep them from hearing any news 
but its own, and worshipping any God but the dear leader. If we kowtow at 
this moment because we are ambivalent as to principle, then I suggest that 
China really has read us right, we will sell our souls for a buck. If we do 
that, we do deserve what we get. —Tarik Radwan.70 
 
 I begin with this passage from Tarik Radwan, an immigration lawyer who 
testified in a 2004 congressional hearing on the North Korea human rights Act (NKHRA) 
to illustrate the logic that connects the plight of North Korean refugees to the 
Underground Railroad: Both groups fled clandestinely in an attempt to escape 
oppression. What anchors this analogy is the constant use and deployment of the term 
“escape” to induce on the one hand, feelings of desperation and perseverance, and on the 
other hand, of hope and anticipation that there was something worth escaping to in the 
                                                      
70 Committee on International Relations, North Korea: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian 
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first place. In fact, the term “escape” is included in many non-fiction titles that describe 
the plight of North Korean refugees: Escape from North Korea: The Untold Story of 
Asia’s Underground Railroad; Escaping North Korea; The Defector: Escape from North 
Korea; Escaping North Korea: Defiance and Hope in the World’s Most Repressive 
Country; A Thousand Miles to Freedom: My Escape from North Korea; and Dear 
Leader: My Escape from North Korea. In reframing an unknown North Korean refugee 
crisis into terms that can be widely understood by a larger American audience, this 
analogy transforms these refugees into a persecuted group worthy of attention and rescue.  
 This section uses Melanie Kirkpatrick’s Escape from North Korea, a 2012 non-
fiction title, to identify the making of the North Korean refugee through the Underground 
Railroad analogy for the larger American audience. I then move to the 2004 documentary 
Seoul Train to show how it has customized the analogy for the purposes of the North 
Korea human rights movement, paying particular attention to how it relies on visuality to 
produce certain forms of knowledge that can be easily extracted, circulated, and 
consumed. I bring Escape from North Korea and Seoul Train together to explicate the 
textual and visual strategies that these materials of the North Korea human rights 
enterprise had adopted to incite affect, connections, and action.  
In Escape from North Korea, Kirkpatrick cites a passage from the “Underground 
Railroad Record” to introduce each part of her book, thereby asking the reader to use the 
Underground Railroad stories to guide their understanding of North Korean refugees.71 
For example, Kirkpatrick offers this passage:  
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Korean Americans in the crisis, and the possibility of reunification. 
31 
 
 
Anthony had fully made up his mind that when the last day of December 
ended, his bondage should end also, even if he should have to accept death 
as a substitute. He then began to think of the Underground Rail Road and 
of Canada; but who the agents were, or how to find the depot, was serious 
puzzle to him. —The Underground Railroad Record November 1854.72 
 
This passage lays out the stakes and the consequences that await those that traverse the 
Underground Railroad. The chapter that follows then details the danger, desperation, and 
ultimately, hope that North Koreans experienced along their escape routes. Kirkpatrick 
thus uses the imagery and the language of the Underground Railroad to provide a shortcut 
to the emotions that should be felt by the reader, in the hope of inciting them to action 
against the serious threat that North Korea allegedly poses to its people and more 
broadly, the global community. By underscoring the fact that these refugees are resorting 
to death to escape North Korea communicates the severity of this crisis, and constructs 
the refugees as a figure that is worthy of our attention, and rescue.   
 Kirkpatrick also explicitly pairs the slaves who escaped through the Underground 
Railroad with North Korean refugees who fled North Korea. For instance, Kirkpatrick 
begins her book by comparing the life of Abram Harris, a slave who escaped his owner in 
1857, with Hannah, who left North Korea and settled in China.73 Drawing on her four-
hour interview with Hannah, Kirkpatrick recounted the horrors Hannah faced during the 
journey, and the fact that Hannah did not “smile” until Kirkpatrick asked about her life is 
like United States, to which she replied, “My heart feels free.”74 However, what makes 
the comparison between Harris and Hannah glaring is that Harris was escaping the 
United States whereas Hannah was fleeing to it. The pairing of these narratives thus 
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places the United States in the simultaneous role of being both perpetrator and savior. 
While the pairing contains within it the possibility of disrupting U.S. claim of 
benevolence, Kirkpatrick chose to represent the United States as the destination for 
freedom for North Korean refugees who were fleeing “the immoral regime.”75  
 In particular, I am interested in how the North Korea human rights movement has 
emphasized the narrative of family separation, often articulated through the figure of the 
refugee child.  Claudia Castaneda has conceptualized the child: “…as a potentiality rather 
than an actuality, a becoming rather than a being: an entity in the making.”76 I investigate 
the narrative of family separation and the child figure in Seoul Train, one of the first 
cultural texts to make the analogy between the Underground Railroad and North Korean 
refugees palpable to an American audience. It marks the routes traveled by North Korean 
refugees, identifying and interviewing the handlers or “conductors” that assist refugees in 
their migration, and bring attention to U.S lawmakers and advocates “or abolitionists” 
who staunchly advocate for American intervention. Seoul Train uses these interviews to 
narrate its footage—narration that instructs the audience how to process the images that 
are being shown to them. Jim Butterworth and Lisa Sleeth produced, directed, and 
provided camera work for Seoul Train. Both Butterworth and Sleeth decided to make the 
film after attending a presentation on the food and refugee crisis in North Korea by a New 
York Times reporter.77 In a PBS interview, Butterworth and Sleeth shared that they have 
screened the film three times on Capitol Hill and have “seen laws passed and polices 
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changed.”78 As one of the first documentaries on North Korean refugee crisis to cater to 
an American audience, Seoul Train is significant because it reflects the discursive 
practices that have been adopted by the North Korea Human Rights movement to make 
itself relevant to an American audience. In addition to relying on the language and 
imagery of the Underground Railroad, Butterworth and Sleeth center the film on the 
figure of the child. The most significant footage of Seoul Train, which shows refugees 
rushing into consulates or protesting, is not original but has been lifted from other sources 
and edited accordingly. For instance, the filmmakers do this with Han-mi and her family, 
whose story became an international incident.  
On May 8th 2002, The New York Times reported that in Shenyang China, seven 
North Koreans tried to rush through the entrance of the Japanese Consulate to seek 
refugee status. Two North Koreans had climbed over the wall of the consulate the night 
before; the remaining North Koreans included a 2-year-old child who attempted to bypass 
Chinese guards by running through the front entrance. The article explains that there has 
been a growing trend of North Koreans living in secret in China who feared being 
repatriated back to North Korea where they would be punished. China does not recognize 
North Koreans as refugees but consider them “illegal economic migrants.” Seoul Train 
appropriated the footage of this incident to advocate for the regime collapse of North 
Korea. Although the incident with Han-mi and her family was more about the repatriation 
agreement between North Korea and China, the filmmakers refitted this footage to 
support the intervention of the United States into this refugee crisis.  
                                                      
78 Butterworth and Sleeth do not specify what specific legislation was passed as a result of these screenings 
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Figure 1.1: Han-mi watching her mother.79  
 
 
In the original footage, the focus on Han-mi’s face is only for a mere second, 
whereas in Seoul Train, the filmmakers freeze the footage and zero in on Han-mi’s face. 
This close-up highlights the despair of a little girl watching her mother being wrestled to 
the ground by men in military uniform. The filmmakers also removed the audio in this 
instance to focus the audience on Han-mi’s expression of fear, sadness, and confusion. 
Paula Rabinotwitz explains that the technique of the close-up “…heightens emotional 
intensity” which “…sutures the viewer into the scenic space.”80 As mentioned above, one 
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of the techniques of human rights media is that it uses certain symbols to forge a 
connection with the audience; it is through this “emotional engagement” that the 
significance of the issue becomes established. In this case, Han-mi becomes the object of 
identification, whose innocence must be protected. Seoul Train is quite effective at this 
strategy through its use of concentrated close ups and the slowing and freezing of images. 
Seoul Train does more than inform; it attempts to have the audience lift themselves from 
the confines of reality and “surrender themselves to the immediacy of the reality 
onscreen.”81 In this moment of surrender, the audience becomes a witness because the 
medium of human rights enables “…images of suffering [to] travel” and constructs 
“audiences as virtual witness, a subject position that implies responsibility for the 
suffering of others.”82 After this scene, the audience is informed that Han-mi and her 
family have been arrested.  
The Han-mi footage circulated through South Korean media, creating outrage 
among citizens, thus placing pressure on the government to arrange for the release of 
Han-mi and her family. At the end of the film, Han-mi and her family are shown arriving 
at the airport in South Korea and being greeted by a large crowd of people. As “virtual 
witnesses,” members of the South Korean public held their government responsible for 
arranging the release of Han-mi and her family. In the immediacy of the moment, these 
witnesses became suspended from the geopolitical reality that specifies how North 
Korean refugees like Han-mi and her family are to be treated in such circumstances. In 
regards to North Korean refugees, Chinese policy stipulates that they must be 
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immediately returned to North Korea.83 In this moment of visibility, Han-mi and her 
family became the exception to the rule, which was made possible because the circulation 
of the footage allowed for public intervention. Seoul Train appropriated and accentuated 
the footage of Han-mi and her mother’s struggle at the embassy to reach a larger 
audience and to induce legislative change in refugee law. By showing the scene of Han-
mi and her family arriving at the airport being welcomed by members of the South 
Korean government and people, it demonstrates that public intervention can succeed. But 
again, this ending relies on the exceptional figure, in this case, Han-mi, whose innocence 
makes it for easy for the audience to connect to her cause.   
In 2009, reporters Laura Ling and Euna Lee were arrested by North Korean 
authorities for illegally crossing into North Korea. Several months later, with the 
assistance of former President Bill Clinton, both women were released. After they were 
released, each published a book recounting their experiences. Euna Lee’s The World is 
Bigger Now: An American Journalist’s Release from Captivity in North Korea depicts the 
first time she came into contact with Han-mi. While working at “Current TV,” Lee was 
asked to edit Seoul Train into a ten-minute clip. In response to the footage of Han-mi and 
her family, Lee expressed her relief that they were able to find a “happy ending,” but that 
the “shocking footage” made it difficult for her to “…forget the desperate dash for 
freedom, and the heartbreaking confusion on little Han-mi’s face. She was only a little 
older than Hana (her daughter) at the time, so these scenes really affected me.”84 For Lee, 
the pain that she felt when witnessing the separation of Han-mi from her mother became 
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compounded by her own motherhood. The filmmakers’ focus on Han-mi and her mother 
allows for these layers of affiliations that rely on feelings of sacrifice, unconditional love, 
desperation, and fear to emerge.  
 In his book, Escaping North Korea: Defiance and Hope in the World’s Most 
Repressive Country, Mike Kim recalled his reaction to the Han-mi clip: “…I still 
remember the image of Han-mi, who was two years old at the time, standing safely inside 
the consulate crying, while just a few feet away, outside the gate, Chinese guards held 
down her mother…”85 Kim’s book uses a snapshot of the confrontation between Han-mi 
and the Chinese guards as its cover. The image seems to have incited the same strong 
reactions from the public. In a review of the book, Michael Gibb, the deputy editor of the 
Korea JoongAng Daily, believes that the image lingers because “it’s the brutal force the 
Chinese guards are using to prevent the mother from reaching her child. It’s the fear 
spreading across the toddler’s face. It’s the innocence of the pink clothes of the escapees 
against the officious green of the starched military uniforms.”86 In this consumption of 
the image, Han-mi becomes defined through her innocence against the violent contrast of 
her mother being wrestled to the ground by Chinese guards. As described by Gibb, Han-
mi remained unprotected because her mother could not reach her. Gibbs invites the 
audience to adopt this protective role when he asks: “How did we as humans become so 
savage that we have let this kind of vicious inhumanity persist?”87  
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The circulation of Han-mi’s image depicts a threat to her innocence—and by 
extension, the innocence of North Koreans who lived under the tyranny of the North 
Korean government. The Han-mi incident thus communicates the tenet of the larger 
political claim at hand—the collapse of North Korea for humanitarian reasons. Suzanne 
Scholte, a key figure in the North Korea human rights movement, who appeared in Seoul 
Train, concludes: “The South Korean government is afraid of regime collapse. But that’s 
wrong to fear that. They should be welcoming it and they should be planning for it.”88 
Scholte’s push for collapse reveals how militarism becomes a protective measure against 
human rights violations. This ethic of humanitarianism is thus grounded in the exercise of 
state aggression and violence, and in this case, for the war on terror. Han-mi would find 
herself in the public spotlight, this time, in the Oval Office.  
A couple years after the incident, in 2006, in celebration of “North Korea human 
rights Week,” then President George Bush invited Han-mi and her family to the White 
House along with other family members of Japanese citizens who had been abducted by 
North Korean agents.   
 
 
                                                      
88 Incite Productions, Seoul Train, directed by Jim Butterworth, Lisa Sleeth, and Aaron Lurbusky (2004; 
Boulder: Incite, 2004) DVD.   
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Figure 1.2: Han-mi and President George W. Bush.89 
 
In this image, Han-mi, now six-years-old, was meeting the President of the United States, 
a drastic difference to how she was first introduced to the world. Yen Le Espiritu argues 
that the re-narration of the Vietnam War as an American victory has been dependent on 
the figure of the Vietnamese refugee—an object that solidifies the larger narrative of US 
benevolence. The Vietnamese refugee is cast into this before and after model: “Before” 
the rescue, the Vietnamese refugee is shown living in desperate conditions, whereas in 
the “after,” the refugee is shown as “…flourishing in cosmopolitan and affluent United 
States.”90 In the case of Han-mi and her family, her “before” is depicted as living in 
North Korea, which has been regarded by former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton as a 
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“state-sponsor of terrorism;”91 her “after” is meeting the U.S. president in the White 
House. 
In the meeting with Bush, Han-mi was dressed in pink, the same color she was 
wearing in her “before” image. However, Bush’s other guests, were not prominently 
featured in the photograph, nor mentioned by name in the description of the photograph. I 
contend that they are not the focus because their narrative has not been resolved as their 
children have not been found.92 Instead, Han-mi became the center of attention because 
her rescue has been completed.  In the meeting, President Bush “…promised six-year-old 
Kim Han-mi that he will work hard for freedom, so the people of North Korea can raise 
their children in a world that’s free and hopeful.”93 Bush expressed his disbelief over the 
“heartless” nature of North Korea in that it would condone abductions in the first place. 
Bush positions the U.S. as the antidote to such brutality by identifying its role of 
providing freedom and hope to other refugees. This photograph of Han-mi symbolizes 
this promise and the possibility of resolution via state intervention for others who were in 
the same conditions that she was once in.  
Although North Korean refugees are still subject to punishment if found, their 
“escape stories” are still being circulated through public cultural media like Escape from 
North Korea and Seoul Train. I focused on Han-mi because of her visibility as a 
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marketing tool for Seoul Train. For example, when you visit the homepage of Seoul 
Train, Han-mi’s face can be located next to their URL in the address box—Han-mi has 
been transformed into an icon of the rescued North Korean refugee.  Also, if you search 
for reviews for the film, this photograph always seems to accompany the text. Han-mi has 
thus become the defining feature of the film and the event itself. Of course, the 
marketability of Han-mi resides in her innocence, fear, and confusion as a child—these 
emotional markers become the points of identification that are immediately felt with her 
face. These materials work together to bring insight into how the North Korea human 
rights movement has adopted textual and visual strategies in the cultural sphere to 
communicate the emergency of this crisis and to suggest available legislative solutions to 
the problem.  
If They Are Here, It Has To Be True: Supplemental Value of Refugee Testimonies  
 
In a June 2002 congressional hearing, Debra Liang-Fenton, the Vice Chair of the 
U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, reported that Han-mi and her family 
were now in Seoul. The hearing was held a month after the incident with Han-mi’s family 
and the Chinese guards. Liang-Fenton’s testimony illustrates that Han-mi’s story had 
traveled all the way to the congressional halls of the United States. Liang-Fenton did not 
elaborate on Han-mi’s story so it could be assumed that congressional members were 
already familiar with her story. Along with her update, Liang-Fenton testified that 
“human rights violations and abuses affect a larger majority of 23 million North Korean 
people. There is precious little specific information available about human rights in North 
Korea since the government refuses entry to international human rights groups. This in 
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itself causes for profound concern.”94 In other words, if North Korea refused inspections, 
they must be hiding something.  
North Korea was also accused of improperly distributing the international aid it 
received from non-governmental organizations and foreign countries. I am not concerned 
with the validity of this accusation, but with how these hearings did not cite concrete 
evidence to prove these accusations. Instead, the mere presence of North Korean refugees 
was used as evidence for these claims of corruption. In other words, the mere presence of 
North Korean refugees articulated the failure of North Korea—a political and rhetorical 
maneuver that has been practiced since the Cold War. In Body Counts, Yen Le Espiritu 
explains that the U.S. acceptance of refugees fleeing from communism was valuable 
because they were considered “living symbols of communism’s failure.”95 In this case, 
the refugees’ testimonies supplemented the larger belief in North Korea’s inability to care 
for its people, or in the words of former President George W. Bush, its “true nature.” If 
they (North Korean refugees) are here, then it has to be true.  
Instead of framing congressional hearings as an act of “information gathering,” 
cultural anthropologist Phyllis Pease Chock argues that these proceedings and the 
testimonies reflect how “…ideologies [that are] put to work in the talk, both as practical 
activity and as ritual performance.”96 Chock alternatively imagines the congressional 
hearing as a site where cultural narratives like “…canonical versions of national myths 
and hegemonic ideolog[ies] [that] encompass the speakers’ disparate renderings of 
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events” are reproduced.97  The myth that is circulated in these select hearings is that 
North Korea’s collapse will model Eastern Europe’s—the fleeing of refugees will 
destabilize North Korea just as the flight of the Eastern European refugees toppled 
communist rule in Eastern Europe.98 The reality was that Eastern Europeans who 
defected were “caught between the administration’s desire to promote escape and 
powerful legislators’ declination to accommodate those who did so within the United 
States.”99 The collapse of Eastern Europe overshadowed the fact that Eastern European 
refugees did not receive the necessary support and resources. This section uses Chock’s 
theorization to highlight how the “information-gathering” process of congressional 
hearings is not neutral but builds on existing narratives. The myth of the Eastern 
European model of collapse reveals how refugees have been used as nonmilitary weapons 
to bring the downfall of unsavory nation-states.  
By analyzing a selection of hearings, I trace how congressional members, expert 
witnesses, and refugee testimonies echo each other to create a discernable narrative of 
how North Korea is interiorly differentiated. Also, the lack of “significant partisan 
distinctions on human rights policy toward North Korea” in the hearings allows for a 
narrative free of partisan bickering that clouds most congressional discussions.100  As 
such, these hearings repeatedly reproduced the United States as a humanitarian agent who 
safeguards the global community thus sustaining the hierarchy between the United States 
and everyone else it “helps” beneath it. These hearings function as ritualistic practices 
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that “work” to ensure the hegemonic narration of the United States as a reputable 
humanitarian with a hierarchy that accords to its formation. This hierarchy is mirrored in 
how these hearings are conducted in which refugee testimonies are given at the end after 
congressional members and expert witnesses have spoken, thus ultimately framing how 
these testimonies should be understood. The space of the congressional hearing is a 
significant site of knowledge production because it explicates how the state (through the 
legislative branch) collaborates with non-state actors and agencies to exercise state 
power. This collection of hearings reflects the ability of the state to sustain the existing 
knowledge about North Korea by incorporating the testimonies of North Korean refugees 
and expert witnesses to authenticate its claims. I read this collection of hearings as 
conversations that have blended into each other over time that reify North Korea’s 
interiorized difference and thus the necessity of its inevitable demise.   
“Experts” who were called on to testify on North Korea’s improper distribution of 
aid consistently commented on the lack of information, yet proceeded to make claims 
despite this ambiguity. In a June 2002 hearing, Arthur E. Dewey, the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, states:  
We do not have a lot information about what goes on in North Korea and 
we have little information also about the situation on the border, but we 
certainly have enough to realize that this would be on anyone’s short list 
of greatest manmade disasters in the world.101 
 
What do we certainly have enough of? Just like Senator Sam Brownback from above, 
Dewey’s certainty of North Korea’s culpability in its own “disasters” makes the need for 
evidence to prove otherwise unnecessary. In a 2005 hearing, Marcus Noland, a scholar 
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who has published work on refugees, also assumes North Korea’s corruption of foreign 
aid: “How large is this diversion, and what effect does it have? No one knows for sure, 
but it is likely to be substantial”—which translates to: whatever they are doing, it’s 
bad.102 Noland argues that North Korea’s diversion of foreign aid to its people is a larger 
reflection of its “…denial of a battery of other rights to its citizens. If these rights were 
present, neither the great famine nor the ongoing food shortages would have occurred.”103 
Noland’s argument dismisses the fact that the great famine was not engineered by the 
North Korean government but was the accumulation of natural disasters, unfavorable 
agricultural conditions, and changes in its relationship with the former Soviet Union.104 
Instead, North Korea’s “behavior” was located as the source of its own demise. Dana 
Rohrabacher (R-CA) took these criticisms of North Korea’s actions one step further by 
subtly questioning the mental state of its leadership:  
well, however we would like to characterize the mental state of their 
leader and the leaders of the regime. But we do know they are willing to 
see larger numbers of their own people starve to death while they pump 
money into their military establishment; perhaps, out of some 
physiological paranoia.105 
 
By focusing on the mental state of North Korean leaders, these experts ignored the 
structural conditions that may explain the current state of North Korea. Rohrabacher’s 
testimony echoed President George W. Bush’s first State of the Union after 9/11 in which 
he accused North Korea of prioritizing its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
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over the welfare of its own people. My objective is not to discredit the claims made in 
these congressional hearings, but to focus on how assumptions based on North Korea’s 
interiorized difference produced simplified conclusions. As such, refugee testimonies 
merely supplemented this common sense that had already formed around North Korea. 
For example, in his introduction to refugee testimonies during a 2003 hearing, Senator 
Brownback stated: “What you’re about to see has been going on for 50 years since the 
end of the Korean conflict. It’s about time that behavior comes to an end.”106 The practice 
of including refugee testimonies at the end of the congressional hearings also allowed the 
testimonies by congressional members and “witnesses” to set the stage for the North 
Korean refugees’ stories. Besides being the symbol of North Korea’s failure, North 
Korean refugees represented the potentiality of complete success in the Korean peninsula 
while continuing the success of the war on terror. The duality of this ideological labor 
articulates the durability of North Korean refugees. In a May 2002 hearing, Norbert 
Vollersten, a medical doctor who had worked in North Korea, testified: “I have to speak 
and I have to believe in the power of refugees. That means a land of refugees can lead to 
the final collapse of a terror regime. And North Korea is a terror regime.”107 Vollersten’s 
statement can be read in two ways: “the final collapse” of North Korea signals an end to 
the Korean War (more broadly, the Cold War), or one axis down on the war on terror’s 
“axis of evil.”  
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Just as Seoul Train relied on the affective pull of Han-mi and her family, these 
congressional hearings also depended on an exceptional individual: Soon Ok Lee was 
that exception. Soon Ok Lee first testified in a May 2002 hearing and was referred to as a 
“Former Prison and Camp Prisoner.” Lee was known for her 1999 memoir, Eyes of 
Tailless Animals, which detailed her experiences in a North Korean prison. Typically, 
witnesses may be interrupted by questions or their testimonies may be suspended because 
congressional members have to leave to vote on other legislations. In the case of Soon Ok 
Lee, she was granted more time because her testimony was “…stunning [in its] details of 
human hardships” and conveyed “the depth of her experiences and convictions.”108 
Besides the incredible length (at over 20 pages) of Lee’s prepared statement, there was 
also an accompaniment of illustrations. Lee worked with a volunteer art student to 
produce these drawings. Here is a drawing depicting the treatment of North Korean 
prisoners by North Korean prison guards:  
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Figure 1.3: A drawing of prisoners and prison guards witnessed by So Lee.109 
 
Note the rudimentary nature of these illustrations. They all have basic captions like this 
one, but Lee’s prepared statement filled in these drawings with details. These drawings 
were never discussed in the hearing itself, but at its close, Congressman Ed Royce (R-
CA) encouraged his fellow congressional members to read Lee’s lengthy statement in its 
entirety. For those who could not attend the hearing, the drawings provided a visual 
substitute for the affect of her personal testimony. These illustrations attempted to 
communicate the brutality, torture, violence that Lee experienced in a very direct way—
its visualization left no room for alternative interpretations because they there for you to 
see, not imagine. No other refugee testimony within this collection of hearings has 
provided such textual and visual details like Soon Ok Lee. As noted above, Lee was 
given more time because of the details she has been able to provide in her testimony and 
her “convictions” that included advocating for the humanitarian collapse of North Korea.  
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James Leach (R-IA) would preside over two more hearings on the plight of North 
Korean refugees in 2004 and 2005—I bring this up because like with any other 
humanitarian project, there are always figures that re-appear time and time again, thus 
marking their position as gatekeepers. For instance, Leach’s giving Lee more time to 
convey her “conviction” reveals what types of knowledge are validated within this 
movement. In the case of Lee, what made her testimony (or testimonies) particularly 
compelling was because it aligned with the narrative of regime collapse that relied on 
North Korean refugees to destabilize North Korea: “In my view, for North Korea to 
collapse, we need more refugees to leave North Korea. This way, we can prevent war.”110 
But how do we collapse a country without a war? And how do we collapse a country that 
we are still at war with?  
According to a report conducted by the Congressional Research Service, in 2008, 
the United States halted its aid to North Korea because of its development of its nuclear 
program. The Obama administration implied that it would be “…willing to consider other 
types of aid if North Korea takes steps indicating that it will dismantle its nuclear 
program.”111 But in the same report, the researchers referred to a 2014 United Nations 
Commission of Inquiry, which found that North Korea’s deliberate starvation of its 
people was a crime against humanity. If so, why would the U.S. also deliberately 
withhold aid if it knew that people in North Korea were starving? This refusal reveals the 
contradictions within the North Korea human rights movement in which (short term) 
violence justifies the pursuit of human rights. As nonmilitary weapons of regime change, 
                                                      
110 Subcommittee on Immigration, Examining the Plight of North Korean Refugees: The Case of North 
Korea, 107th Congress., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2002) 22. 
111 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark 
E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, R40095 (2014).  
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refugee testimonies supplemented the existing common sense (and conclusions) about 
North Korea with their “insider perspective;” they also authenticated it. Refugee 
testimonies provide a form of affective labor that cannot be duplicated by any 
congressional members or “expert” witnesses—their desperation, perseverance, 
innocence, survival, and triumphs (as articulated in these hearings) make North Korean 
refugees worthy of rescue and intervention.  
Lee’s story was circulated through multiple outlets outside of the congressional 
hearing. Lee would testify at another hearing in June 2002 but would submit only a 
prepared statement at a 2004 hearing because she was at a vigil for North Korean 
refugees just outside of the hearing. An abbreviated version of Lee’s testimony was also 
published in the November 2002 issue of Harper’s Magazine with the title “Made in 
North Korea” which was categorized in the magazine under “ordeal.” Lee would also be 
named in Senator Sam Brownback’s autobiography, From Power to Purpose, as the 
person who provided insider information about North Korea based on her experience in a 
North Korean prison that Brown described as a “heartrendering story.”112 I bring 
attention to Lee’s appearance in these multiple sites to show how her narrative is used to 
echo key ideas and conclusions in the North Korea human rights movement. Of course, 
Sun Ok Lee is the only figure to be in multiple places, but there are other state agents, 
non-state actors, and scholars who do so as well to cohere a singular knowledge base 
around North Korea. I argue each segment of these contributors (or producers of this 
knowledge) provides a different degree of credibility and certification that contemplates 
                                                      
112 Sam Brownback, From Power to Purpose: A Remarkable Journey of Faith and Compassion (Nashville: 
Thomas Nelson, 2007) 164. 
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each other but is ultimately rooted in the residual geopolitics of the Korean War—which 
found new life in the war on terror. While the first two sections focused on the 
exceptionalism of North Korean refugees, the last portion concludes with the 
exceptionalism of the individual.  
Coming Full Circle: Conceptualizing “Humanitarian Citizenship” through the Bush 
Institute  
 
We must do more to improve the human condition of North Korea 
especially those of us blessed to live in free societies. Over the past year, 
the Bush Institute has brought together experts, government officials, and 
leaders in civil society and business to form a new path for improving the 
human condition in North Korea. We have issued a call to action to help 
raise global awareness of the suffering of North Korean people. We can do 
more to support and empower refugees, break down informational barriers 
in North Korea, and make human rights a priority for all governments. 
Please join me in standing with the people of North Korea. —Former 
President George W. Bush 113  
 
This passage was transcribed from a 2015 video clip provided by the Bush Institute—
thirteen years after Bush’s 2002 State of the Union in which he declared North Korea a 
member of the “axis of evil.” While this passage does acknowledge the collaboration 
between the public and private sector that constitutes the larger North Korea human 
rights movement, this section focuses on how the single citizen-subject is called into 
action for this cause. Bush’s appeal to the “blessed” suggests that those living in “free” 
societies have an abundance of resources that can “improve the human condition” of 
North Korea. This plea illustrates Grewal’s concept of humanitarian citizenship, which 
“…is constructed against those who are not allowed to be citizens and on behalf of those 
believed to require Western rescuers; it works through networks of foundations, resources 
                                                      
113 George W. Bush, “President George W. Bush: A Call to Action on Human Rights in North Korea,” The 
Bush Center, online video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1mTsOwZsWA.  
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from groups and individuals, and relies on privileged forms of mobility.”114 I use this 
concept to direct our attention to how the individual is incorporated into this human rights 
movement, and how the individual also becomes exceptionalized. In the North Korea 
human rights enterprise, the mobility of information becomes the key that subjects of the 
West hold above North Koreans. Bush suggests that we use this privilege to spread the 
information that we do have (from North Korean refugees) to “improve the human 
condition of North Korea.” Neda Atanasoski explains that this “humanizing mode of 
governance” calls upon individuals to place “…their faith in a global humanity manifest 
in normative articulations of racial, religious, and cultural diversity enshrined as 
individual juridical rights.”115 Although, Bush does not directly speak to this 
multiculturalism, the ways in which the U.S. portrays itself as a beacon of diversity has 
been used to exemplify the freedoms it offers.  
Unlike the Bush of 2002, when he was in elected office, the Bush Institute shifts 
from the sole exercise of state power to include non-state actors to illustrate a 
collaborative neoliberalism of: “the humanitarian order [that] encompasses a wide range 
of individuals, groups, and organizations from both the Left and Right, and it brought 
them together within a neoliberal citizenship that partners the projects of militarism and 
empire.”116 As a non-partisan organization, the Bush Institute presents a collective of 
state actors, non-profit organizations, scholars, and other relevant figures who are 
working to: “expose the suffering of the North Korean people, put the gulags and other 
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human rights abuses on the radar screen of opinion leaders and the general public, and 
develop policies with the public and private sectors to help the North Korean people.”117 
In a way, Bush came full circle with the establishment of this institute, which compounds 
state action with other sources and resources to formulate a more comprehensive solution 
for the North Korean refugee crisis and by extension, the violation of human rights in 
North Korea.  
 The “Freedom in North Korea” section on the Bush Institute’s website contains a 
variety of mechanisms to present its information about human rights violations in North 
Korea: infographics, video clips and reports/studies. This variety of informational 
mechanisms seeks to appeal to the spectrum of visitors who access the site from the 
casual browser to the concerned citizen to the skeptical academic. For the casual browser, 
infographics is able to streamline critical information into digestible pieces while 
providing a corresponding visual to drive its point. For the concerned citizen, video clips 
of interviews with relevant figures of the crisis and reports about North Korean refugees 
living in the United States and policy recommendations are available for viewing. Not 
only does the webpage work to inform its visitors but also to provide an opportunity to 
act upon that knowledge, in this case, this chance is presented in steps:  
 
                                                      
117 The Bush Center, “Promoting Freedom in North Korea,” bushcenter.org, February 16, 2016, 
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Figure 1.4: Steps to #EXPOSENK.118 
For the remainder of this section, I will refer to this list of steps as #EXPOSENK. 
#EXPOSENK relies on the digitally mobile and technologically privileged to achieve its 
objective of “exposing” North Korea—an action that suggests that there is something 
insidious to be discovered about the nation-state. This assumption fits in perfectly with 
Bush’s earlier iterations of North Korea’s inherent inability to care for its citizens. This 
hashtag reinforces the common sense about North Korea in such a succinct matter that 
renders additional explanation or clarification unnecessary. Like the Underground 
Railroad analogy, the hashtag functions as a discursive shortcut to a larger set of political 
objectives regarding North Korea, in this case, making the nation-state transparent for 
global intervention. #EXPOSENK elevates the digitally mobile, and technologically 
privileged to pursue and achieve this transparency. Grewal explains that digital media 
become the critical advantage in a human rights campaign in that even if the state in 
question is corrupted, digital media “provide[s] transparency—utilizes what are seen to 
be the democratizing aspects of new media.”119 The elevation of the digitally mobile and 
technically privileged turns the average citizen-subject into the exceptional figure, who 
                                                      
118 Ibid.  
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chooses to use its “blessings” to uplift others. Grewal explains that Western media tends 
to “…celebrate[s] individual activists in Asia or Africa or Latin America, these 
individuals are understood as extraordinary and unusual rather than as normative citizens 
of their countries, as is the case with US humanitarians.”120 #EXPOSENK relies on the 
citizen-subject to utilize its digital access and participation in social media for the greater 
good of establishing freedom in North Korea.  
The normative citizen-subject thus becomes exceptional because it uses the 
resources it has in abundance to uplift others. This work is done not in isolation but in 
collaboration with the larger confines of the Bush Institute—an organization that 
collapses the divide between the public/private and transnational/national. This 
partnership and its demands explicate how humanitarian citizenship functions in which 
individual actions become the critical site of change. In this case, the individual is critical 
to circulating the common sense about North Korea as articulated by the Bush Institute. 
Also, the reliance on this extraordinary citizen-subject (and its digital mobility and 
technological privileges) further pronounces the larger global hierarchy that has 
categorized North Korea as a “…poor, backward, and isolated place [that] should been 
relegated to history’s graveyard.”121 For example, the iconic satellite picture of the 
Korean peninsula is used as a referent for North Korea’s technological shortcomings. In 
the same video clip from above, Bush describes the picture:  
Satellite images of the Korean peninsula show a startling contrast between 
the North and South. While South Korea is alive with light, North Korea is 
shrouded in darkness just as stark in the contrast of human freedom. South 
Koreans live in a free and prosperous society. Just across the border, 
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twenty-four million North Koreans suffer tyranny and deprivation under 
brutal rule. Torture and political camps are routinely used to keep the 
population in line.122  
 
This belief in North Korea’s technological backwardness becomes further emphasized 
when the exceptional citizen-subject is called upon to utilize its digital mobility and 
technological privileges to “expose” this shortcoming. The exceptional citizen-subject is 
called upon to be become another conduit for the North Korea human rights enterprise to 
circulate the common sense understanding of North Korea.  
Conclusion 
 
As of 2017, fewer than two hundred refugees have been admitted to the United 
States through the North Korea human rights Act (NKHRA) since its passage in 2004. I 
suggest that the underlying object of the NKHRA was never about creating a significant 
North Korean refugee community in the United States but was instead a concerted effort 
to use the symbolic value of these refugees to prove North Korea’s failure as nation-state. 
In other words, what makes the North Korean refugee exceptional is not necessarily the 
number of refugees, but the fact that they exist to prove North Korea’s brutality of its 
people. This chapter underscores how this exceptionalism was made legible for the 
American audience through familiar narratives, figures, and tropes. The cultural materials 
that were analyzed in this chapter were grounded in the convenience of the present in 
which atrocities committed by American militarism are conveniently forgotten. By 
working concurrently across different forms, these cultural materials weave together a 
coherent and common narrative about North Korea and its people.  
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As I noted in the introduction, the objective of this analysis is not to disprove the 
claims that are being made by refugees and their advocates but instead to show how these 
narratives are being used to further U.S. state power and violence; in particular, how 
North Korean refugees have been used to construct North Korea’s brutality and thus 
justify the continuation and escalation of American militarism in the peninsula. In other 
words, the goal of this analysis was to provide a foundation to understand the specific 
construction of the North Korean refugee within American-based context that designates 
the United States as an agent of intervention. In the following chapter, I focus on how the 
Korean American community has been prompted to fulfill this role as well. While this 
chapter details how this campaign has been narrated, the following chapter examines how 
young Korean Americans reckon with this narration through their own humanitarian 
work toward North Korean refugees and imbue North Korea with their transgenerational 
memories of violence and loss.   
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
 
“You’re Korean, don’t you care about your own people?” The Korean Diasporic 
Politics of LiNK’s “People Over Politics” Campaign 
 
Twenty-four million people–ordinary people like you and me–face the 
world’s most repressive government, but they have been lost in this 
definition of North Korea. This politicized and securitized narrative has 
created a barrier of apathy, preventing global citizens from engaging with 
this issue, causing a huge deficit in support for the North Korean people. 
-Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) 
 
They are my people. 
-Richard, LiNK Rescue Member 
 
LiNK is a Southern California-based non-profit organization that aids in the 
“refugee rescues”123 of North Korean refugees out of China. LiNK also supports refugee 
resettlement through different educational and professionalization or “empowerment” 
programs. Established in 2004, LiNK has raised over five million dollars and has helped 
or “rescued” over 500 refugees.124 LiNK was founded by the Korean American Student 
Conference (KASCON), the largest national organization that hosts Korean American 
undergraduates on an annual basis to address issues facing the community. Not long after 
LiNK was established, the organization sought to broaden its reach to a more general 
American public via its “people over politics” campaign, whose goal is to humanize 
North Korean refugees as just “people” deserving of help.  
This chapter examines how the ethnic and familial ties of LiNK’s Korean 
American members challenge the language of universal human rights and 
                                                      
123 LiNK uses the term “rescue” throughout their organizational material but does not situate itself as being 
the “rescuer.” Instead, LiNK sees themselves as being only a helping help or a mediating force that is 
providing assistance to North Korean refugees.  
124 Liberty in North Korea, “Overview,” Financials, Liberty in North Korea LiNK’s, accessed April 24 
2016, http://www.libertyinnorthkorea.org/financials/.  
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humanitarianism that the organization uses to persuade its audience to intervene on behalf 
of North Korean refugees. The opening epigraphs demonstrate this tension: In the first 
epigraph, LiNK encourages its audience to see North Koreans as “ordinary people like 
you and me;” in the second, a Korean American LiNK member moves beyond the “we 
are all people” mantra to claim kinship with North Koreans: “They are my people” 
(emphasis added). Other Korean American members whom I interviewed for this chapter 
echoed Richard’s sentiment. For others, the memories of war, loss, and violence, as 
experienced by members of their family, have shaped their connections to the North 
Korean refugee crisis. However, the “people over politics” effort expunges any mention 
of the historical origins of the Korean War, especially the U.S. role in the division of the 
Korean peninsula.  
In a 2005 congressional hearing to discuss the progress of the 2004 North Korean 
human rights Act, Adam Smith (D-WA) stated: 
The United States has by far the largest refugee settlement in the world. It 
is also home to the largest Korean population in the world outside of 
Korea. Many members of the highly successful Korean-American 
community came from the North around the time of the Korean War. 
Large networks of vibrant North Korean churches have expressed a desire 
to help their brothers and sisters who are seeking refuge.125 
 
In this passage, Congressman Adam Smith mentioned the Korean War but only as a 
backdrop to the achievements of “the highly successful Korean-American community.” 
And yet, the Korean Peninsula is still in a technical state of war, as evidenced by these 
reminders: the presence of 28,500 American troops in South Korea, as it is still 
designated a “combat zone;” the existence of long-separated Korean families, kept apart 
                                                      
125 Committee on International Relations, The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004: Issues and 
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by the highly regulated borders; the declaration of North Korea as a member of the “axis 
of evil;” and the highly-publicized plight of North Korean refugees.126 In this chapter, I 
argue that the legacy of the Korean War and the division of the Korean Peninsula has 
created a different kind of belonging for Korean Americans within the larger Korean 
diaspora, particularly around familial and ethnic affiliation. And yet, the loss and 
violence that shaped these affiliations are often obscured by the touted “successes” of 
Korean Americans—an “organized forgetting” that justifies ongoing U.S. militarism in 
Korea.127 This chapter investigates how LiNK’s language of shared humanity works in 
relationship with its Korean American members’ personal ties to Korea. It also examines 
how the trope of Korean American success displaces the responsibility of the North 
Korean refugee crisis onto the shoulders of Korean Americans, and thus turning them 
into actors who will intervene on behalf of this population.   
As discussed in chapter one, the North Korean refugee crisis has become a major 
topic of attention amongst political scientists, policymakers, and scholars. Many political 
scientists have claimed that the 1990s famine in North Korea caused the mass exodus of 
North Koreans to surrounding countries. But Ji Yeon Yuh has argued that while the 
famine was the immediate catalyst, the “…instability, repression, conflict created by the 
political result of the Korean War, the framework of national division and opposing 
                                                      
126 Raina Han, “Continuing Impact of the Korean War on Korean Americans,” Encyclopedia of Asian 
American Issues Today Volume 2, edited by Edith Wen-Chu Chen and Grace J. Yoo (Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO, 2010) 782.  
127 I thank Simeon Man for articulating this argument for me and pushing me to think about how the 
citizenship of Korean Americans have been conditioned to ensure the continuation of U.S. militarism in 
Korea.  
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nation-states, are [the] underlying causes.”128 In contrast, LiNK presents North Korean 
leadership as the main cause of this crisis: 
The people of North Korea are denied even the most basic rights of free 
speech, free movement, and information of freedom, because the ruling 
elite prioritizes regime survival over all else. They use a brutally 
repressive system of political control to ensure their domination over 
society, employing extreme measures including collective punishment, 
public executions, and political prison camps.129 
 
LiNK’s designation of North Korean leadership as the ultimate and only perpetrator 
reveals how the language of universal human rights “renders illegible or ‘rogue’ rights-
based interpretations of structural violence perpetrated by imperial nations.”130 What 
LiNK’s charge obscures is how the Korean War has persisted as an active conflict by the 
continued presence of the American military at the DMZ. Christine Hong, a critic of the 
North Korean human rights movement, argues that this type of omission of  
“asymmet[rical] militarism” within LiNK’s universal human rights discourse 
“amnestically wipes the slate of colonialism clean, adopting a conveniently presentist 
perspective.”131 As such, LiNK’s platform of “people over politics” produces a form of 
antipolitics that centers on the suffering and desperation of individuals instead of on a 
“political discourse of comprehensive justice.”132 
                                                      
128 Ji-Yeon Yuh, “Moved by War: Migration, Diaspora, and the Korean War,” Journal of Asian American 
Studies 8, no. 3 (2005) 285-286.   
129 There is a section that provides historical background to the Korean War but there are no explicit 
connections between the conflict and the current moment. Also, this history is not prominently placed like 
its other information materials. See Liberty in North Korea, “Why North Korea,” Learn, Liberty in North 
Korea, April 24, 2016 accessed, http://www.libertyinnorthkorea.org/why-north-korea/.  
130 Christine Hong, “War by Other Means: The Violence of North Korean Human Rights,” The Asia-
Pacific Journal 12, no. 2 (2014) 11.  
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 While LiNK ensures that the Korean War continues to be forgotten, some young 
Korean Americans have continued to center the war. In my conversations with Korean 
American rescue team members, it is clear that the memories of the Korean War have 
been passed down to them from older generations. The memories of loss, family 
separation, and frustration over the division of Korea remain at the forefront of young 
Korean Americans’ understanding of this crisis and provide a point of tension with 
LiNK’s generalized slogan of “people over politics.” Unlike LiNK, the Korean American 
organization Nodutdol, based in New York City, approaches the topic of North Korea 
through a radical critique of American imperialism and militarism in Korea.133 The 
differences between Nudutdol and LiNK reflect a longer legacy of political divisions in 
the Korean diaspora in regards to unification, the role of the United States in Korea, and 
other war-related topics.134 With its “people over politics” priority, LiNK remains 
committed to only helping North Korean refugees. I decided to focus on LiNK, rather 
than on Nudutdol, because of the accessibility of its organizational materials, staff, and its 
larger network of student volunteers. LiNK’s infrastructure and professionalization 
provided much ease in the research for this chapter.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section maps out the 
organizational framework of LiNK which I examine through its promotional materials, 
                                                      
133 Nodutdol adopts an intersectional approach to understand the issues around its community such as 
economic exploitation, gender, and racial violence.  
134 After Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonialism, two parties of the independence movement 
emerged: those who aligned with the Americans and those who partnered with the Siberian-Manchurian 
group.  South Korea aligned with the Americans and produced what historian Richard Kim called a 
“…strategic reliance on the U.S. nation-state as a guarantor of the national goals of Koreans” and forged 
“the domestic and foreign policies of South Korea, which came to be manifested in a neocolonial 
relationship with the United States.”  Simply put, the legacy of Korean division produced its own divisions 
within the Korean diaspora. I suggest the varying objectives of LiNK and Nutdutdol reflect similar splits in 
the current state of U.S. and North Korean relations.  See Richard S. Kim, The Quest for Statehood: Korean 
Immigrant Nationalism and U.S. Sovereignty, 1905-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 160.  
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press coverage, and other related media that has been made available through its 
webpage. Through these materials I trace how LiNK’s “people over politics” campaign 
places an onus on the role of North Korean refugees as advocates of change that begins 
their trek from their homeland to their successes as North Korean refugees in the United 
States with the unique capacity to “open” North Korea. The second section moves from 
the individual North Korean refugee to rescue team members. LiNK’s rescue teams are 
made up of groups of individuals from universities, high schools, and churches. Instead 
of focusing on the collective of the rescue team, I look at how the individual rescue team 
member is valorized. I assert that positioning the individual as the site of change makes 
visible the neoliberal values of contemporary humanitarianism. While the first two 
sections seek to inform the public about how LiNK has attempted to universalize the 
North Korean human rights crisis on an organizational and volunteer level, the final 
section examines the ethnic affiliations that motivate the participation of Korean 
Americans. I conducted ten interviews with LiNK’s Korean American rescue team 
members to better understand their reasons for joining the organization in the first 
place.135 For these interviews, I reached out to the college rescue teams of LiNK via 
social media, which was made possible through the support of their rescue team manager, 
Sarah Palmer.136 In my conversations with interviewees, I used a basic questionnaire that 
functioned more like a guide and through clarification and follow-up questions, these 
                                                      
135 It was difficult to find Korean American members to discuss their participation about LiNK as some 
students may not have wanted discuss or publicize their participation in LiNK for numerous reasons: it’s 
taboo to discuss North Korea in parts of the Korean American community, their parents may not approve of 
their participation, or any other related reason. For those reasons, the students that did interview with me, I 
gave them fictitious names to ensure anonymity. I included the questionnaire I used in the appendix.  
136 I interviewed Sarah to get an overview of how rescue teams function and how they interact with the 
organization. My interview with Sarah yielded a lot of information that was necessary to understand the 
significance of rescue teams in relationship to LiNK. Also, I was able to gain insight as to why college 
students are attracted to LiNK and thus decide to volunteer in the first place.  
64 
 
 
discussions expanded to include personal anecdotes, difficult family histories, and even 
positions on reunification.  
 As a young scholar writing about the North Korean human rights movement, I 
have found LiNK’s public discourse around North Korean refugees problematic; 
however, I recognize the work it is trying to do for North Korean refugees. In its short 
twelve years, LiNK has raised a significant amount of money, amassed countless number 
of volunteers and donors, and has helped over 500 refugees—figures that should not be 
dismissed in any context. I wish to provide a balanced and critical portrait of LiNK to 
better understand how its work has impacted the makeup of the Korean diaspora in the 
United States. 
“Changing the Narrative”: LiNK’s Organizational History and Framework  
 
 In response to the perceived North Korean human rights crisis, different scholars, 
policy makers, and advocates have supported Korean Americans in taking charge of the 
issue. Michael Horowitz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, has regularly testified 
before congressional members about the human rights crisis in North Korea. Horowitz 
insists that if the Korean community or if “every Korean American church” went to 
Congress and demanded freedom for North Koreans ‘Kim Jong Il would not survive…It 
is the leadership for the Korean American community, they are gaining a sense, which 
they do not have, of the power they have to shape events.’137 Note that Horowitz’s 
statement problematically assumes that Korean American political power and agency 
rests solely in institutions like the church. In her study on the connections between 
                                                      
137 This was taken from an interview that Mike Kim conducted with Michael Horowitz for his book, 
Escaping North Korea. See Mike Kim, Escaping North Korea: Defiance and Hope in the World’s Most 
Repressive Country (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 215.  
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Korean Americans and foreign policy, Katherine Moon explains that the plight of North 
Korean refugees is a critical issue because it “attracts the interests, passion or sense of 
political or moral purpose of both Koreans and those without Korean heritage.”138 Moon 
argues that this movement has adopted this universal language so that the general 
American audience can “claim [the movement] as part of their own national creed; it can 
thus draw the sympathy and organizational interest of human rights organizations and 
individuals in the United States and around the world.”139 LiNK is a key example of how 
an organization has used the language of universal human rights to spread global 
awareness about the refugee crisis through their “people over politics” campaign.  
 In 2004, at the Eighteenth Annual Korean American Students Conference 
(KASCON), LiNK was created. At this KASCON, Jim Butterworth showed rough cuts of 
Seoul Train, which eventually became a seminal documentary of the North Korean 
human rights enterprise.140 The film was part of KASCON’s effort to educate young 
Korean Americans about the plight of North Korean people.141 In an interview with 
KoreaAM about LiNK’s beginnings, founding CEO Adrian Hong described LiNK as 
being “fueled more by passions” for reunification and for “saving everybody” in North 
Korea.142  With its 70 chapters, the volunteer-based LiNK had a difficult time managing 
                                                      
138 Katherine H.S. Moon, “Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy: Korean Americans,” Asia Policy 13 (2012): 
30.   
139 Ibid.  
140 My first chapter discusses how this film became a canonical piece in the North Korean human rights 
movement.  
141 C. O’Carroll and J. Hong, “Liberty in North Korea: Can You ‘accelerate change’ from the outside?” 
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142 Suevon Lee, “A Vital LiNK: How One Group Is Helping Change the Narrative on North Korea,” Kore, 
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its messaging.143 Eventually Hannah Song replaced Hong as CEO and has been credited 
with turning LiNK into a “legitimate, functioning nonprofit” that has two-dozen salaried 
employees, interns, and team-building retreats.144 LiNK re-directed their efforts from 
policy work to using storytelling as a method for change, in particular, focusing on North 
Korean people and “their potential to drive change.”145 This shift prioritized “people over 
politics.” LiNK believes that an existing “barrier of apathy” prevents the global public 
from seeing North Korea’s twenty-four million people as “ordinary people like you and 
me,” which led to a “huge deficit in support” for North Koreans.146  The language of 
LiNK’s “people over politics” campaign demonstrates how “human rights and 
humanitarian law share a view of humanity as a unified legal community when crimes are 
committed that offend not only a nation or country but the entire human race.”147 As 
such, the connection of the individual to this larger community of humanity is used to 
appeal to the larger general public. LiNK’s work in rescuing, settling, and empowering 
North Korean refugees allows the organization to use the successes of these programs to 
illustrate how individual action can culminate in a larger resolve—the “opening” and 
“transformation” of North Korea.   
LiNK’s services are divided into three parts: refugee rescues, resettlement, and 
empowerment programs. First, refugee rescues employ what they call a “free passage 
model” for North Korean refugees. Through this model, North Korean refugees can 
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bypass potentially abusive brokers and rely on a network of LiNK-affiliated individuals 
who can provide them with ground support on “escape routes” through China and 
Southeast Asia. LiNK believes that its free passage model “…ensures that refugees are 
treated with dignity and respect through the risky journey, and allows them to begin their 
new lives in freedom without the burden of broker loans.”148 Second, LiNK offers 
resettlement assistance for refugees such as counseling, health care and financial support, 
community gatherings, and translation and interpretation services. The objective of 
LiNK’s resettlement programs is to provide support for North Korean refugees in South 
Korea and the United States to overcome the obstacles that accompany resettlement and 
ultimately to become “self-sufficient.”149 Finally, LiNK’s Empowerment Programs help 
refugees to “reach their full potential”150 by offering English Tutoring & Cultural 
Exchange, Study Abroad and Career Development, Education Grants, and leadership 
training. For LiNK, it is not just about helping refugees fulfill their professional and 
personal ambitions but also about cultivating their role in becoming advocates for change 
in North Korea:  
North Korean refugees who have resettled in safe and free societies have a 
vital role to play in bringing forth change in their homeland. They have 
emerged as essential channels for getting information and resources back 
into North Korea. They are also the most important advocates for the 
North Korean people, and an unrivaled source of insight on the country. 
The more they can maximize their potential, the greater force there will be 
for change in North Korea, and the stronger the North Korean people will 
be in the long term. That’s why we run our Empowerment Programs. We 
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are investing in the long-term ambitions, potential, and strength of the 
North Korean people.151  
 
 In the previous chapter, I showed how in U.S. public and official discourse, the 
mere presence of North Korean refugees was used as proof of North Korea’s terror. In 
contrast, LiNK views the North Korean refugees as advocates that can lead to change in 
North Korea. For example, Joseph Kim was one of the first North Korean refugees that 
LiNK supported. Kim has become a well-known advocate—giving a TED talk that has 
been viewed over two million times with 300 viewer comments that commend his 
bravery. He released a memoir titled, Under the Same Sky: From Starvation in North 
Korea to Salvation in America in 2016 that makes Amazon’s top 100 books on North 
Korea. LiNK prominently features a screenshot of Kim at his TED talk under the 
“EMPOWERMENT” section of its webpage with the tagline: “Resettled North Koreans 
have emerged as some of the most effective agents of change on this issue—and they 
have the potential to do even more.”152 For LiNK, Joseph Kim represents the success that 
other North Korean refugees can emulate—a perfect advocate for the rescuing of other 
refugees. Kim’s picture is also included in a photo collage with other refugees. When the 
cursor hovers over each photograph, a short paragraph appears that provides details about 
how that refugee has participated in LiNK’s Empowerment Programs. The pictures of 
other refugees show them studying in school, using a computer, and traveling—evidence 
that these refugees are able to persevere despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles to 
lead “normal” lives. Unlike other organizations that commodify images of human 
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suffering to attract attention and funding, LiNK showcases the success of its refugees to 
prove their worthiness of support.153  
 Additionally, LiNK commends the tenacity of North Korean refugees in the face 
of the challenges of resettlement: “…many of them show remarkable resilience and spirit 
in tackling these challenges, but they are also able to study and work (often at the same 
time), and find their grounding in their new surroundings. Not only that, many are able to 
send thousands of dollars back to their families in North Korea.”154 This description 
reflects how meritocracy is valued by LiNK. Instead of playing into the narrative of being 
saviors, LiNK sees itself as simply a helping hand: “…individuals may require assistance 
in order to claim their rights, but the assumption is still one of self-directed individuals 
pursuing their claims, immunities, privileges…”155 LiNK constructs this journey to 
freedom as a universal human experience of persevering for a better life. This journey to 
freedom (and its various formations) through meritocracy parallels how Asian 
immigrants have been valorized through the model minority concept. The familiarity of 
the successful Asian immigrant becomes a method for LiNK to make North Korean 
refugees relatable and legible to the American public—a population that has been 
constructed as being unreletable because of North Korea’s isolation from the global 
community. By mobilizing the model minority figure, the isolated and unrelatable North 
Korean refugee becomes the successful and familiar Asian immigrant. In this case, the 
successes of North Korean refugees can be used to obfuscate the role of the United States 
in the crisis. Yen Le Espiritu explains, “scholars and policymakers often wield [the model 
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minority] as an ideological weapon to chastise and discipline poor black and brown 
communities for perceived persistent problems of poverty, unemployment, and crime.”156 
Similarly, the United States (and LiNK) uses the North Korean refugee to reprimand 
North Korea for its inability to care for its citizens while the U.S. continues to refuse aid 
to North Korea until the nation-state halts its development of “weapons of mass 
destruction.” Instead of solely depending on the suffering of North Korean refugees to 
garner attention and action, LiNK’s featuring the success of its refugees creates a familiar 
narrative and thus makes them relatable but also distances them from North Korea. In the 
context of the post-9/11 era, Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai explain that the model minority has 
been used by some South Asians to establish their distance from the “Muslim Other” of 
the South Asian diaspora and thus their commitment to the U.S. campaign against 
terrorism.157 The language of success that defines the North Korean refugee (within 
LiNK) operates in a similar fashion, in that this construction challenges the image of 
failure that has been used to define North Korea and its people. In this case, just like the 
model minority figure, the valorization of the North Korean refugee’s success ensures a 
global order in which the legitimacy of the United States is dependent on the illegitimacy 
of North Korea.  
In Race for Citizenship, Helen Heran Jun explains that the construction of post-
1965 Asian Americans as “competitive, self-enterprising, market driven, 
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instrumentalizing, highly productive” made this population “universally desirable.”158 In 
the same way, LiNK’s representation of North Korean refugees as successful transforms 
them into advocates who have the potential to impact their compatriots still in North 
Korea.159 This representation erases the role of the United States in the North Korean 
human rights crisis and places the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of “ordinary 
citizens” and North Korean refugees themselves. In other words, if North Korean citizens 
were not subjected to such repressive leadership, they would have been successful.  
In The Gift of Freedom, Mimi Thi Nguyen explains that the gift of freedom is 
what allows subjects to “catch up” with the rest of modernity to fulfill their “preordained 
future, whether technological progress, productive capacity, or rational government.”160 
For LiNK, it was the absence of freedom that made it impossible for these North Koreans 
to realize their potential. However, as Nguyen argues, this “gift of time” also includes 
“…the politics of comparison, homogenous time, and other commensurabilities—through 
the intervention (a war or development) that rescues history for those people stalled or 
suspended in time.”161 As the final stage of the Cold War, North Korea has been 
represented as being locked in time, unwilling to move forward, thus hindering its own 
progress. LiNK’s focus on the success of North Koreans creates an afterimage of western 
intervention that clearly articulates its benefits of having the gift of time to move forward. 
While these afterimages do privilege the importance of “people” over “politics”—a 
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political statement is still being made that North Korean refugees are worthy of being 
rescued.  
The LiNK’s homepage features pictures of the “rescued” North Korean refugees, 
but the majority of them have their eyes blurred or their faces covered. In most cases, 
North Korean refugees fear the retribution that family members who still in live North 
Korea may face for their defections; therefore, many refugees live in anonymity to keep 
their families safe. At the same time, even when the refugees are disguised, the audience 
can still see their smiles, which communicates the successes of LiNK and the failures of 
North Korea. These portraits are a living reminder of the need for LiNK to continue its 
work and for others to join their efforts. The following section examines how LiNK takes 
these narratives of success and translates them into organizational tools for its college 
chapters or “rescue teams.”  
“YOU”: The Cultivation of Humanitarian Citizenship in LiNK’s Rescue Teams   
 LiNK offers a variety of resources to help its rescue team members organize, 
sustain, and maintain their respective chapters. These materials offer instruction on how 
to fundraise, how to conduct meetings, and even how to maintain the chapter during the 
summer. LiNK also provides downloadable and printable handouts, posters, and even 
photographs that can be shared between members and potential donors. As mentioned 
earlier, LiNK’s founding member Adrian Hong explained that it was difficult for LiNK to 
manage its messaging because the organization relied on volunteer work. As such, these 
rescue team resources work to systemize how its rescue team members organize their 
branches and do so according to LiNK’s main messaging: “people over politics.” This 
section focuses on how LiNK’s “people over politics” is practiced by its rescue team 
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members whereby the individual of this general collective becomes a key factor in 
LiNK’s efforts to mitigate this humanitarian crisis. I argue that the elevation of the 
individual in this context exemplifies the concept of humanitarian citizenship. I use this 
concept to illustrate how rescue team members are reminded of their privilege and urged 
to help those who have been made powerless, in this case, North Korean refugees. This 
form of citizenship “…relies on the self-perception of Americans as ‘good’ and 
‘generous,’ giving aid and coming to rescue of distant others.”162 While LiNK does 
depend on this self-perception, LiNK attempts to correct the perpetual victim/savior 
dynamic in human rights and humanitarian discourse through the language of 
empowerment, agency, and collectiveness; nevertheless, these corrective measures still 
elevate the Western subject and their ability to effect change. I argue that the Western 
subject or the individual remains at the forefront of solving this crisis because it is their 
freedoms that allow for the democratic-driven transformation of North Korea. LiNK’s 
valorization of individual rescue team members and their potential to contribute to this 
change further minimizes the role and responsibility of the United States in the crisis. The 
following section examines how LiNK’s materials call on the individual to fulfill this 
responsibility.  
 In order to help rescue members to remain “on message,” LiNK has crafted a 
“brand guide” that illustrates the “basic standards for design and communication to unite 
this global movement into one body of action.” The brand guide instructs rescue team 
members on how to ideologically, aesthetically, and verbally align with LiNK’s 
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organizational objectives and goals. Before the brand guide dives into its specific 
instructions, there is a page-long explanation about “what makes us different” that is 
answered with a resounding “YOU”:  
Liberty in North Korea goes beyond the office of a non-profit. We are 
the collective energy and effort of a global movement of support for the 
North Korean people. People just like you are educating and engaging the 
entire world on the vision of liberty in North Korea. This requires local 
action on a global scale. That is where you and thousands of people 
around the world play an integral role. As a part of this movement, you are 
not involved just to support an organization; you are involved to stand 
with and support the North Korean people. Thank you for supporting the 
people and adding your time, talents, and energy to this movement of 
support.163  
 
While the paragraph does emphasize the importance of building a base of collective 
support for North Koreans, it also places special attention on the power and potential of 
the individual. The individual is the critical link between the world and the North Korean 
people—a role that has boundless possibilities to create an impact on a global scale. In 
Cold War Orientalism, Christina Klein explains that the imagery of a shared humanity (as 
articulated in the paragraph above) is a form of sentimentalism, which is a “complex 
cultural mode” grounded in “reciprocity and exchange, often of a personal, intellectual, 
or material nature; the paired acts of giving and receiving serve as the mechanisms 
through which differences are bridged.”164 Klein highlights how sentimentalism was used 
as a method to write the narrative of anticonquest in Asia during the Cold War—a 
narrative that emphasized integration to legitimize expansion as opposed to coercion. In 
the case of LiNK, the rescue member is asked to enter into a similar dynamic of 
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reciprocity and exchange in which their contributions (their time, labor, donations) will 
be acknowledged as being central to the objectives and goals of LiNK—based in their 
belief of “people over politics” or simply, a shared humanity with North Koreans. In 
addition, the centering of the individual as being central to alleviating the North Korean 
refugee crisis keeps the United States unaccountable and thus, out of view.   
 While the LiNK paragraph above seeks to empower and imbue the individual 
with importance and a sense of purpose, the rest of the brand guide places certain 
limitations on the boundlessness of the individual. The ensuing pages of the brand guide 
after this page are filled with direction on what phrases to use, what color and font to use 
for promotional materials, and how the narrative of the North Korean human rights crisis 
should be articulated. Also, there are instructions on what terms not to use when 
discussing the crisis such as “victim & suffering” or “saving.” In particular, LiNK 
explains that using the phrase “victim & suffering” creates the “…perception of Us and 
Them. Many North Koreans are suffering, but many are active agents of change inside 
and outside their country, so labeling the people as victims is not completely accurate.”165 
This explanation illustrates how LiNK attempts to keep their rescue team members “on 
message” while educating them on the reasoning behind using certain types of discourse 
to describe the crisis.  
LiNK suggests replacing “victim and suffering” and “saving” with: “together,” 
“empower,” “possible & positive,” and “North Korean people.” Instead of producing an 
“Us & Them” mentality, these terms suggest collectivity, agency, and most importantly, 
solidarity. These suggestions on phrasing and language are illustrative of how LiNK 
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wants to systemize the strategies of its rescue teams, in order to reduce the possibility of 
individual members stepping out of line with LiNK’s messaging. For instance, there is a 
section of the guide that is titled “Our Key Messages”:  
The problem: North Korea is one of the greatest challenges facing 
humanity today.  
The solution: The North Korean people are the best solution, and they are 
already driving changes to overcome these challenges.  
Our role: We can stand with & support the North Korean people to 
accelerate these changes.  
 
In this section, there is a photograph that accompanies each point. “The problem” was 
paired with the notorious photograph of a dark North Korea next to a bright South 
Korea—this image eliminates the need for a thorough explanation as to why North Korea 
might be “the problem” because it’s clear that a country that chooses to reside in darkness 
must be suspect. “The solution” is set next to a photograph of a young North Korean boy 
and girl pulling a wagon-like vehicle carrying strips of wood. This photo expresses how 
ordinary North Korean people like these two children are capable of bringing change to 
their country. The final photo that accompanies “Our role” is an image of rescue team 
members holding flags with “LIBERTY IN NORTH KOREA” printed on them. This 
photo shows a racially diverse crowd of rescue team members that subtly articulates that 
you do not have to be Korean or even Asian to care about North Korean refugees because 
this is a “people” issue that requires all of our attention and action. This careful 
packaging enables rescue team members to disseminate its language and discourse in a 
clear, concise, and impactful manner through a multitude of outlets via its rescue team 
members. Even though LiNK begins this guide by emphasizing the significance of the 
individual and her/his potential contributions to LiNK’s efforts, the rest of the guide 
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makes clear what those contributions should look like, sound like, and how it should be 
done.  
The brand guide ends with the section “Most Importantly”:  
 
When you share about our work, wear a shirt, or host an event, YOU are 
representing this movement. The things you say and do will reflect on 
everyone else around the world working toward the same vision. It is 
through YOUR words and actions, your respect for others, and your 
passion for change that people will be inspired to join us and stand with 
the North Korean people. Liberty in North Korea is larger than any one 
person or group. We are all collectively responsible for the effectiveness 
for the people, and that begins with the words and actions of each 
individual.166 
 
Despite this paragraph’s emphasis on the importance of the collective, the individual is 
positioned as the starting point that is required to engineer transformative change in 
North Korea. While LiNK’s language of empowerment, agency, and collective does not 
fit neatly into the savior/victim dynamic that typically constitutes human rights and 
humanitarian discourse, I argue that its elevation of the individual contributes to how the 
Western-citizen subject is still privileged as a critical point of action and intervention. For 
example, this passage valorizes the ability of the individual to create a domino effect in 
that if the individual rescue team member carries forth LiNK’s message and goals, they 
motivate others to do the same. In other words, the individual is necessary for collective 
action and impact. Also, the privileging of the western citizen-subject as the starting point 
for intervention and change suggests that western democracy is the model of freedom that 
qualifies its attendants to model it for willing participants. Whether it is the individual 
refugee or rescue team member, the construction of the individual and its potential for 
success and intervention pushes the United States further out of view of critique. 
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However, as indicated in the following section, for some LiNK members, memories of 
the Korean War—the violence, loss, and a divided Korea—remain central in their lives, 
at times complicating LiNK’s “people over politics” message.  
“It Could Have Been Me”: College-Age Korean Americans in LiNK  
After the Holocaust, Jews vowed, never again. American Jews kept that 
promise during the Cold War, advocating in Washington, D.C., on behalf 
of persecuted Jews in the Soviet Union and demanding that Moscow allow 
Jews to exit the county. This example is not lost on the second and third 
generations of Korean-Americans. These young people increasingly are 
taking up the issue of North Korean human rights and beginning to 
organize on campuses and elsewhere. The U.S.-born activists were raised 
on American values of personal liberty and respect for the rule of law.167  
 
 While LiNK’s “people over politics” slogan invokes shared humanity to motivate 
its audience to assist North Korean refugees, the above excerpt identifies ethnic bond as 
the reason for Korean Americans to help North Korean refugees. For Melanie 
Kirkpatrick, who authored Escape from North Korea: The Untold Story of Asia’s 
Underground, what makes Korean American activism and intervention possible is their 
upbringing on “…American values of personal liberty and the respect for the rule of 
law”—a difference that distinguishes Koreans in the United States from North Korea and 
a distinction that legitimizes the work of Korean Americans and American imperialism. 
Although the success of Korean Americans has been used to justify the continued 
presence of U.S. militarism in Korea, this section examines how this success has 
obligated college-age Korean Americans to help their fellow Koreans in the North. 
Instead of deploying the language of universal human rights, some young Korean 
Americans base their involvement in LiNK on familial and ethnic affiliations that move 
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away from LiNK’s “people over politics” framework. I argue that these familial and 
ethnic connections allow some young Korean Americans to pursue a kind of politics that 
does not completely invest in the language of universal human rights, but that recognizes 
how the material and psychological effects of the Korean War continue to affect their 
families—those they still may have as well as those they have lost during this conflict.  
As such, these personal ties create an alternative set of politics that move beyond the 
discourse of liberal human rights. However, my interviewees still operated under and 
believed in LiNK’s “people over politics” position. LiNK provides a physical and 
ideological infrastructure that allows young Korean Americans to acknowledge their 
connections to the larger Korean diaspora and their place within it. Although LiNK does 
not promote itself as being part of the Korean diaspora, their work with North Korean 
refugees does significantly impact the movement of North Koreans that ultimately 
implicates the makeup of the Korean diaspora. Also, LiNK’s focus on North Korean 
people as being the source of change provides young Korean Americans a unique 
opportunity to fulfill their sense of ethnic and familial obligation.  
 In recent decades, Korean Americans have emerged as a vibrant political group. 
In Legacies of Struggle, Angie Y. Chung explains that after the Los Angeles riots, 
Korean Americans worked to integrate themselves into mainstream politics to establish 
their presence in the larger community. With money raised after the riots, Korean 
Americans formed programs “on youth leadership, economic development, and 
interracial cooperation” and non-profit organized voter drives to encourage civic 
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participation.168 For Korean Americans, the events of 1992 taught them “that blind 
dependency on the Seoul government in Korea, marked indifference to the society around 
them, and unconditional donations to local politicians would not earn them the respect 
and stature they needed to demand outside protection and prevent future calamities within 
the community.”169 Consequently, these efforts have motivated and made Korean 
Americans visible as viable participants in mainstream politics. As of April 2016, there 
are 35 Korean Americans in various public service sectors such as elected and appointed 
office, the judicial branch, and various administrative positions.170 While the 1992 Los 
Angeles riots changed how Korean Americans participated in the domestic political 
sphere, the events of 9/11 have shaped the “Korean American consciousness of political 
activities abroad.”171 Grace Cho argues that “the specter of the axis of evil and North 
Korean communism have also troubled the honorary whiteness in that the scrutiny of 
Korean Americans and South Korean activists in the United States since 9/11.”172 This 
section is not concerned with whether or not my interviewees are participating in the 
performance of “honorary whiteness,” but I do agree that North Korea’s precarious 
position in the post-9/11 era may have reanimated its presence within the lives of my 
interviewees.  
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In a report on circulating information in North Korea, Jieun Baek included a 
photograph in the appendix that she took with a young girl when she was in North Korea. 
The caption reads:  
I met this young girl who called me ‘Comrade’ during my trip to North 
Korea in August 2013 after having studied the country for 9 years. She 
asked me numerous questions about my life in the United States. This was 
a very beautiful haunting moment for me because I, a US-born citizen 
with grandparents from North Korea, could have easily been born in North 
Korea like this little girl, and have led a tremendously different life.173 
 
In this caption, Baek’s shared Korean ancestry with the young North Korean girl compels 
her to contemplate the life she could have had if she had been born in North Korea. While 
Baek does not suggest that this potential life could have been worse, its possibility haunts 
her. Avery Gordon defines haunting as “when the over-and-done-with comes alive, when 
what’s been in your blind spot comes alive. Haunting raises specters, and it alters the 
experience of being in time, the way we separate the past, the present, and the future.”174 
For Baek, the ways in which North Korea has been relegated to the past comes into her 
present to remind her of the life she could have had. In Haunting the Korean Diaspora, 
Grace Cho explains that the Korean diaspora in the United States “has been haunted by 
the traumatic effects of what we are not allowed to know—the terror and devastation 
inflicted by the Korean War, the failure to resolve it, and the multiple silences 
surrounding this violent history.”175 Baek’s experience of haunting is not based on what 
she is “not allowed to know” but by the shared belief in North Korea’s mistreatment of its 
own people. Although Baek does not elaborate on what that “tremendously different life” 
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could have been—the tone of her caption suggests it would have been an unwanted 
difference. 
 I included Baek’s anecdote because it parallels the sentiment of many second-
generation or American-born Koreans who volunteered for LiNK as rescue team 
members. For my interviewees, the stories of lost families and war violence are passed 
down through generations to create for them a base of knowledge about the Korean War. 
One of my interviewees, Ethel, recounts a story that has been impressed throughout her 
childhood:  
My grandfather was sent to the South by his family for a better education. 
While he was in the South, the Korean War broke out. So when the war 
broke out, his family was up in the North, and he was still down in the 
South. He was actually able drive by up to the North and he was able to 
see his family. When he was going to bring his family down to the South, 
his townspeople were all there and they were saying please take us but 
there wasn’t enough room. So his family told him that you can take the 
townspeople to the South and come back for us. So he drove the 
townspeople to the South and when he was going back up the bridge 
connecting the North and South was bombed off by the North. 
 
Ethel lamented that the story “broke her heart” because her paternal grandfather never did 
know what happened to his family, whether they were still alive or had been killed. Her 
grandfather passed down this feeling of never knowing to her father and finally, to her —
a haunting that weaves together multiple generations’ contemplation of the fates of lost 
loved ones. As Grace Cho writes, “seemingly incomprehensible acts of violence are thick 
with a history of collective trauma that refuses to remain fixed in the past or in its original 
place.”176 For Ethel, the trauma of never knowing has trickled into her present, pushing 
her to engage with the past through her work with LiNK. Her father has reminded her 
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“you cannot ignore the North Korean crisis because your ancestors may still be living 
there.” Through LiNK, Ethel can explore a multitude of possibilities: if her ancestors are 
still in North Korea, maybe they have tried to leave, and so possibly they were able to 
receive LiNK’s support in their migration. In other words, the loss of family in times of 
war has created a “potential presence” for Ethel that has prompted her to be active in 
LiNK.177 I suggest that by understanding the possibility of seeing loss as being 
“productive,” we can challenge how we can view loss solely as a deficit.  
 The experience of lost family members also resonated with LiNK’s current CEO, 
Hannah Song, who shared during our interview that her grandmother had to leave behind 
her husband and children during the war. For Song, this certainty of having family in the 
North Korea yet being unable to ever meet them or ever truly know them is compounded 
by her grandmother’s refusal to discuss the past. Another interviewee, Olivia, explains 
that the older generation’s refusal to engage with the past stems from the brutality of the 
Korean War:  
From what I have observed, the older generation tends to generally view 
North Koreans as communists and a topic to avoid. This is understandable 
though since the red scare and the witch-hunt for communists in South 
Korea was particularly brutal after the Korean War. It would be like 
having someone who has touched a hot stove to try touching it again 
without convincing them that the circumstances have changed and that the 
stove has been turned off. 
 
Olivia’s use of a hot stove metaphor reflects how hot the Cold War was and continues to 
be for the older generation. The salience of this silence seems to motivate the 
participation of Korean Americans in LiNK because of their curiosity about a place that 
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lives in the memories of their family members. Interviewees expressed that a shared 
Korean ancestry also motivated their participation. For instance, Richard explained that 
non-Korean causes did not “cling on as much” whereas LiNK provided a chance to help 
those who “…look like me. They have a similar history as me” and because “they are my 
people.” Although Richard did not share any family history during our conversation, his 
ethnic-based affiliation with North Korean refugees allowed him to be “naturally 
sympathetic” to their plight. Ethel, who shared her story about her grandfather also 
explained that the connection to this issue is stronger because “we have the same 
language, we have the same culture, background, history.” For another interviewee, 
Lance, his hesitation to join LiNK was met with “You’re Korean, don’t you care about 
your own people?” from friends—shared ethnicity became synonymous with shared 
responsibility and obligation. This exchange depicts ethnic affiliation as a method to 
encourage action and to care for others beyond yourself—a logic that takes the specific 
experiences of some members of an ethnic group to make it evident for all members. 
Alternatively, this exchange could also represent how an ethic of community/ethnic-
based responsibility was being impressed on Lance.  
 For a majority of my interviewees, this shared ethnicity also brought forth a form 
of generational responsibility and obligation that drove their respective work in LiNK. 
One of my interviewees, Alex explains:  
My ancestors were lucky enough to have escaped. It is amazing how 
vastly different my life could have been had they not escaped. If I had 
arbitrarily been born in another family, I might be in North Korea now.  I 
joined this rescue team because I, to an ingenuous degree, believe in fixing 
the opportunity gap between South and North Koreans.  
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Other interviewees shared this sentiment of “it could have been me” in their responses—a 
pattern that expressed an obligation that had to be fulfilled because their families were 
able to leave a war-torn Korea and lead successful lives. This “it could have been me” 
narrative revealed feelings of gratefulness but at the same time, sympathy for those who 
were left behind. This narrative of “it could have been me” mirrors the indebtedness that 
comes with the “gift of freedom” that Mimi Nguyen argues creates other freedoms: “the 
right to have rights, the choice of life direction, the improvement of body and mind, the 
opportunity to prosper—against a spectral future of their nonexistence, under 
communism, under terror.”178 In this case, gratefulness is expressed through obligation to 
care for those who were unlucky enough to be the “unfortunate”:  
Whenever I think about the people in North Korea I think about how 
unfortunate their circumstances are. In terms of the people, South Koreans 
and North Koreans are practically the same in my opinion. The only thing 
that has caused the difference to occur is due to political disturbances. 
Because of this, I am motivated to help the people that could have been 
me and my family. I mean think about it, until the split occurred we were 
all the same people with the same language and the same culture. Even if I 
don’t personally know anyone in North Korea, the fact that they are 
Korean motivates me to help them. 
  
The emergence of obligation out of gratefulness compels Jennifer to “help” despite not 
knowing “anyone” in North Korea. In this case, Nguyen rightfully asks: “how is that 
thankfulness, and all that it implies about the gift and its giving, a problem of imperial 
remains?”179 Jennifer’s response reflects a larger global order in which North Korea is 
racialized as the problem that needs help—a reasoning that coincides with LiNK’s 
characterization of the nation-state as the reason for North Korean refugees and for the 
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continuing division of Korea. This narration leaves the United States unaccountable for 
instigating the war in Korea and for participating in its division.  
 In addition, the feeling of “it could have been me” reveals how the practice of 
imagination plays an integral role in humanitarian work. In The Need to Help, Liisa 
Malkki examines the need to work of members in the international Finnish Red Cross. 
For example, Malkki explains that not only do people have to see the figure in need but 
also imagine how they are related to the figure based on their own personal 
circumstances.180 In the case of these interviewees, their relationship or how they relate to 
refugees is grounded in the belief that they easily could have been these refugees or that 
they still might have family in the North or family wanting to leave the North. I suggest 
that this imagination functions as a form of haunting—possibilities that become instances 
of responsibility and obligation. In particular, this obligation is compounded by the 
material success of the interviewees’ families and parents:   
What I do think makes my participation uniquely important is coming 
from a middle-income family and an opportunity to attend a university 
which allowed me to gain the resources to learn about different social 
issues in our community and around the world that I can participate in 
changing. 
 
This passage further draws out the larger theme of success that has been developed 
throughout this chapter. In this case, material success produces class privilege that affords 
these students the ability to reach out to North Koreans who could have been them, who 
look like them, or even could have been related to them. This feeling of it “could have 
been me” is similar to the narrative of “would have been” as discussed by Yen Le 
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Espiritu in Body Counts: “in many ways the ‘would-have-beens’ are the most powerful in 
communicating the allures of the United States because they assume the form a 
testimonial—a looking back from individuals who have tasted life on the ‘other side.’”181 
Espiritu argues that the “would have been” narrative is grounded in a racial knowledge 
that constructs Vietnam as a place of poverty, misery, and hunger.182 Similarly, my 
interviewees reflect back the construction of North Korea as a place of hunger, 
destitution, and suppression as articulated by LiNK and their allies in the North Korean 
human rights movement.  
Like the other forms of socioeconomic success discussed throughout this chapter; 
the successful Korean American further makes invisible the United States as a perpetrator 
of violence in the Korean peninsula. Instead of locating the state as a responsible or even 
obligated agent, these students place the burden on themselves. What is significant about 
this displacement is that these students turn themselves into agents who must act on 
behalf of their shared ethnicity and possible familial affiliation with North Korea 
refugees. This language of familial connections, shared ethnicity, and personal and 
community responsibility provides a much-needed historicized context to the North 
Korean refugee crisis that LiNK does not offer. I argue that this context is central to 
narrating the Korean War in ways that are critical of the current narrations of U.S. and 
North Korea relations. However, even as my interviewees carried their own personal and 
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family experiences into their work with LiNK, they also subscribed to LiNK’s “people 
over politics” vision.  
 As extensive and transparent LiNK is with their work and how rescue team 
members can succeed in their fundraising efforts, these narratives of responsibility that 
are couched in family and ethnic-based responsibility are nowhere to be found in LiNK’s 
materials. When I asked the interviewees: How do you (and/or the rest of your rescue 
team) want to represent North Korea? All of my interviewees fell back on LiNK’s motto: 
“people over politics.” Lance explains:  
I want to be very open about North Korea. Their issues are very 
marginalized in the news. The most important thing is to represent North 
Korea as people. People who are just like us, but were born into very 
unfortunate circumstances.  It compelled me to join the rescue team when 
I saw North Koreans as dreamers. Why are they less able to chase their 
dreams than I am?  
 
Lance’s response adheres to the LiNK’s “people over politics” campaign by focusing on 
the shared humanity between rescue team members and North Korean refugees. For 
Lance, the shared humanity between himself and refugees was expressed through the act 
of dreaming or being “dreamers”—an expression of sentimentality that emphasizes and 
privileges integration as opposed to the differences that separate people. Other 
interviewees explained that the goal of their respective teams was to focus on North 
Korean people and their suffering, resistance, and difference from North Korean 
leadership. For instance, Elizabeth insisted that North Korean people be seen as being 
“actual people” separated from North Korean leadership: “I don’t want people to think 
that North Korea is filled with people just like their leaders.” Richard agreed with this 
distinction:  “What I am certain are the facts that we want to help those who are suffering 
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due to tyranny in North Korea and represent the PEOPLE of North Korea. Overall, I 
would like to represent our rescue team as LiNK, an organization who stands FOR THE 
PEOPLE, rather than represent North Korea as a whole.” 
Although this distinction may be important for rescue team members and LiNK to 
change the knowledge production about North Korea, it still naturalizes North Korean 
leadership as being the main source of oppression and suffering of North Korean people. 
In other words, this distinction reflects the common sense around North Korea and its 
leadership as being the only responsible actor for the plight of North Korean refugees and 
people. While these responses focused on the separation between North Korean people 
and leadership, Lance commented on how he wanted to portray North Koreans as 
performing forms of resistance:  
The common consensus is that the people are suffering helplessly under 
the totalitarian rule, but that isn’t entirely true. Recent videos have pointed 
to signs of resistance from the people as a whole.  Citizens are shown 
standing up against the guards, watching movies and television shows that 
were banned by the regime, and many more. And while these forms of 
resistance may seem small and trivial, it is not the act that is important but 
the mindset behind it. This shows that the country isn’t filled with 
brainwashed men, women, and children as the media would have the 
world believe. 
 
This response adheres to LiNK’s “people over politics” by emphasizing that change can 
come through the hands of the North Korean people. Lance’s focus on the “mindset” 
behind acts of resistance that “may be small and trivial” can be seen as an effort to close 
the gap between Americans (LiNK’s donor base) and North Koreans in that their shared 
humanity means that both seek and want freedom. Also, that North Koreans can think for 
themselves and have not been “brainwashed” by North Korean leadership. For these 
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students, the constant focus on North Korean people is an attempt to alter how the larger 
global audience thinks about North Korea. Instead of imagining North Korea as an 
isolated country that is completely out of synch with the global community, these 
responses are about drawing out a commonality that the world and LiNK’s potential 
donors can attach themselves too. But how do we understand these responses in 
relationship to tales of brutality, family separation, and the feeling of “it could have been 
me”?  
Many of these responses are illustrative of how rescue teams are remaining “on 
message” by focusing on the North Korean people and their efforts to change North 
Korea from the inside out. However, when we juxtapose these responses with personal 
stories of family separation, war brutality, and the “it could have been me” haunting, they 
produce a vexed form of belonging for these interviewees in the Korean diaspora. While 
none of my interviewees explicitly remarked on their place within the Korean diaspora, 
their responses reveal a complex form of belonging in this community that emphasizes its 
historical specificity and investment in a shared humanity. LiNK offers an infrastructure 
for young Korean Americans to contemplate their place in the Korean diaspora through 
their ethnic and familial connections to the North Korean refugee crisis even though the 
organization does not articulate itself as doing so nor does it discourage its Korean 
Americans members from doing so. While LiNK’s organizational structure and language 
provides a sense of uniformity amongst its members, the obligation, gratitude, and 
affiliation of my interviewees can be read as a productive disruption and critique to the 
organization’s orderliness. 
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However, LiNK’s lack of (public) acknowledgement of the larger historical 
context of the North Korean refugee crisis and its relationship to the Korean War makes 
it difficult for these narratives of violence, loss, and division to be articulated through 
LiNK’s organizational and discursive approaches. This limitation works in contradiction 
to how the organization was founded through KASCON—an establishment that was 
made possible precisely because of these narratives. As such, these memories remain as 
the implicit narrative behind LiNK’s “people over politics” campaign.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In December 2015, LiNK announced that rescue team members could win an all-
expenses-paid trip to South Korea to meet North Korean refugees that have been 
supported by LiNK’s fundraising efforts. To qualify, rescue teams had to raise at least 
500 dollars during the month of December and their chances increase every time that 
amount is raised. The announcement was accompanied by a description of what previous 
winners did during their five days in Seoul. Winners had the chance to share meals with 
former refugees that LiNK has funded and resettled in South Korea. Winners also went to 
the DMZ, met with Shin Dong-hyuk, author of Escape from Camp 14 and a well-known 
advocate in the North Korean human rights crisis, and visited a school for North Korea 
orphans and other children, whose families could not support them. This contest offered 
an opportunity for rescue team members to meet with those that they had helped—
tangible proof that their fundraising efforts made a difference in refugee lives. However, 
this chance was based on whether or not rescue team members could fundraise enough 
money to qualify for the competition in the first place. The contest was a unique way to 
92 
 
 
energize LiNK’s rescue team members to seek to raise more funds and collect more 
donations. The winners of this contest would be able to directly meet with refugees that 
their fundraising had helped—an opportunity that offers a form of gratification that 
cannot be accessed in any other context. Not only do North Korean refugees benefit from 
rescue team member’s efforts to raise enough money to be in the running for the trip, 
rescue team members also obtain a certain kind of recognition for winning the trip.  
 I close the chapter with this “contest” because it demonstrates the ways in which 
LiNK does offer opportunities for young Korean Americans to engage with Korea 
through humanitarian work. Although this competition is not strictly for Korean 
Americans, it could be argued that its prize may be slightly more meaningful for these 
particular members, especially since the North Korean refugees settle in other countries 
besides South Korea. The goal of this chapter was not to criticize LiNK nor praise its 
success but to draw out the tensions that emerge between its discourse of the North 
Korean refugee crisis and the memories of war of its Korean American members. My 
interviews prove that this tension cannot easily be absolved but can be productive in 
understanding how some Korean American see themselves in relationship to the larger 
Korean diaspora. The stories of violence, loss, and separation that my interviewees 
shared were not simply just expressions of familial or ethnic affiliations but insights into 
how the young generation deals with the residual of a war that has not ended. My 
interviewees were able to explore their familial and ethnic affiliation through LiNK’s 
specific deployment of the common sense that surrounds North Korea. In the following 
chapter, I examine how comedienne Margaret Cho has wrestled with these constructions 
against the backdrop of national security.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
‘I’m playing the rice card, not the race card’: The Unassimilable Alien in Margaret 
Cho’s North Korea 
 
At the 2015 Golden Globes, Korean American comedienne Margaret Cho 
appeared as Cho Young Ja, the newest member of the Hollywood Foreign Press 
Association and a general of the North Korean Army. As Young Ja, Cho spoke English 
with an accent, dressed in traditional military garb, and donned pale make-up. Young Ja 
was stoic throughout the show but when prompted by hosts, Tina Fey and Amy Poehler, 
Young Ja expressed her discontent: “In North Korea we know how to put on a show. This 
is not a show. You no have thousands of babies paying guitar at the same time…”183  
Cho Young Ja was intended to be a comedic gag that poked fun at the Sony 
hacking scandal, which released a deluge of embarrassing emails from Sony executives 
that resulted in the termination of its Co-Chairperson, Amy Pascal. All of this was said to 
have been instigated by North Korea in retaliation for the release of The Interview, a 
comedic Hollywood film that revolved around the assassination of North Korea’s Kim 
Jung Un. After the ceremony, Margaret Cho faced immediate public fallout, with 
reviewers characterizing the performance as “low, then even lower,” “stereotypical and 
offensive,” and “humorless.”184 E. Alex Jung of Vulture criticized Cho for fulfilling the 
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94 
 
 
racialized expectations of the predominately white audience by solidifying the belief that 
North Korea is “ultimately unknowable, ignorant and bad speakers of Engrish.”185 Cho 
defended her performance by tweeting: “I'm not playing the race card. I'm playing the 
rice card.”186 This chapter asks: What is the difference between the race card and the rice 
card? And how does the rice card speak to the Asian American experiences? Also, how 
does her usage of the “rice card” relate to North Korea?  
The “race card” is a colloquial shorthand for when an individual purportedly 
invokes race to gain advantage or to pander to others.187 Cho’s tweet denies that she was 
pandering to the racial expectations of the white audience, but provocatively suggests that 
she was playing the rice card instead. While Cho probably used the term “rice card” for 
the effect of comedic absurdity, I argue that the term also underscores the specificity of 
the Asian American experience: as perpetual foreigners. Placed within Cho’s larger 
repertoire of comedic work and personal writings, Cho’s evocation of the rice card 
destabilizes the black-white racial binary in the United States and centers her own 
embodiment as the “unassimilable alien.”188 This embodiment becomes further 
emphasized against the backdrop of North Korea—a rogue nation that refuses to play or 
assimilate to the “rules” of hegemonic expectations of global governance. In this 
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instance, Cho plays up or amplifies the rice card to underscore the racialization of Asian 
Americans as foreign, permanently unable to assimilate.  
This chapter focuses on two of Margaret Cho’s key performances: Cho’s 
portrayal of Kim Jung Il on the television show, 30 Rock in 2011; and her appearance as 
Cho Young Ja at the 2015 Golden Globes. Although these appearances are four years 
apart and Cho is portraying different characters, I show how the legibility and continuity 
of these performances are reliant on the discursive hyperbolism that constitutes North 
Korea in American popular and political culture—as illustrated in the Sony hacking 
scandal. I read these performances against the backdrop of the events around the scandal, 
in particular, how the American government accused and penalized North Korea without 
consistent evidence on their wrongdoings. As I argued in the first chapter, the presence of 
“evidence” is not necessary in the case of North Korea because the construction of its 
interior difference has been used to prove its constant and consistent guilt.  
This chapter utilizes a transnational analytic to make visible the dynamics that 
make Cho’s performances legible for an American audience but also the larger 
geopolitical conditions that shape them as well. Cho’s performances are a projection of 
the common sense that has constructed North Korea within the American cultural and 
political landscape; but this chapter makes visible how these projections can be re-
imagined when read through Cho’s larger collection of performances and writings. Also, 
Cho’s own family connections to the Korean War reveal how her performances need to 
be situated within a longer of history of American militarism, imperialism, and sexual 
violence in Korea that has directly impacted the representations of Korean Americans 
like Cho.  
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The Race Card, Rice Card, and Amplified Disidentifications 
 
 This section shows how Cho’s strategy of amplification or hyperboles frames 
how I understand her usage of the rice card, especially when read through the larger 
collection of her performances and writings. In particular, the ongoing amplification of 
North Korea as the unassimilable “rogue nation” mirrors Cho’s own practice of 
amplification to underscore her positioning as the foreigner that refuses to or cannot 
assimilate. Margaret Cho’s ability to extract subversive value from excess is a practice 
that draws from racial fictions that pivot on the foreigner’s inability to assimilate, or 
perhaps worse yet, to fulfill racial expectations. I define and understand amplification as 
Cho’s reliance on exaggeration or excessiveness to maintain a form of subversive 
legibility for the masses. In order for Cho to be heard within mainstream American 
culture, she amplifies what she terms the rice card as a way to index the language of 
white supremacist imperial domination. In The Racial Mundane, Ju Yon Kim explains 
that historically “…the everyday scenes of eating, working, shopping have buttressed 
competing views of Asian Americans as ideal and impossible Americans.”189 I suggest 
that Cho’s replacement of race with rice reflects the impossibility of Asian American 
belonging in the national body because of how certain things like rice are forced to cling 
onto Asian Americans as a reminder of their foreignness. Instead of perpetuating the 
belief that the race card accords some degree of racial advantage, Cho’s usage of the rice 
card illustrates how racialization limits her legibility as a performer of color.  Cho’s 
deployment of the rice card to explain her performances reveal how the racial 
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sensibilities of a white audience frame her legibility as a performer and thus leave her 
vulnerable to charges of perpetuating racial stereotypes. However, when we consider 
Cho’s usage of the rice card within the larger context of her career, the possibility of 
subversion is evident. This chapter contends that the “rice card” functions as the 
discursive/performative shorthand for the mirage of physical and vocal mannerisms, 
foodstuffs, and other related “cultural” practices that have been assigned to “Asians” that 
have constituted their racialized difference from the U.S. national body politic. In doing 
so, the rice card enables Margaret Cho to use this hegemonic language to subvert spaces 
in which she is only legible as the unassimilable alien.  
I use Cho’s collection of standup-performances, autobiographical writings, and 
interviews as a lens through which to analyze the subversive possibilities of the 
hyperbolic language that surrounds North Korea in her 30 Rock and Golden Globe 
performances. I argue that this methodological approach acknowledges Cho’s larger 
political stakes in her work that allows for generative readings of her more mainstream 
performances. For instance, Cho’s fluctuating weight during the run of All American 
Girl, the first sitcom to feature an Asian American family, served as the excess that ABC 
television executives wanted to restrict and control.190 Cho recounts this incident in one 
of her stand-up performances: “I always thought that I was okay looking. I had no idea I 
was this giant face that was taking over America. HERE COMES THE FACE!!!”191 
Rachel C. Lee argues that Cho’s weight or the fear of its excess is “…likened to an 
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invasion or a deluge of too much immigrant/foreign body”—a body that was only 
acceptable after Cho dieted.192 Lee describes Cho’s amplification of ABC executives’ 
attempts to manage her body as a “hyperbolic quip.”193 This hyperbolic quip is crucial to 
the way Cho embraces her own excess in volume as a method to “wake up” her audience 
and to force them to see her for how she wants to be seen.  
Similarly, Susan Pelle argues that Cho exemplifies the “grotesque” because her 
body has been perceived as being excessively threatening, “…because it is big, loud, 
leaky, perverse, abject, dangerous, and always transforming.”194 In the examples by Lee 
and Pelle, Cho’s embrace of excess through amplification aligns with Jose Munoz’s 
concept of disidentification: “a mode of performance whereby a toxic identity is remade 
and infiltrated by subjects who have been such identity categories but have not been able 
to own such a label.”195 Cho’s practice of disidentification remaps racialized and 
gendered personas that have been created out of social fantasies that restrict the Asian 
body while making it readily accessible for consumption onto her body, through her 
artistry to create disruptions in conversations about race, race relations, and xenophobia 
in the United States.  
Additionally, I argue that the rice card answers to how the evocation of the race 
card dismisses critical discussions of race. Richard Thompson Ford writes “playing the 
race card makes it too easy to dismiss rather than address the legitimate concerns of 
others. And the accusation of bigotry inevitability provokes defensiveness and resentment 
                                                      
192 Ibid.  
193 Ibid.  
194  Susan Pelle, “The ‘Grotesque’ Pussy: ‘Transformational Shame’ in Margaret Cho’s Stand Up 
Performances,” Text and Performances Quarterly, 30.1 (2010) 22. 
195 Jose Munoz, Disidentification: Queers of Color And The Performance of Politics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 185.  
99 
 
 
rather than thoughtful reaction.”196 I contend that Cho’s embrace of the excess of the rice 
card forces audiences to confront what the racialized Asian body must do to achieve 
legibility. The following section details how Cho’s impersonation of Kim Jung Il in 30 
Rock considers the hyperbolic imagery of the former leader in American culture but 
creates a disidentification that lends to a subversive reading.    
Margaret Cho & KJ: The Disidentification of Kim Jung Il and the “Bomb”  
  
The first time Margaret Cho did a performance centered on North Korea was in 
the American sitcom, 30 Rock, in which she impersonated former leader, Kim Jung Il. In 
this episode of 30 Rock, Avery, the wife of Jack Donaghy and a financial reporter for 
MSNBC, was captured by North Korean authorities while on assignment in China. The 
plot centers on Jack’s efforts to get Avery released from North Korea by reaching out to 
different political figures such as John Boehner and Condoleezza Rice. Margaret Cho’s 
impersonation of Kim Jung Il renders her almost unrecognizable. Cho donned a buzz-cut 
hair piece, dark sunglasses, and a pantsuit that mimics the communist garb that Kim Jung 
Il was known to wear—an appearance that contrasted Cho’s typical display of her 
colorful tattoos, medium-length straight black hair, and casual dress. In preparation for 
the role, Cho explained that she could not find any clips of Kim Jung Il actually 
speaking—she then gave him a “voice” in which Engrish functions as the vocal stand-in 
for Kim that is based on Cho’s mother’s voice, a substitution that she deemed “worked 
out fine.”197 While a casual viewer may find Cho’s explanation playing into various 
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stereotypes of Asians, when read through the lens of her upbringing, this response reveals 
the complexity and the stakes behind Cho’s position as an Asian American comedienne.  
Much of Cho’s standup and personal writings have focused on her mother in 
which Cho portrayed her as being larger-than-life. As such, Cho’s mother has been 
considered a “cornerstone” of her career.198 In an interview with NPR, Cho explained that 
her immigrant parents were “incredibly, undeniably foreign” which caused her younger 
self so much embarrassment that she wanted to distance herself from them.199 Cho used 
humor to distance herself from the foreignness of her parents such as making fun of her 
mother’s inability to pronounce certain English words. This “bit” found its way into 
Cho’s stand-up routine, a space where she was recognized as being “racially different”:  
when I became a stand-up comedian, it was a very natural thing to talk 
about. Also, when I started doing comedy, I was so different from 
everybody else doing comedy. I was racially different. I was much 
younger. There were very, very few women and certainly no young 
women, so it was a weird thing. So I ended up talking a lot about my 
heritage and a lot about what made me kind of the way that I was and so I 
think talking about my mom was a very, very natural thing to do.200 
 
Cho’s decision to include her mother in her stand-up was a way for Cho to identify with 
her Korean heritage while discussing her earlier attempts to disassociate with her ethnic 
identity. Cho shared that her father worked hard to lose his accent while her mother held 
on to hers. In this case, Cho’s embrace of her mother serves to remind Cho that her racial 
difference cannot be pushed aside. I read this performative intention as a form of 
disidentification from American-ness: Cho’s portrayal of her mother’s Engirsh accent re-
imagines this marker of foreignness as one immigrant’s refusal to assimilate. In 
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Immigrant Acts, Lisa Lowe explains that disidentification is the “…cultural and racial, 
and linguistic forms of the nation…” that constitute an alternative site where “…the 
palimpsest or lost memories is reinvented, histories are fractured and retraced, and the 
unlike varieties of silence emerge into articulacy.”201 By extension, I read Cho’s embrace 
of her mother’s accent in her impersonation of Kim Jung Il as her own form of survival 
and fight to belong as an artist of Asian descent in mainstream media. In Double Agency: 
Acts of Impersonation in Asian American Literature and Culture, Tina Chen argues that it 
is through the act of impersonation that Asian Americans can simultaneously 
“…establish their own claims to U.S. identity and to critique American institutions that 
have designated them as aliens.”202 Cho’s adoption of her mother’s accent is indicative of 
what Cho had to do as a comedienne to be legible to the older, white, male-dominated 
industry of standup comedy; it is also a refusal to brush aside her “difference.” As such, I 
read Cho’s impersonation of Kim Jung Il as a performance layered with critique even in 
its attempt to be legible within the confines of American popular culture.  
Although the episode pays tribute to how North Korea and Kim Jung Il is used to 
incite fear in the American public, it also portrays the former leader as being endlessly 
obsessed with American popular culture. For example, when Kim announces to the North 
Korean public that another American reporter has “come” to the region, he introduces 
himself as the “…world’s greatest golfer, and movie director, and best man at Tom 
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Brady’s wedding.”203 This characterization of Kim gets played up in his friendship with 
Tracy Morgan’s character, Tracy Jordan. It is revealed by Tracy that the two of them 
have collaborated together in a film of the buddy cop genre that Kim had written and 
directed. In this episode arc, Tracy refers to Kim Jung Il as “KJ” and is not familiar with 
KJ’s infamous reputation in the global community. Although Tracy’s ignorance of KJ’s 
reputation is supposed to rift on the character’s lack of awareness of events and people 
outside of himself, this rift reduces the hyperbole that constitutes North Korea and turns 
Kim Jung Il into a relatable and almost normal character. For Tracy, KJ is simply a friend 
who had made a movie with him. 
 The audience is shown a brief clip from Tracy Jordan and KJ’s buddy cop film in 
which Kim and Jordan defeated CIA operatives within North Korea. KJ declares their 
victory with “I defuse bomb, black partner. Hasta la vista baby!” Once again, KJ 
illustrates his familiarity with American popular culture; in this instance, KJ reiterates the 
emblematic phrase of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Terminator.204 KJ’s knowledge of 
American popular culture (albeit, belated) makes KJ relatable to the audience but does so 
in a manner that casts the former leader as the bumbling foreigner who wants to 
desperately belong. For example, the pairing of Jordan and Kim mimics the successful 
Rush Hour trilogy, in which a black detective, Carter, played by Chris Tucker, is assigned 
to work with a detective from Hong Kong, Lee, portrayed by Jackie Chan— the contrast 
of the American and foreigner relies on the comedic value of misinterpretations, 
miscommunications, cultural and temporal disconnect. In 30 Rock, Kim Jung Il tries to 
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replicate this comedic pairing with Tracy Jordan but fumbles in an inaccurate replication 
with his use of Terminator’s famous one-liner. The poor replication reflects how the 
foreign Other inevitably stands at a distance from Western culture—a distance that is 
communicated as an inherent shortcoming and/or dysfunction. This inadequacy is 
materialized through this poorly constructed fictionalized film. The film is illustrative of 
Kim’s characterization as the foreigner obsessed with yet unable to fully engage 
American popular culture; his association is thus portrayed as comically fraudulent. The 
poor production and execution of the film reflects the logics of the rice card in which the 
unassimilable alien cannot belong despite persistent efforts. However, this episode arc 
made visible that the unassimilable alien only becomes legible in the amplification of 
their foreignness.  
On the other hand, what is ironic about this fumbled replication of Terminator is 
the scene where Kim’s character tells Jordan’s character that he has defused the “bomb.” 
Instead of Kim Il Jung being the person who detonates the bomb, as KJ, he disables the 
bomb—a disidentification that rearranges the hyperbolic construction of North Korea and 
its leadership. In this rearrangement, North Korea is no longer the threat but the solution 
to nuclear proliferation. This reading becomes possible when we consider this excerpt 
from Cho’s standup film Margaret Cho-Revolution: “People come up to me and say: 
“What’s going on with North Korea? What’s up with that guy? Does he have a bomb? 
What’s going on? What’s going on with North Korea? What’s up with that guy? Does he 
have a bomb?”205 In response, Cho angrily yells “I DON’T KNOW! I have no idea. Quit 
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asking me. I do not have his phone number. Please.” 206 This excerpt allows the audience 
to recognize the possible disidentification that can emerge in Cho’s impersonation when 
read through her standup work. Cho answers excess with excess—a performative 
maneuver that loudly expresses Cho’s frustration with these racialized assumptions. Or 
quite simply, if Cho yells loud enough someone may finally hear her. I pair this passage 
from Cho’s standup with the storyline of KJ dismantling the bomb in 30 Rock to 
rearrange or disidentify North Korea’s association with the “bomb” —North Korea is no 
longer the threat but the solution to nuclear proliferation. This reading becomes possible 
with Cho’s excessive rejection of having any ties to North Korea’s leadership or any 
knowledge of their nuclear program. Instead of being the rogue nation that threatens the 
world with nuclear weapons, North Korea is the hero that saves the world from nuclear 
destruction. Cho’s impersonation does borrow from the amplification that has constructed 
North Korea as dangerous and unpredictable. In order for the subversive elements of her 
performance to register, Cho must speak through the hyperbolism of North Korea to 
produce a form of disidentification. Cho takes the language and imagery that has created 
North Korea in American politics and culture but rearranges it for subversive purposes. 
Cho’s embrace of Kim Jung Il is made possible by de/refusing the one object that has 
come to define Kim—the bomb.  
This particular 30 Rock episode was released in the spring of 2011. Kim Jung Il 
passed away at the end of 2011. In response to Kim Jung Il’s passing, Cho wrote a piece 
for the Arts & Entertainment section of the Wall Street Journal titled: “I Was Once Kim 
Jong Il.” The first half of the article is similar to the interview she gave about her 
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preparation for her role on 30 Rock; however, the latter half veers into her personal 
connections to North Korea in which she laments family members she has lost in North 
Korea and will never able to know. Although Cho does partake in the general U.S. 
consensus of Kim Jung Il as the “crazed megalomaniac who fancies himself a polymath,” 
she also accuses Leonardo Dicaprio, Thomas Edison, and Woody Allen of being the 
same.207 In one sentence, Cho draws upon the caricature that defined Kim Jung Il in the 
U.S. cultural sphere but also extends this exaggeration to revered American cultural 
figures. While this slight could be read as just another joke, I suggest that this comparison 
works to undercut the vilification of Kim Jung Il by pointing to other American cultural 
figures that exhibit the same characteristics.  
At the close of the article, Cho poignantly but comically writes: “Now that he is 
dead I would like to know what he really sounds like. Let me hear so I can truly do him 
justice.”208 The juxtaposition of Cho’s impersonation of Kim Jung Il with her very real 
ties to North Korea calls our attention to the connection between the mainstream 
vilification of Kim Jung Il and the legacy of U.S. militarism in the Korean peninsula. In 
this moment of comedy, an alternative affiliation emerges for Margaret Cho and possibly 
other Korean Americans—an association that is grounded in part in the loss brought on 
by the war. Before I delve into Cho’s performance at the 2015 Golden Globe Awards, we 
must first examine the events of the Sony Hacking scandal that created the context for her 
performance in the first place.  
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Sony Hacking Scandal 
Although there was no empirical evidence, Sony executives believed that North 
Korea was behind the attack as retaliation for the upcoming release of The Interview.209  
The plot of the Interview is about a talk show host, Dave Skylark (played by James 
Franco) and his producer, Aaron Rapport (played Seth Rogen) who travel to North Korea 
under the guise of interviewing Kim Jung Un but are actually there to assassinate Kim on 
behalf of the CIA. The inflammatory plot imagines the death of a current leader and does 
so as a comedic film.210 The hacking attack delayed the release of the film and forced the 
film to be distributed through the popular streaming site, Netflix because movie theatre 
owners did not want to take the risk of possible terrorist attacks.211 Citing these potential 
threats, the stars of the film, Seth Rogen and James Franco, also cancelled promotional 
events. Rogen was shocked by the adverse response to The Interview, declaring that all he 
wanted to do was to “‘make a really funny, entertaining movie and the movie itself is 
very silly and wasn’t meant to be controversial in any way.’”212 Rogen’s cavalier 
response reveals the privilege he has as a prominent white actor; for North Korea, these 
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accusations created consequences that furthered damaged its relationship with the United 
States.  
North Korea proclaimed their innocence of the hacking and offered to work with 
U.S. federal agencies to find the true assailant. The FBI believed that North Korea was 
responsible for the attacks because the “IP addresses that were being used to post and to 
send the emails were coming from IPs that were exclusively used by the North 
Koreans.”213 The director of the FBI, James Comey, blamed North Korea and described 
the attacks as “sloppy” because the hackers would forget to disguise themselves 
sometimes with the proper proxy servers.214 Comey’s comment is reflective of how North 
Korea is often treated as a “threatening failure”: Although North Korea poses a danger to 
national security, it is also represented as incompetent—a failure. In the case of the Sony 
Hack, the simultaneous impossibility and possibility of North Korea committing the 
breach shifts back and forth—a characterization that has become a familiar narrative of 
North Korea.  
Private cybersecurity experts argued that North Korea was incapable of this 
breach because the hackers would have had to have detailed knowledge of Sony’s digital 
infrastructure, thus blaming North Korea felt “politically convenient.”215 They concluded 
that it was more likely that a disgruntled employee was responsible for the attacks 
because Sony was planning massive layoffs. However, it was convenient to blame North 
Korea because the ongoing vilification of North Korea in the American mediascape 
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encourages such accusations.216 These discussions about whether or not North Korea did 
the hacking boils down to two conflicting narratives that have come to define North 
Korea: North Korea is guilty because of its past transgressions and its overall enmity 
towards the United States; and North Korea is not capable of such an attack because they 
are not technologically equipped to do so. The seemingly inconsistency of these 
narratives reveals the contradictory ways in which North Korea is portrayed: suspicious 
but not worth worrying about. In a larger sense, this contradiction reveals how the 
constructions are flexible enough to benefit a multitude of political projects.  
While there was no direct evidence to indicate that North Korea was responsible 
for the hacking of Sony Studios, the United States passed Executive Order 13687 that 
imposed new economic sanctions on North Korea as punishment.217 In a press release 
from the State Department in December 2014, John Kerry described the attack on Sony 
Entertainment as “…lawless acts of intimidation” that demonstrated North Korea’s 
“…flagrant disregard for international norms.”218  Kerry explained that these cyber-
attacks only “strengthen[d] our resolve” to work with global partners to “promote norms 
of acceptable state behavior.”219 The passage of Executive Order 13687 thus solidified 
the accusations against North Korea into an executive order that contributes to the larger 
belief that North Korea must be handled with force, even when there is little evidence to 
suggest otherwise. Just as the figure of the North Korean refugee has been treated as the 
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evidence of North Korea’s deplorable treatment of its own citizens, the mere suspicion of 
North Korea’s involvement in the hacking scandal proved to be enough. The passage of 
Executive Order 13687 follows a longer history of sanctions that the United States has 
placed on North Korea—the ideological and material infrastructure is already in place for 
the United States to maintain its legacy of subordination of North Korea in the current 
moment. I bring these details of the Sony hacking scandal into this chapter to illustrate 
the larger political context that preceded the 2015 Golden Globe Awards, an event that 
took a comical spin on the scandal.  
“Do it for all of us”220 : Margaret Cho and the Responsibility of Representation  
  
Four years after and an Emmy nomination later, Margaret Cho returned to 
American television as another imaginary figuration of North Korea and again with Tina 
Fey but this time, on one of Hollywood’s most prestigious main stages: the Golden 
Globes.221 In this iteration, Cho’s performance must again rely on the hyperbolism of 
North Korea as the rogue nation that has renewed its threat against America through the 
Sony Hacking scandal. As the hosts, Amy Poehler and Tina Fey treat Cho Young Ja with 
care in the hopes of avoiding another incident with North Korea. The running joke 
throughout the night was quite clear and simple—North Korea can infiltrate Hollywood 
so do whatever Cho Young Ja wants. For instance, initially Cho Young Ja does not speak 
but instead gestures to Fey and Poehler that she wants to take a picture with actress Meryl 
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Streep. Fey urges Streep to comply with Cho Young Ja’s request by saying that “we got a 
lot of weird emails we can’t get out. You gotta do this for us. Do it for all of us, 
Meryl.”222 Streep helps the skit along and takes a picture with Cho Young Ja, to which 
Fey responds with relief: “Thank you! Crisis adverted. God bless.”223 Fey’s request that 
Streep “do it for all of us” demonstrates how commonplace the threat of North Korea is 
that it becomes a comedic shortcut to the joke’s punchline. Similarly, Fey’s own 
(satirical) paranoia about North Korea hacking her emails mimics Liz Lemon’s in 30 
Rock. However, similar to how James Comey’s assessment of North Korea in the Sony 
Hack, there is a feeling of unviability that clouds North Korea’s potentiality of being a 
threat.  
Just like in 30 Rock, the discrediting of North Korea as an unviable threat is 
demonstrated through its obsession with American popular culture. For example, Cho 
Young Ja was shown sitting amongst the audience and holding a copy of Movies Wow! 
with a cover filled with pictures of Kim Jung Un’s face. The only visible headline and 
that is in English is: “Kim: Break The Internet” which plays on a popular 2014 magazine 
cover of reality show personality Kim Kardashian that appeared with the same tagline. 
Movies Wow! cleverly uses Kim Jung Un’s surname of “Kim” to replicate the Kardashian 
cover, whose first name is “Kim.” Similar to how KJ or Kim Jung Il in 30 Rock try to 
replicate an aspect of American popular culture via the buddy cop movie genre, the 
Movies Wow! cover feels like an unconvincing mirroring with its poor English and lack 
of familiar celebrities. This comedic prop continues the caricature of Kim Jung Il as the 
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foreigner obsessed with American celebrity culture in 30 Rock. In this instance, the 
caricature becomes stretched to include his son. This continuity provides a dependable 
source of comical relief especially in a moment of cultural crisis (the hacking scandal) in 
which the villain (North Korea) who threatens our cyber security cannot be taken too 
seriously because he is too preoccupied with American popular culture to actually follow 
through with its threats. Cho worked with Fey and Poehler to develop Cho Young Ja.224  
Cho had to work with the hyperbolic imagery and language that constitutes North Korea 
as the rogue nation to make herself legible to the dominant white audience.  However, 
these efforts were greatly criticized by the Asian American community.   
After the Golden Globes aired, Margaret Cho faced fallout for her appearance 
because it was deemed as an act of yellowface. In “Margaret Cho’s Golden Globes Skit 
Was Minstrelsy, Not Comedy” Kai Ma writes: “Cho was invited for the sole purpose of 
making fun of the North Korean government in light the alleged Sony hack, while a 
backdrop of white celebrities laughed.”225 As Cho Young Ja, Cho was not allowed to be 
“herself but was treated as a ‘perennial stereotype’ made to perform for an awards show 
that has historically excluded Asian American performers. As a performer of color, Ma 
argues that Cho is forced carry the “responsibility of representation” in which people held 
Cho accountable through various platforms of social media by accusing her of “shuckin 
for white people.”226 This responsibility has not been assigned to white, heterosexual, 
male comedians, who are free to make racially and culturally insensitive jokes without 
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being subjected to any significant penalty. Ma does acknowledge the precarious position 
that Cho occupies as a performer of color, whose material has been considered both 
subversive and racist: “The reactions to Cho’s Sunday performance capture a sliver of her 
unique role as a breakthrough Asian American artist that employs outrageous racial 
content: she had been applauded for dramatically pushing back racial barriers during her 
career, while also being accused of racism throughout it.” 227 
In response to the accusations of minstrelsy, Margaret Cho provided a variety of 
defenses: that her ethnic Korean identity and familial ties authorized her performance; 
that her performance was meant to draw attention to the accusations of human rights 
violations in North Korea; and that because she believed North Korea was treating its 
citizens poorly, Cho felt justified in her performance. In another tweet about the 
performance, Cho tweeted: “I’m of mixed North/South Korean descent – you imprison, 
starve and brainwash my people you get made fun of by me #hatersgonhate 
#FreeSpeech.”228 Similar to the Korean American members of LiNK, Cho’s 
performances around North Korea provide an opportunity for her to establish her familial 
and ethnic affiliations to the country; in this case, it also outlines the rights she has as an 
American citizen. This contrast plays into common sense that portrays North Korea as 
being a threat to its own citizens. Her identity as a Korean American and a performer 
color intersect in this moment to allow Cho to have a platform to be critical of North 
Korea’s treatment of its people.  
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 In addition to this reasoning, Cho took this moment as an opportunity to criticize 
the predominately white field of actors, actresses, and audience members in attendance at 
the Golden Globes. Cho pointed out:  “What’s racist is that I was the only Asian person at 
the entire event.”229 The performance was deemed racist because the parameters that 
determined its possibility were inherently racist—it played within the confines of the 
white imagination of the unassimilable alien. However, if we read this performance 
through her method of amplification, it underscores how the legibility of Asian American 
performers is dependent on their racial degradation. In a collection of personal writings, I 
Have Chosen to Stay and Fight, Margaret Cho writes:  
My very presence as an Asian American woman talking about race and 
sexuality is a political statement. I had always regarded the world of 
political humor as the exclusive domain of white men and immediately 
disqualified myself from participation. I know better know, and it’s 
immensely pleasing when I’m referred to as a political comedian because 
it rings true. It feels right. It feels strong.230 
 
While one of the objectives of Cho’s performance as Cho Young Ja was to bring 
attention to the lack of Asian American performers at the Golden Globes, this passage 
reveals the political value Cho sees in her mere presence in spaces that have been 
dominated by White performers. As such, Cho’s defense of her performance reveals the 
larger stakes of this performance and thus cannot be simply reduced to and understood as 
a racist spectacle. The continuity between Cho’s performance as Kim Jung Il and Cho 
Young Ja is not a coincidence but reveals how foreignness is a racial construction that 
can easily be replicated and circulated. I argue that in the case of Cho’s mainstream 
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performances, each replication can be imbued with subversive possibility when read 
through her larger body of work. If we consider race through this performative frame 
then we can identify the “…complex negotiation between always already articulated roles 
and emerging paradigms of performance” and thus consider how the practice of 
impersonation (and more broadly, performance) can be both limiting and generative for 
moments of “self reflexive strategies of enactment.”231 In this instance, I argue that using 
Cho’s larger body of work as a lens allows us to locate these possible moments of self-
reflexivity and to view Cho’s longer career as being about creating those possibilities.  
Conclusion  
  
Margaret Cho as Cho Young Ja was allowed to be loud while Cho as Margaret 
Cho, the Asian American comedienne, was expected to be silent. This silence was further 
pronounced as the journalists of Charlie Hebdo were remembered as martyrs at the 2015 
Golden Globes for their pursuit of the freedom of speech when their satire targeted the 
Muslim community of Europe by depicting them as the violent, uncivilized, and perverse 
zealots of Islam. Covering this satire with “…liberal values like secularism and freedom 
speech [cloaks] garden-variety xenophobia.”232 The death of these journalists made clear 
what bodies were worth mourning, and how their rights, in this case, their freedom of 
speech, is understood as legitimate. In contrast, Cho’s access to this same right is denied 
because it infringes on the logics of nativism and race that constitute white supremacy. I 
bring the events of Charlie Hebdo to illustrate the role of people of color at industry 
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events like the Golden Globes—as figures that provide scaffolding for the racial 
sensibilities of the dominant white audience. In the black and white dichotomy of race in 
the United States, Asian Americans are subjected to a litany of racial hyperboles that 
remind of us of their suspected foreignness.  
For instance, at the 2016 Academy Awards, Asian Americans faced racial 
hyperboles that emphasized their foreignness, which left them out of the discussions of 
the lack of racial diversity that plagued the Academy. The ceremony was marred in 
controversy because of its lack of African American nominees. Chris Rock, the host, 
chastised the Academy for its racism during his opening monologue, which attempted to 
produce a critical tone for the ceremony. During the show, Chris Rock brought up three 
young Asian American children and introduced them as Ming Zhu, Bao Ling, and David 
Moskowitz. Rock described the children as the “most dedicated, accurate, and hard-
working accountants” at PricewaterhouseCoopers, the accounting firm that counts Oscar 
votes.233 In an anticipation of backlash for the joke, Chris instructs the audience to “just 
tweet about it on your phone that was also made by these kids."234 This skit relies on the 
racial hyperbolism of the model minority myth and yellow peril because its points to 
hyper-achieving Asian Americans who cannot be trusted. This incident reveals that when 
race becomes a topic of conversation, the rice card is used to alienate Asian Americans 
from this discussion and remind them of their suspect foreignness. The preoccupation 
with Asian Americans as suspect foreigners makes it impossible to consider how the 
community fits within American racial context.   
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While the rice card reminds us of the ways in which Asian Americans are still 
treated as the forever foreigner, Cho uses the rice card to challenge this racialized 
legibility. If the rice card directs our attention to the ways Asians have been racialized, 
then Cho’s larger career functions as a lens to see these constructions in a subversive 
light. In particular, Cho’s embrace of the excessive and loud is similar to the racial 
hyperboles or amplification that follows North Korea which provided a familiar template 
for Cho to work and wrestle with. Instead of challenging representations of North Korea 
as the unsavory rogue nation, I argue that Cho embraced its excess to make a larger claim 
about the place of Asian Americans within mainstream media. Cho’s racialization as an 
unassimilable alien aligned with North Korea’s (and its leadership) positioning as a rogue 
nation—both are unwilling or cannot assimilate into hegemonic understanding of proper 
governance. This alignment makes clear how larger geopolitical conditions continue to 
sustain the racialization of Asian Americans as the unassimilable alien. By using Cho’s 
artistry as an analytical lens, this approach makes visible how these connections can be 
broken down and reanimated with different meanings that challenge their initial 
constitution. Ultimately, what this analysis calls for is more holistic consideration of how 
performers of color negotiate and navigate their legibility, which can offer readings of 
possible subversion and resistance.  
 On the other hand, Cho did play into the common sense that surrounds North 
Korea when she discusses her familial and ethnic ties to Korea. Cho’s participation in the 
circulation of this common sense of North Korea, in particular, as a nation-state that 
brainwashes its citizens, brings attention to how her engagement with North Korea as 
something to be performed reveals the flexibility of these prevalent constructions. On the 
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one hand, North Korea provides her a template to challenge the relationship of Asian 
Americans to the American entertainment industry; on the other, it gave her the 
opportunity to support the larger political and cultural campaign of the United States 
against North Korea. The following chapter also points to the ways in which North Korea 
provides a space for others, in this case, the Black Panthers, to project their political 
beliefs and aspirations. 
 
 
Chapter 3, in part, contains material that has been submitted for publication. Lisa 
Ho. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this material.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
Black Power in the Hermit Kingdom: Re-imagining Cold War North Korea through 
the North Korean International Documentation Project 
 
“Stubbornly dedicated to chuche, which translates roughly as ‘masters in 
our own house’ and also means autarchy or total self-reliance, Kim is 
dependent on foreign aid he knows can be capricious, arbitrary and 
unreliable.”—Robert S. Elegant, Los Angeles Times (1968)  
 
“We have seen here with our own eyes the beauty and strength of the 
Korean people under the wise leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung, and 
have learned in detail of the glorious anti-Japanese struggle; the 
ignominious defeat of the U.S. imperialists in the Fatherland Liberation 
War.”—Eldridge Cleaver (1970)  
 
I open the chapter with these two epigraphs to demonstrate conflicting 
representations of North Korea during the Cold War: the Los Angeles Times excerpt 
depicted North Korea as a threat to American democracy and a reckless dependent of the 
former Soviet Union, while Eldridge Cleaver’s quote glorified it as the victorious young 
country that had defeated the United States. As a counterpoint to the mainstream 
representation of North Korea as a rogue nation, this chapter examines how the depiction 
of North Korea as a radical counterbalance to global American hegemony was central to 
the U.S. Third World Left’s efforts to challenge American imperialism and colonialism. 
To do so, I focus on the alliance of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and North Korea, 
specifically through an examination of the activities of one of its members, Eldridge 
Cleaver.235 I examine how the BPP cultivated a relationship with North Korea, promoting 
it as a viable ally in the shared struggle against American imperialism. The BPP-North
                                                      
235 I am relying on the politics of the U.S. Third World Left to explain why organizations like the Black 
Panthers seek alliances with nations like North Korea. This chapter is using the U.S. Third World Left to 
frame the Cleaver’s travels with the Anti-Imperialist Delegation but also, looking at the specific 
transnational efforts of the BPP to understand the stakes and context of these relationships.  
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Korea alliance challenges the widespread perception of North Korea as isolated from the 
outside world, and instead presents it as a willing ally to the transnational aspirations of 
the BPP and the U.S. Third World Left more generally.  
 This chapter analyzes the writings of Eldridge Cleaver, the former Minister of 
Information of the Black Panther Party, who traveled to North Korea in the 1ate 1960s 
and early 1970s with the Anti-Imperialist Delegation while he was in exile. The Anti-
Imperialist Delegation included Elaine Brown from the BPP, Robert Scheer and Jan 
Austin from Ramparts, Regina Blumenfeld and Randy Rappaport from the Women’s 
Liberation Movement, Alex Hing of the Red Guard, Ana Froines from the Panther 
Defense Committee of New Haven, Patricia Sumi from the Movement for a Democratic 
Military, Andy Truskier of the Peace and Freedom Party, and Janet Kranzberg.236 
Cleaver’s wife, Kathleen, who was the communications secretary of the BPP, traveled to 
North Korea ahead of the delegation because of her pregnancy.  
 The bulk of the evidence for this chapter comes from Cleaver’s writings that are 
stored in the “American Radical Left and North Korea” section of the North Korean 
International Documentation Project (NKIDP). Culled from larger archives at the 
University of California, Berkeley and Texas A&M University, the NKIDP functions as 
an “…informational clearinghouse on North Korea for both the scholarly and 
policymaking communities” by distributing recently declassified materials on North 
Korea that “…provide[s] valuable insight into the action and nature of the North Korean 
                                                      
236  In Radicals on the Road, Judy Wu provides a detailed background of each member of the delegation. 
This delegation was a diverse cross-section of the American Left, whose experiences of North Korea were 
a reflection of their own political goals and objectives. See Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, Radicals on the Road: 
Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism during the Vietnam Era, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2013) 137.  
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State.”237 The depiction of North Korea in Cleaver’s writings connects global American 
hegemony to the racial terror and structural violence experiences by marginalized 
communities within the United States—connections that were central to the U.S. Third 
World Left’s campaign against the United States. I examine Cleaver’s writings on North 
Korea to understand how the alliance between North Korea and BPP and the larger U.S 
Third World Left developed and shifted over time. As in my previous chapters, I argue 
that what makes North Korea so valuable to U.S. political discourse is how malleable its 
constructions can be to fit the imperatives of different political projects.  
In analyzing how North Korea was imagined through the transnational 
dimensions of Black Power, I show how the BPP - North Korea alliance elucidates the 
role of American militarism in the division of the Korean peninsula. I contextualize this 
analysis within the larger politics of the U.S. Third World Left—a collective that saw 
their struggles in “global terms.”238 In Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making 
of a U.S. World Left, Cynthia A. Young explains that this collective of activists, 
journalists, students, and artists who looked to Third World anticolonial movements for 
inspiration and for strategies in the fight against state violence, racial terror, and other 
related issues that targeted communities of color.239 In the case of Eldridge Cleaver, his 
writing about his trips to North Korea with the Anti-Imperialist Delegation reveals his 
efforts to uncover the possibility of racial harmony within the newly decolonized North 
Korea.  
                                                      
237 Wilson Center, “About” North Korea International Documentation Project, Wilson Center, Accessed 
2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/about-14.  
238 Cynthia A. Young, Soul Power: Cultural, Radicalism, and the Making of a U.S. Third World Power Left 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006) 2.   
239 For the purposes of clarification, I consider the BPP as a part of the U.S. Third World Left because 
Young’s description aligns with the makeup of delegation that Cleaver lead to North Korea.  
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While the first three chapters of my dissertation explore how North Korea was 
continually produced as an eminent threat to the United States, this chapter flips this 
script by examining how U.S. militarism threatens the existence of North Korea. By 
returning to the era of North Korea’s formation as a nation-state, I argue that the 
knowledge produced by these documents is central in building a larger critique of the 
violent ventures of American imperialism and its linkages to racial violence in the United 
States. Also, North Korea’s commitment to national self-determination (through juche) 
was a model of governance that inspired Cleaver and members of the Anti-Imperialist 
Delegation. Although other scholars, like Judy Tzu-Chu Wu and Benjamin Young, have 
written about North Korea’s coalition building with Third World countries, I bring 
attention to the strategic nature of these efforts as illustrated by Cleaver’s denouncement 
of North Korea and shift to conservative politics after he surrendered to American 
authorities when he returned from exile in the late 1970s. In doing so, I illuminate how 
the constructions of North Korea are reflective of whatever political agenda different 
groups are pursuing at a given moment. For instance, the trope of “North Korea as an 
eminent threat” is integral to the continuation and escalation of American hegemony in 
the Korean peninsula and more broadly, in Northeast Asia. In the following sections, I 
analyze how Cleaver’s depictions of North Korea aligned with the U.S. Third World 
Left’s admiration of the decolonized world’s challenge to global American hegemony 
and imperialism.  
The first section provides context to the transnational connections and approaches 
that the BPP used to critique, disrupt, and undermine the spread of American imperialism 
across the globe. I also show how the transnational formation of the party emerged out of 
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a longer legacy of Black Internationalism. This section is not exhaustive but offers insight 
into the foundational aspects of the BPP that facilitated its solidarity building with the 
different revolutionary centers and leaders. I use this section to explain and contextualize 
the affinity that the BPP and Eldridge Cleaver had for Kim Il Sung and North Korea.  
The second section conducts a close reading of the selected documents from the 
NKIDP collection that were chosen based on their length and detail, as not all the 
materials were complete. The goal of this section is to draw out key themes that mirror 
the important linkages that the BPP were making between racial terror that was 
experienced by black communities in the United States and American imperialism 
abroad. I suggest that these connections reflected how a form of relational geography was 
produced out of these relationships that challenged the bipolar formation of the Cold 
War. But, I also argue that Cleaver’s elevation of North Korea and Kim Il Sung produces 
a different kind of hierarchy that accord to the logics of Judy Chu’s concept of radical 
orientalism.  
The last section shifts in a different direction that feels more familiar in the 
context of this dissertation project. In Soul on Fire, Eldridge Cleaver’s second memoir; 
shares a very different image of North Korea that contradicts his previous declarations 
that celebrate North Korea as a fellow comrade in the struggle against American 
imperialism. While the NKIDP does not include Cleaver’s memoir in its collection, I do 
so because this analysis aims to illustrate how the portrayal of North Korea shifts 
accordingly to the change in Cleaver’s politics. As such, what makes North Korea so 
valuable within the context of American politics (whatever affiliation) is the malleability 
of its construction by external actors. The objective of this chapter is not to argue one 
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depiction of North Korea is more “valid” than other but to articulate the political value 
that North Korea had as an ally to the U.S. Third World Left, in particular, for the Black 
Panthers.  In this case, the imagination of North Korea as a viable ally to the Black 
Panthers does not perpetuate the common sense that dictates North Korea as a site of 
unstable and constant violence.  
Instead, this chapter argues that the representation of North Korea as anti-U.S. 
imperial agent reveals the culpability of the United States in the Korean War and 
division. This reversal disrupts the narration of North Korea as the violent perpetrator and 
presents the nation-state as righteously defending itself and other subjugated peoples. 
Also, this challenge is rooted in the connections being made by the Black Panthers 
between the racial and structural violence that is experienced by communities of color 
and the global spread of American imperialism. While there has been other scholarship 
that has studied Cleaver’s trips to North Korea, I am more interested in what these 
materials have to say about the nation-state itself and its relationship to the current status 
of North Korea in the landscape of American cultural and political discourse.  
The Transnational Dimensions of Black Power  
 
The transnational approaches of the Black Panthers are rooted in the larger legacy 
of Black Internationalism—a movement that was considered by the American 
government as instigating the spread of communism during the Cold War. Historian 
Robyn Spencer explains that figures like W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson were central 
in “flouting the official Cold War line” because they connected the struggle for racial 
justice in the United Sates to the global campaign against capitalism, militarism, and 
imperialism. For instance, Paul Robeson, a supporter of the Civil Rights Congress, 
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charged that the United States was violating the rights of African Americans—a petition 
titled We Charge Genocide was submitted to the United Nations in 1951. The group 
framed the violence of racial terror through the newly institutionalized language of 
human rights and did so by making connections to the Korean War.240 The transnational 
nature of We Charge Genocide “link[ed] mass violence perpetrated with impunity in the 
imperial center that furiously unleashed on millions in the periphery—here implying a 
homology between police brutality in the United States and the U.S. ‘police action’ in 
Korea.”241 Although those who helped to “internationalize” the civil rights movement 
would be censored by the United States, activists who followed in their footsteps 
continued to bring global attention to the struggles of the black community and form 
connections with other nations to make a larger critique of American empire. I bring 
attention to this history to illustrate that the global dimensions of the BPP were 
extensions of Black Internationalism.  
 Spencer argues that what made the BPP unique was that the group “fused a 
radical internationalist posture—anticolonialism, Third World solidarity, and opposition 
to U.S. imperialism—with an equally radical critique of U.S. society” that revealed 
structural inequalities and violence that plagued subjugated communities across space.242 
In Black Against Empire, Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin explain that Huey Newton 
and Bobby Seale understood that their struggle against the racial subjugation of Blacks 
                                                      
240 Cheryl Higashida, Black Internationalist Feminism, Women Writers of the Black Left, 1945-1995 
(Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2013) 20.   
241 Christine Hong, “War By Other Means: The Violence of North Korean Human Rights,” The Asia-
Pacific Journal 12 (2014): 8.  
242 Robyn Spencer, “Merely One Link in the Worldwide Revolution Internationalism, State Repression, and 
the Black Panther Party, 1966-1972,” From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International since the Age of 
Revolution, edited by Michael O. West, William G. Martin, Fanon Che Wilkins (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2009) 217. 
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was “…part of a global revolution against American imperialism.”243 Members of the 
BPP were required to read the writings of revolutionaries like Che, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi 
Minh, and Kim Il Sung for their political education classes. In particular, the Vietnamese 
liberation struggle deeply influenced the BPP because the organization revered how the 
Vietnamese people fought American imperialism.244 The unpopularity of the Vietnam 
War attracted many anti-war activists who demanded peace and U.S. withdrawal from the 
country; however, the BPP distinguished themselves from this larger movement by 
declaring solidarity with the Vietnamese in hopes of defeating U.S. imperialism.245 Even 
though the Panthers were influenced by these Third World revolutionaries, Bloom and 
Martin argued that the ideological alignment with these leaders was “…never rigid, 
sectarian, or dogmatic” but was “…motivated by a vision of a universal and radically 
democratic struggle against oppression, ideology seldom got in the way of Party’s 
alliance building and practical politics.”246 As such, the Party’s declaration of global 
solidarity with other nations that were struggling against colonial forces was reciprocated 
with similar support and admiration by those nations, especially when the Party needed it 
the most, like when Huey Newton was imprisoned in 1967.  
 The admiration of the BPP by different foreign allies enabled the organization to 
“pursue[d] their own foreign relations,” which Nikhil Pal Singh argues challenged “the 
                                                      
243  Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black 
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state in what is perhaps the most scared of its own constitutive monopolies.”247 For 
instance, Huey Newton celebrated the fact that the Panthers were the only Americans that 
had “a foreign policy” towards Vietnam and that he visited China in 1970 before 
President Nixon—a visit that allowed Newton to “rebuke the American President 
publically in front of the Chinese.”248 Singh explains that this strategy of the Panthers 
was practiced by Robert Williams and Malcolm X to validate their respective movements 
but did so through the “internationalist rituals of delegation and diplomacy.”249 In other 
words, the Panthers had adopted state practices to create opportunities to spread their 
critique of American empire on a global stage, thereby enlarging the scope of their 
influence. The Panthers traveled to Algeria, Cuba, Mozambique, some parts of Europe, 
and of course, North Korea. The relationships that would be cultivated through these 
travels would be critical for the livelihood of Panther leadership.  
 In 1967, Newton was imprisoned after a police confrontation that left one police 
officer dead. After Newton’s imprisonment, Cleaver, who was the Party’s Minister of 
Communication, became a more prominent member. Cleaver joined the BPP in 1967 
because of the Party’s militant practices and disposition. In his foreword to The Black 
Panthers Speaks, an edited collection of BPP writings, Clayborne Carson explains that 
Cleaver’s initial attraction to the party was born out of violence: in February 1967, 
Cleaver witnessed a confrontation between the police and a group of armed Panthers who 
were guarding the widow of Malcolm X, Betty Shabazz. Carson writes that Cleaver was 
“impressed by their brash militancy” a partiality that would come to characterize 
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Cleaver’s approach to Panther politics.250 Cleaver became the editor the Black Panthers’ 
Community News Service and the public spokesperson of the Party.251 In his 
autobiography, This Side of Glory, David Hilliard, former Chief of Staff of the BPP, 
described Cleaver as a “master of words” who was “…not scared of saying anything.”252 
According to Hilliard, before Cleaver’s entrance into the Party, he had been imprisoned 
on rape charges. Cleaver had written a letter to Beverly Axelrod, who was a Bay Area 
lawyer; Axelrod fielded requests like Cleaver’s all the time. However, Axelrod was 
impressed by Cleaver’s “command of language” that prompted her to organize a 
campaign for his parole.253 Axelrod submitted the letters she received from Cleaver to 
Ramparts magazine, which led Cleaver to gain national attention. Later, Cleaver joined 
Ramparts as a staff writer and turned his letters to Axelrod and other writings into a 
book, Soul on Ice, which became a best seller. This anecdote reveals how Cleaver 
became such an effective spokesperson for the Party because his written work helped him 
establish connections with the radical community of the Bay Area, connections that 
would follow his work with the Panthers. 
 In response to Newton’s imprisonment with other members, Cleaver helped 
launch the “Free Huey” campaign that became “internationalized” through declarations 
of support from allies abroad.  For example, Connie Matthews, who worked for the 
United Nations Educational, Science, and Cultural Organization in Copenhagen, arranged 
speaking tours for Bobby Seale and fellow Panther member Masai Hewitt throughout 
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Scandinavia. At each stop of their tour, the Panthers were able to create a solidarity 
committee, gain official endorsements of support from European organizations, and more 
importantly funding for Newton’s legal defense.  The global presence of the Party was 
facilitated through these transnational offshoots. As noted earlier, these relationships 
were reciprocal in that the BPP and their respective allies were educated in each other’s 
politics and struggles. Quite simply, these relationships were important in a practical and 
ideological sense for the maintenance and expansion of the BPP. On the domestic front, 
Cleaver’s position as the editor of Ramparts allowed him to share a counter-narrative of 
Newton’s case that was not being shared in mainstream media outlets; and his speaking 
engagements allowed him to provide funds that were needed for Newton’s legal defense. 
However, Cleaver would again find himself in trouble with authorities.  
 On April 6, 1968, Cleaver was involved in a shootout with police that ended in 
the death of fellow Panther, Bobby Hutton, and left Cleaver injured. With his parole 
revoked, Cleaver was released on June 12th but was ordered to return to prison on 
November 27th. Cleaver fled to Cuba the day before he was expected to return to prison, 
on November 26th. Cleaver arrived in Cuba on December 25th. As a fugitive, Cleaver 
sought refuge in Cuba, Algeria, and North Korea. After some time in Cuba, Cleaver 
would relocate to Algeria where he spent his life traveling to other nations. Algeria was 
considered a “valuable political sanctuary” for the Panthers because it provided 
opportunities for them to interact with a “constellation of global revolutionaries” from 
other like-minded countries.254  These interactions gave members the chance to engage 
with diplomatic officials from socialist nations and to receive formal invitations to visit 
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countries like North Korea. During this period, the International Section of the Party was 
established on September 13, 1970 in Algeria. The purpose of the International Section 
was to promote BPP activism on a global stage, gather resources, align with other social 
movements, and bring Party issues to the United Nation—all in one centralized space.255 
The establishment of the International Section was central for the BPP to cultivate 
relationships with politically like-minded nations like North Korea.  
 
The “Ugly Piratical Face” of U.S. Imperialism: Building Affinity with North Korea 
 
 In a statement on behalf of the Anti-Imperialist Delegation, Eldridge Cleaver 
praises North Korea and Kim Il Sung’s fight against U.S. imperialism. Cleaver declared: 
 
 If all of the oppressed and revolutionary peoples of the world follow the 
example of the heroic Korean people, led by the far-sighted Genius-
Commander, the Ever-Victorious Comrade Kim Il Sung, then our program 
of PEOPLES DIPLOMACY will be a great success and U.S. imperialism 
will have received a stinging and significant slap in its ugly piratical 
face.256   
 
Cleaver’s bold declaration illustrates the predatory nature of U.S. imperialism on a global 
stage. I included this passage here to explicate how Cleaver identified a key commonality 
between North Korea and other revolutionary agents—dismantling U.S. imperialism.  
This section recounts how North Korea and the BPP formulated their political alliance—
in particular, their shared struggle against U.S. imperialism. In 1969, North Korea’s 
ambassador in Algeria invited Eldridge Cleaver to attend the International Conference of 
Revolutionary Journalists in Pyongyang, North Korea.257 Cleaver attended the conference 
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with fellow Panther member, Byron Booth, and returned to North Korea in 1970 with the 
Anti-Imperialist Delegation.258  
 In his second autobiography, Soul on Fire, which was released when he returned 
to the United States after surrendering to American authorities, Cleaver reflected on his 
political work abroad: “Recognition of the International Section of the Black Panther 
Party by these Asians gave me status and belonging in the overseas jungle. Without 
diplomatic recognition, I was simply a notorious gangster.”259  For Cleaver, these 
international travels were not just about cultivating alliances but also about having his 
political positions affirmed and even valorized. Also, Cleaver’s trips to North Korea and 
later to Vietnam and China reflected the practice of “peoples diplomacy,” in which the 
members were treated like “dignitaries.”260 As Annie-Marie Bradley explains, for China, 
people’s diplomacy was a pathway for the government to make “official” contact with 
“nonofficial contacts” to spread its influence as a nation-state.261 For North Korea, 
people’s diplomacy provided an opportunity for the nation-state to support Third 
Worldism and thus a pathway to creating a “new international order based on mutual 
assistance amongst small postcolonial nations” that would be central to socialist 
modernity.262 For Cleaver and the delegation, these trips were part and parcel of the 
romanticization of Asia among U.S. activists as “the progressive, revolutionary East” that 
                                                      
258 Kathleen Rout, Eldridge Cleaver (London: Macmillan Publishing, 1991) 52.  
259  Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Fire (Hachette: Hodder, 1979) 149.  
260Judy Wu, Radicals on the Road, 137. 
261 Anne-Marie Bradley, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003) 23.  
262 Benjamin Young, “Juche in the United States: The Black Panther Party’s Relations with North Korea, 
1969-1971” The Asia-Pacific Journal 13, no. 3 (2015) 6.  
131 
 
 
 
challenged the “capitalist and militaristic West.”263 In other words, both North Korea and 
BPP (and members of the delegation) were working to defeating the hegemonic global 
order of the Cold War by replacing it with an order that challenged this dominant 
formation.  
 In North Korea, Cleaver and the delegation were greeted with a welcoming 
message that affirmed the country’s relationship and solidarity with the BPP. Although 
the “speaker” is not identified, the speech begins with a warm welcome for the 
delegation, stating that the purpose of this gathering is to show the “…great significance 
in strengthening the solidarity of the Korean people and the progressive people in 
America in the struggle against U.S. imperialism, the common enemy.”264 The speaker 
identifies that the site of commonality between the delegation and the DPRK is their 
struggle against the violence of U.S. imperialism. However, at the same time, the 
speaker’s labeling of the delegation as being part of the “progressive people” marks 
North Korea’s efforts to find important commonalities with those outsides its borders.  
The speaker refers to then President Nixon as being a “war maniac” who is 
“…running amuck to find a way out of their crisis at home and abroad in stepping up 
their maneuvers for aggression and war externally and intensifying their plunder and 
repression of the people internally.”265 The speaker frames U.S. aggression as being an 
external and internal force, which was a strategic challenge to U.S. claims of moral 
superiority on a global stage. I draw attention to the generality of the speaker’s language 
because it highlights how the rhetoric of the speaker is flexible enough to illustrate 
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support for the delegation and to bring in more potential alliances with other similar 
groups. I suggest North Korea’s welcoming message is strategically vague in order to 
illustrate goal to become a model for Third Worldism and how an alliance with the BPP 
would be central to that purpose.  
 Although the speaker does acknowledge that the BPP and the Black population 
are forced to endure the racial discrimination of the United States, the speaker does not 
elaborate on the conditions of this racial repression. Instead, the speaker focuses more on 
how “genuine freedom, liberation, and the right to existence” is a shared goal of the BPP 
and North Korea and what ultimately connects both parties. The speaker ends the 
greeting by demanding that the United States “…unconditionally and completely 
withdraw from South Korea without delay…”266 By making this demand in front of 
Cleaver and the Anti-Imperialism illustrates how North Korea valued this alliance to 
achieve their own political goals. The speaker indicates that North Korea wants Korean 
reunification to be achieved without foreign intervention or oversight and that the process 
should be “…settled by the Korean people themselves independently, on democratic 
principles…”267 The conditions for reunification outlined by the speaker emphasize the 
need for self-determination for the people of North Korea, thus rejecting interference or 
oversight by both the United States and their ally, the former Soviet Union.  
This vision of reunification is grounded in the logics of “relational geography” that was 
based on the perceived similarities of North Korea’s struggle against U.S. militarism and 
the liberatory politics of the BPP. North Korea struggled for reunification whereas the 
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BPP sought to eradicate black subjugation and in order to do so, American imperialism 
needed to challenged and eliminated as well.268 In both cases, American imperialism was 
marked as the key obstruction to these demands of self-determination and freedom.   
Sheila Hones and Julia Leyda define “relational geography” as the process of moving 
away from “viewing space as a kind of container…and toward the idea that is the acting 
and relating that literally produce space.”269 Instead of affirming the Cold War divide, both 
North Korea and the BPP challenged the superpower of the United States and the former 
Soviet Union. North Korea wanted to pursue reunification on their own terms and the 
BPP challenged the moral standing of the United States by critiquing the subjugation of 
Black Americans. In other words, both North Korea and the BPP imagined a world 
without the two global powers who were struggling for global domination.   
While in North Korea, Cleaver provides a similar statement of support, albeit 
longer and more detailed, expressing his affinity for the nation-state and its leader, Kim Il 
Sung. For example, Cleaver opines that if all the “oppressed and revolutionary peoples of 
the world” would follow the “…example of the heroic Korean people, led by the far-
sighted Genius-commander, the Ever-Victorious Comrade Kim Il Sung, then our program 
of PEOPLES’ DIPLOMACY will be a great success and U.S. imperialism will have 
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received a stinging and significant slap in its ugly piratical face.”270 Cleaver’s boisterous 
and colorful language is indicative of Cleaver’s valorization of Kim Il Sung and the 
DPRK. Cleaver’s admiration for Kim extends not only to the DPRK’s efforts to resist 
U.S. imperialism but also to “the revolutionary history of Comrade Kim Il Sung’s 
family—a family that had fought bravely for generations as true patriots of Korea.”271 
Cleaver and the delegation concluded that Kim’s “revolutionary heritage” had been 
“courageously planted and carefully nurtured so that he [would] be able to take on the 
glorious task of leading the Korean people down the road of liberation and revolution.”272 
Cleaver argues that because of this “revolutionary heritage,” Kim was able to predict the 
“impeding rise of Japanese militarism under the guiding of U.S. imperialism.”273 
Cleaver’s belief that Kim was born to be a revolutionary or his admiration of such a 
legacy represents Kim as the pre-ordained leader of the DPRK. The reader is not privy to 
the other facts of this history mentioned in the document which makes it difficult to 
identify the larger context of this narration so we do not know how Cleaver and the 
delegation came by this information and what ways. I suggest that these gaps are 
important to fill to understand the larger objective of narrating Kim as being a pre-
ordained leader of North Korea.  
Cleaver’s overzealous praise of Kim is an act of turning developing nations like 
North Korea into “heroic” countries. As “radical orientalism” details, radical activists, 
such as Cleaver, have disrupted the global hierarchies engineered by U.S. imperialism 
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and militarism, only to replace them with other hierarchies that solidify the power of 
leaders of the decolonizing movements in Asia. For instance, the BPP’s admiration of 
revolutionary leaders like Kim, Che, and Mao prompted leadership to include writings 
and teachings of these individuals into the organization’s newspaper, The Black 
Panther.274 In Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, Feminism during the 
Vietnam Era, Judy Tzu-Chun Wu uses radical orientalism to refer to the process of how 
some activists of the American Left used the idealized depictions of decolonizing Asia to 
create a new hierarchy in which the East was superior to the “denigrated West.”275 Wu 
contends that “the radicalness of their orientalism stemmed from how they invert and 
subvert [these] previous [West-East] hierarchies….”276  
As I noted above, another member of the BPP, Byron Booth joined Cleaver on his 
first trip to North Korea in 1969 for the International Conference of Revolutionary 
Journalists. Booth published an article detailing his experiences in the Panther 
newspaper, The Black Panther. Like Cleaver, Booth saw Pyongyang as the “future” that 
the BPP envisioned for its communities.277 North Korea had healthcare, free education, 
and a stable economy while “poverty, crime, and gun violence plagued the streets of 
Oakland.”278 In particular, the BPP believed that education would be central in combating 
the violence of white supremacy that controlled Black America.279 Of course, it must be 
noted that this perception of North Korea was the result of BPP members being led “on 
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strict government approved routes that maintained the façade of a workers’ paradise.”280 
Wu’s concept of radical orientalism can be used to identify how these romanticized 
portrayals ignored the “...dynamic societies undergoing complex, political, and military 
social changes.”281 In the case of North Korea, it could be argued that these ideal images 
cultivated by North Korean officials were central in building North Korea’s identity as a 
revolutionary nation-state and thus a model for other Third World nations that that seek 
revolution.  
I focus on the ideological value that Kim’s history and legacy provides to 
Cleaver’s effort in forging a global alliance between nations like the DPRK and the BPP. 
Regardless of the validity of Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary life, it provides a pathway for 
Cleaver and North Korea to solidify itself as a legitimate anti-imperialist nation. I argue 
that by focusing on Kim’s revolutionary background provided a tangible figure to relate 
to that could offer inspiration. In Illusive Utopia, Suk Young Kim contends that despite 
how “underverified” Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary legacy and his history of resistance is, 
it has been “…compensated for and reinforced” through different forms of North Korean 
artwork.  For example, the painting, Arduous March (Gonan-ui haenggun) depicts Kim 
leading a group of soldiers through the harsh winter landscape with the red Communist 
flag in which “…he assumes a vertically higher position as the unchallenged leader of the 
brotherhood…”282 Kim explains that little is known about the actual history of Kim Il 
Sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla movement and his revolutionary activities. However, 
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paintings like the Arduous March, are able to “…recover faithfully the undocumented 
part of his actual life.”283 Consequently, the depiction of the early years of Kim Il Sung’s 
life as the future “liberator of the Korean nation” remains in the “…liminal zone between 
and history, feudal past and present, and illusion and reality.”284 Cleaver builds upon the 
revolutionary history of Kim Il Sung (that was shared by his North Korean hosts) by 
explaining that the North’s attack of South Korea on June 25, 1950, which ignited the 
Korean War, “…would go down in history as the beginning of the downfall of the lying, 
murderous U.S. imperialists.” Cleaver expands the revolutionary narrative of Kim Il Sung 
beyond the Korean Peninsula, claiming that when Kim called for the Korean people to 
raise against their repressors, he was also calling for “…all of the oppressed and 
exploited masses of the world to begin their glorious struggle to smash forever the 
imperialist war makers, especially U.S. imperialists.”285 Although Cleaver does not 
provide evidence of Kim Il Sung’s concern with oppressed populations outside of the 
Korean peninsula, his recasting of Kim’s resistance from a national campaign to a global 
one was designed to make Kim Il Sung and DPRK relevant to the BPP and its supporters. 
In this case, the marking of U.S. imperialism as the central obstacle to freedom and 
liberation aligned North Korea and BPP towards a common target. This transnational 
alignment was grounded in the understanding that U.S. imperialism worked internally 
and externally to solidify its domination.  
In his statement on behalf of the Anti-Imperialist Delegation, Cleaver mentioned 
the murder of fellow party member, Fred Hampton, by members of the Chicago Police 
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Department. Cleaver writes that Hampton was shot while he slept, which demonstrated to 
him that the “…methods of terror and suppression are the same wherever the U.S. 
imperialists set foot and attempt to wipe out the righteous resistance and rebellion of the 
people.”286 This connection is similar to how the Civil Rights Congress conceptualized 
police brutality through the language of American imperialism as noted above. In this 
case, Cleaver connected U.S. persecution of Kim Il Sung to that of those in the BPP. In 
other words, American violence (whether through militarism or police brutality) has 
targeted marginalized communities of color—a commonality that binds North Korea and 
the BPP together in resistance and rebellion. Yet, at the same time, Cleaver’s glorification 
of Kim Il Sung felt heavy-handed and problematic in that the information on the life and 
history of Kim Il Sung was provided to him by North Korean officials. As noted by Suk 
Young Kim, the line between fiction and reality that holds together the revolutionary 
narrative of Kim Il Sung becomes blurred through its constant repetition, which Cleaver 
adds to with his own retellings.  
 During his visit, Cleaver vouched to enact what he considered to be the shared 
political objectives of Kim and the BPP’s. Cleaver promised that he and the delegation 
will “…re-educate the American people about a long forgotten chapter of their history; 
that chapter in which the Korean people were the first to bring the U.S. imperialists to 
their knees….”287 Also, Cleaver indicated that through this “re-education,” the American 
people will demand that the leave South Korea so it can be once again a self-determining 
nation. Cleaver explained that the BPP’s expression of solidarity with North Korea would 
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aid the BPP “…in strengthening our own revolutionary struggle.”288 As noted above, 
alliances with like-minded nations was important for the BPP in cultivating a global 
network of support and resources central in their struggle for freedom.  
 For North Korea, hosting these trips gave the nation-state an opportunity to 
showcase the modernization it was experiencing and thus offer “an alternative form of 
modernity, a socialist version that countered Western capitalism.”289 Judy Wu explains 
that the idea that socialist Asia was advancing past the West defied most Americans’ 
understanding of their country and the rest of the world.290 In the preceding chapters, I 
have shown that the construction of North Korea as being “stuck in time” has been used 
to demonstrate their interiorized difference and thus the necessity of removing them from 
the global community. In contrast, Cleaver’s trips showcased North Korea as 
experiencing a form of modernity that was not legible under a Western framework, 
thereby challenging the perception of a “stuck-in-time” North Korea.  
 In 1970, Huey Newton, one of the founding leaders of the BPP, was released from 
jail on bail, while Cleaver was abroad in North Korea. At that time, the BPP was in 
“disarray,” as key members like Seale and Hilliard were awaiting trial for different 
charges. Moreover, party chapters in the Eastern states were not heeding the direction of 
BPP headquarters in Oakland, and there had been various FBI informants, like Earl 
Anthony, who were disrupting BPP affairs.291 To reclaim his control over the Party, 
Newton focused on creating “survival programs” that addressed the everyday realities of 
the Black community. Newton’s new direction clashed with Cleaver’s, who still believed 
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in “picking up the gun.” Newton believed that “Cleaver’s profane, bombastic 
rhetoric…made the Panthers vulnerable to external repression and increased the influence 
of those more concerned with displays of bravado than with political organizing.”292 
Newton believed that Cleaver’s rhetoric was not achieving concrete political goals and 
was isolating potential supporters from the Black community. In “On the Defection of 
Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Panther Party and the Defection of the Black Panther 
from the Black Community,” Newton detailed the ways the Party had abandoned the 
Black community, and charged Cleaver with having forced such a betrayal. Newton 
explained that Cleaver’s “either-or” attitude about armed revolution pushed out 
community members because those who chose not to “pick up the gun” were deemed as 
“cowards” and thus had no place in the organization.293 Consequently, if there were no 
community, “...then there was no way that the Black Panther Party could make any 
revolution, for the record shows that the people are the makers of the revolution and of 
world history.”294 Newton’s accusations of division contrasted sharply to the work of 
solidarity that Cleaver claimed he was doing with Third World nations. As articulated by 
many scholars of the Black Panthers, divisions like the one between Newton and Cleaver 
may have been engineered by the efforts of COINTELPRO—an FBI initiative that sought 
to dismantle the Party through infiltration.  I bring up Newton’s charges against Cleaver 
in order to contextualize the following section which details Cleaver’s political shift, and 
the resulting perspective on North Korea. After Cleaver was forced out of the Party, he 
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settled in Paris with his family, but eventually grew restless because he had to remain 
under the radar due to his undocumented status. Cleaver’s departure from the radical 
spotlight would ultimately push him into a new political circle that contradicted his 
revolutionary beginnings.  
A Change of Heart: Eldridge Cleaver’s Public Conversions 
 
In this section, I detail the surrender and return of Cleaver to the United States, as 
told in his second autobiography, Soul on Fire. As noted by Kathleen Cleaver, his return 
was shrouded with suspicion because of Cleaver’s public conversion to Christianity, 
which he detailed as the motivating force behind his “sudden change of heart.” In Target 
Zero, Kathleen Cleaver writes that Eldridge Cleaver’s “sudden change of heart” to come 
out of hiding from Paris and return to the United States was “…so shocking that it fueled 
wild assumptions and rumors about a supposed ‘deal’ he’d struck with the FBI in 
exchange for his surrender.”295 She explains that “given the dark climate of deception and 
intrigue that cloaked that decade of war in Vietnam, no evidence was needed for these 
assumptions; suspicions became sufficient unto itself.”296 This section does not seek to 
prove or disprove these accusations but to contextualize Cleaver’s changed attitude 
towards North Korea.  
In 1975, before his surrender to U.S. authorities, Cleaver wrote, “Why I Left the 
U.S. and Why I am Returning,” an op-ed for the New York Times. Cleaver writes “lots of 
people believe I left because I preferred to go live in a Communist country, and that now, 
several years later, I find the grass [is] not greener on the Communist side of the 
                                                      
295 Kathleen Cleaver, “Foreword,” Target Zero, edited by Kathleen Cleaver (New York City: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2006) XXIII. 
296 Ibid. 
142 
 
 
 
fence.”297 He explains that even though “from Gov. Ronald Regan down, the politicians 
wanted me silenced,” he optimistically states that “a new fabulous new era of progress 
[was] opening up to the world” because of how the events of Watergate had “…opened a 
creative era for American democracy.”298 Cleaver argues that despite all its “faults,” the 
American political system “…is the freest and most democratic in the world.”299 
Cleaver’s public admiration for American democracy provides a sharp contrast to his 
condemnations of American imperialism, which he made less than ten years prior. 
Cleaver frames this “re-examination” of his politics as a duty that every American should 
fulfill, no matter their political beliefs.  
 In Soul on Fire, Cleaver writes: “I spent several months in North Korea in 1970, 
during which time Kathleen had our second child…Also, long enough to become 
thoroughly disenchanted with their brand of communism.”300 Cleaver confesses that in 
the first few days in North Korea, he wrote to members of the BPP to support the 
reunification effort of the Korean peninsula that was being headed by Kim Il Sung; 
however, what he didn’t report back was his “…increasing resentment over the 
brainwashing and unsubtle racism of North Koreans.”301 For example, Cleaver recounts 
how a female Japanese American member was treated by their North Korean hosts: “The 
hatred for the Japanese was profound and endless. The youngster from the West Coast 
caught it on both cheeks—first for being Japanese, second for being American. The 
Koreans were not friendly to her; they had limited capacity to express the international 
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solidarity of workers who were supposedly united.”302 Cleaver writes that by the end of 
the delegation’s tour of North Korea, the young Japanese American woman was “…ready 
for therapy or at least an exit visa from this paradise of liberation and truth. The poison of 
racism hit her where she least expect it; but then, that is the Communist style.”303 Cleaver 
portrays North Korea or more broadly, communism, as a two-faced force that cannot be 
trusted despite its claims of “liberation and truth.”  
 The Japanese American woman that Cleaver was referring to was most likely Pat 
Sumi, the only Japanese American woman in the delegation. In Radicals on the Road, 
Judy Wu writes about Pat Sumi’s experience in North Korea: 
Pat Sumi had experienced discomfort and embarrassment when exposed to 
the legacy of Japanese imperialism in Korea. She recalled feeling reluctant 
to speak Japanese with one of her North Korean hosts, because she did not 
want to evoke the experience of colonization. In the spirit of people’s 
diplomacy, her Asian host focused on the responsibility of the Japanese 
and American governments in carrying out the imperialist policies, not the 
guilt of the Japanese and American peoples.304   
 
In contrast to Cleaver’s claims of racial discrimination, Wu’s alternate telling of Sumi’s 
experience in North Korea acknowledges Sumi’s mindfulness that her presence could 
remind her North Korean hosts of Japanese imperialism. Second, this excerpt indicates 
North Korea’s willingness to forge critical forms of solidarity, regardless of the national 
origin or ethnic background of their allies.  
 Cleaver was not the only member of the BPP delegation to move away from their 
praise of North Korea. According to Judy Wu, other members of the BPP delegation 
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eventually “expressed skepticism toward the constant references to Kim Il Sung, who 
was credited for all the positive developments in North Korea.”305 It is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to determine the validity of these negative retellings of North Korea and 
its leaders. I argue instead that these later claims against North Korea should not be used 
to dismiss the potency of the earlier writings on North Korea. In the context of the Cold 
War, the alliance forged between the BPP and North Korea was valuable as a part of the 
global movements of decolonization and of the BPP’s struggles against U.S. racism and 
imperialism—so valuable, in fact, that it might have quieted any concerns over the more 
malevolent conduct of the people and leaders of North Korea. Based on the materials that 
I reviewed in chapter one and my reading of the archival documents in this chapter, I 
argue that in the American imagination, North Korea constitutes a malleable figure that 
can be invoked by different groups to support their seemingly divergent political agendas: 
to bolster U.S. claim of humanitarianism, as discussed in Chapter 1, or the global radical 
aspirations of the BPP, as reviewed here.  
The International Section of the Black Panthers in Algiers was shut down after 
three years in 1973. The relations between the BPP and the Algerian government 
“quickly deteriorated,” and the BPP became a “political liability” when officials acquired 
a lucrative liquefied gas deal with an American oil company.306 The breakdown of the 
alliance between the BPP and the Algerian government reflected a larger trend of 
postcolonial nations having to engage in building their countries economically after 
regaining independence. This shift revealed that “there were no clear-cut revolutionary 
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champions and capitalist villains;” and thus, the anti-imperialist alliances that were 
created earlier began to break.307 In the case of  North Korea, the “future” it had once 
offered was not as perfect anymore as the nation-state had its own prejudices that 
contradicted the BPP’s belief in racial equality as exemplified in the Pat Sumi incident.  
As for the BPP, a number of conflicts eventually led to the organization’s demise: 
internal struggles between Party leaders, government suppression like COINTELPRO, 
the restructuring of the organization to emphasize electoral political office, and the 
emergence of authoritarianism within party leadership.308  
Conclusion  
  
As reviewed above, the trips that Eldridge Cleaver took to North Korea have been 
written about and studied for multiple purposes. I contribute to this scholarship by 
highlighting how the transnational dimension of the Black Panther Party allowed for 
another narrative of North Korea to emerge, which differs considerably from how it is 
presently represented in the United States. The NKIDP provided materials that emphasize 
that during the Cold War, North Korea was considered a valuable ally in the global 
struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and militarism. Most importantly, these 
documents underscored the violence of American forces within Korea, which disrupts the 
construction of North Korea as a perpetual site of violence. While there is plenty of 
scholarship that brings attention to the violence of American militarism in North Korea, 
the materials in this chapter do so through a focus on anti-imperialistic alliances. 
Although North Korea was an ally of and received aid from the former Soviet Union, 
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Bruce Cummings argues that North Korea forged other international alliances to establish 
its independence from the former communist superpower.309 Thus, the knowledge 
produced out of the interactions between the BPP and North Korea did not contribute to 
the dyadic ideological formation of the Cold War.  
 The goal of this chapter was to bring attention to how North Korea’s struggles 
against American imperialism were grounded in the transnational practices of the U.S. 
Third World Left —a narrative that disrupts the U.S. mainstream construction of North 
Korea as the perpetual “hermit kingdom.”310 Instead, these archival materials demonstrate 
North Korea’s active engagement with the Third World through solidarity building and 
opening the country for activists like Eldridge Cleaver and Anti-Imperialist Delegation to 
witness the success of its revolution. As I have noted in the last section of this chapter, 
Cleaver’s awe and admiration of North Korea did not last. In Freedom Dreams: The 
Black Radical Imagination, Robin D.G. Kelley writes that “over time, the subjects of my 
books as well as my own political experience has taught me that things are not what they 
seem and that the desires, hopes, intentions of the people who fought for change cannot 
be easily categorized, contained, or explained.”311 In the face of uncertainty, Kelley 
challenges us to dream: “I’m not suggesting we wholly embrace their ideas or strategies 
as the foundation for new movements; on the contrary, my main point is that we must tap 
the well of our collective imaginations, that we do what earlier generations have done: 
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dream.”312 This chapter was not about focusing on the inconsistences of Cleaver’s 
comments about North Korea, but about recognizing the possibility of a different North 
Korea from the one circulated in American public imaginary.  
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Conclusion 
 
 On January 29, 2017, the Yonhap News Agency, a South Korean-based news 
outlet, reported that President Donald Trump’s Executive Order 13769—otherwise 
known as the “Muslim Ban”—was extended to North Korean refugees. The executive 
order suspends the North Korean Human Rights Act, which granted refugee status to 
North Koreans that have fled their homeland.313 North Koreans seeking refugee status 
would have to wait 120 days in addition the 18-24 month vetting process they must 
complete before entering the United States.314 Marcus Noland, who testified in the 
congressional hearings that were analyzed in the first chapter, criticized the Trump 
administration by writing: “One would think that encouraging defection and debriefing 
refugees for insights into an adversary would be a no brainer.”315 Here, Noland still falls 
into the narrative about the value of defection and refugees to the cause of the United 
States in collapsing their “adversary,” North Korea. LiNK (Liberty in North Korea) 
described the executive order as “unnecessary” and “unfortunate” in a public statement 
about the suspension.316 Both Noland or LiNK do not comment on the obvious illegality, 
anti-Muslim sentiment, or discriminatory character of the executive order—an oversight 
that keeps the United States unaccountable for its exercise of state violence towards 
Muslims and other refugee communities. I do not suggest that this omission is evidence 
of Islamphobia but instead how the North Korean human rights movement in the United 
                                                      
313 Jaeyeon Woo, “U.S. entry of N. Korean refugees put on hold by Trump’s executive order: report,” 
Yonhap News, January 29, 2017, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/01/29/52/0301000000AEN20170129000400315F.html 
314 Marcus Noland, “Trump Bans North Korean Refugees,” Petersen Institute, January 30, 2017, 
https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/trump-bans-north-korean-refugees. 
315 Ibid.  
316 Liberty in North Korea, LiNK Statement on the Executive Order on Immigration and Refugees,” 
link.org, February 1, 2017, http://www.libertyinnorthkorea.org/link-statement-executive-order-
immigration-refugees/. 
149 
 
 
 
States has turned a blind eye to the use of state power and violence. In particular, the 
ways in which the North Korean human rights movement has advocated the collapse of 
North Korea in the name of humanitarianism and human rights. However, in the current 
moment, American militarism has become front and center while the concern of human 
rights violations in North Korea has been pushed aside. 
 As I am writing, there has been a significant escalation of tensions between the 
United States and North Korea. Both countries are being led by leaders, who are willing 
to prove themselves with their military prowess. In 2017, North Korea has conducted six 
missile tests alone.317 The United States sent an aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to 
the western Pacific Ocean in response to the increase of North Korean missile tests. The 
USS Carl Vinson conducted tactical training drills with two Japanese destroyers.318 
Although military officials explain that the USS Carl Vinson was only passing through 
on their way to Australia for training, the aircraft carrier returned to the Western Pacific 
as a ‘prudent measure.’319 North Korean-state run media declared that the military 
threatens to destroy the aircraft carrier with a single strike.320 These events and its 
coverage in the American news media created an atmosphere of impending war between 
the United States and North Korea. But, how do we start a war that never ended?  
  “A New C(old) War: Molding North Korean in American Political and Cultural 
Discourse” illustrates the ways in which North Korea has been shaped to fight an old war, 
                                                      
317 Elizabeth McLaughlin and Luis Martinez, “A look at every North Korean missile test this year,” 
abcnews.go.com, April 28, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/International/north-korean-missile-test-
year/story?id=46592733. 
318 Junko Ogura and Susannah Cullinane, “North Korea threatens to sink US aircraft carrier,” cnn.com, 
April 24, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/23/politics/uss-carl-vinson-japan-us-drills/. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid.  
150 
 
 
 
the Cold War, under the cover of a new war, the war on terror. I examined how the 
language of terrorism and brutality has been used to construct North Korea’s interiorized 
difference and thus, renew the sovereign state as a current threat to American national 
security and the larger global community. The interior difference of North Korea has 
been further compounded by how its brutality has been extended to the North Korean 
people—a formation that illustrates the dialectical formation of humanitarianism and 
militarism that constitutes the common sense around North Korea in public and official 
U.S. discourse.  
 While the first chapter identified how the common sense of North Korea has been 
cultivated and circulated through the multiple and colluding circuits of the North Korean 
human rights movement , the next two chapters illustrate how this common sense has 
provided opportunities for other types of engagement. The second chapter examined how 
LiNK has played into the dominant discourse around North Korea but its Korean 
American members use their participation in the organization as an opportunity to deal 
with transgenerational memories of war, loss, and violence. The third chapter illustrates 
how the common sense of North Korea, in particular, was a reason for its culpability in 
the hacking of Sony Studios. These events allowed Margaret Cho to center a performance 
around North Korea and the subsequent backlash she received provided her a platform to 
critique the legibility of Asian American performers in popular culture. The final chapter 
explores how the travels of the Black Panther’s Eldridge Cleaver to North Korea in late 
1960s offered an imagination of North Korea that disrupts current dominant discourse but 
also how this construction provided a chance to envision liberation for the U.S. Third 
World Left. Ultimately, what brought these chapters together was each demonstrated how 
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North Korea is a malleable construction that can be shaped in varying directions to enable 
different conversations, affiliations, and visions to be had.  
 As noted in the introduction, this analysis relied on the field of Asian Studies to 
better understand the historical context of U.S and North Korean relations, the legacy of 
the North Korean refugee, and how scholars have critiqued the current North Korean 
human rights movement. The purpose of this engagement was to identify ways to bridge 
these conversations within the field of Ethnic Studies and Transnational Asian American 
Studies to illustrate how the process of racialization and the implications of the American 
empire within the domestic United States is central to understanding current U.S. and 
North Korean relations. In this moment of escalation, I argue that this interdisciplinary 
engagement is crucial to provide an alternative perspective that does not encourage war 
but instead offers a lens that considers the legacy of the American empire in Korea and 
the implications of that history for Korean Americans.  
 Also, the growing catalogue of cultural texts on North Korea that continue to 
circulate the narrative of North Korea’s interiorized difference requires analysis that 
challenges the legibility of this formation. For instance, at the 2017 Association of Asian 
American Studies Conference, I organized a panel with other scholars that discussed 
North Korea through a transnational Asian American perspective. The panelists were 
trained in a variety of fields: Literature, Sociology, and Ethnic Studies. In response to the 
conference’s theme of “care” we organized our conversation about how North Korea has 
been “cared” for through the language of humanitarianism and human rights. This panel 
was important to have in the field of Asian American Studies because it created an 
entryway point to think about the nation-state within the longer legacy of the American 
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empire and imperialism. I argue that this strategy is central to disrupt the narration of 
North Korea as a brutal dictatorship that seeks war with the United States but instead as a 
nation-state that may simply just want to defend itself against a world power that has 
steadily strangled its livelihood.  
 For this project, there were a lot of materials and sites I decided not to include for 
analysis such as: The Interview, Nodutdol, the organization that takes a critical stance 
against U.S. militarism in Korea, and studies conducted by the Bush Center on the 
settlement of North Korean refugees in the United States. The abundance of materials 
was a limitation of this project because it was difficult to incorporate everything into this 
dissertation in a coherent and concise manner. Instead of including as much as possible 
for this project, I focused on what materials work together to outline the underlying 
common sense of North Korea and how this dominant discourse has circulated that has 
resulted in different types of engagement.  
 In the future, I want to focus more on the role of Korean Americans on the issue 
of U.S. and North Korean relations. In order to do so, I want to examine a variety of sites: 
the presence of North Korean refugees in Korean American churches, Nodutdol, and 
documentaries that have been produced about North Korea from the perspective of 
Korean Americans. I suggest that by focusing on how Korean Americans have positioned 
themselves in relationship to North Korea or how have they decided to engage with the 
nation-state will be critical to explicate what types of knowledge is being produced to 
narrate North Korea from those that may consider the country as home.  
 The goal of this project was never to dismiss the variety of accusations that have 
been lodged about North Korea’s brutality, terror, or state violence. Instead, my questions 
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have always been: why are these accusations important to make? What is the value of 
these accusations? How are these accusations being used to justify the presence of U.S. 
militarism in Korea? Here, I have concluded that these accusations were important to 
make because the United States needed “evidence” to justify North Korea’s assertion into 
the War on Terror even though the nation-state has never committed terrorist attacks in 
the United States (neither did Iraq and Iran for that matter). These accusations were 
valuable because the War on Terror provided momentum and cover to continue to fight 
another war that still has not ended—the Korean War. The number of American military 
bases in South Korea and at the DMZ illustrates how war or the threat of war is used to 
maintain U.S. militarism in Korea. While the War on Terror continues target those that 
have been deemed “interiorly different” and thus a threat, North Korea has been shaped 
to fight this new imperial project.  
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APPENDIX 
The following was the questionnaire used for chapter two’s interviewees.  
Questionnaire:  
Why did you join the LiNK rescue team on campus?  
Does your ethnic background motivate you to join? 
As a Korean American, why do you think your participation may be uniquely important?  
In your opinion, how is North Korea regarded by the larger Korean American community 
or in particular, the older generation?  
 
How do you (and/or the rest of your rescue team) want to represent North Korea?  
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